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ARTICLES
WADA DRUG TESTING STANDARDS*
RICHARD H. MCLAREN**
I. INTRODUCTION
The recently completed Floyd Landis' decision represents the most
extensive and intensive examination to date of the laboratory procedures in use
in World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) accredited laboratories. Earlier cases
have challenged the testing procedures 2 as, for example, in erythropoietin
(EPO), 3 nandrolone, and homologous blood transfusions,4 but none match the
challenge in the Landis case, which went far beyond the testing methodology
for the detection of testosterone.
Originally delivered on September 28, 2007, at the National Sports Law Institute's annual
conference at Marquette University, which was titled "The Increasing Globalization of Sports:
Olympic, International and Comparative Law & Business Issues."
LL.M., London, 1972; LL.B., University of Western Ontario, 1971; H.B.A., University of
Western Ontario, 1968; Member of International Court of Arbitration for Sport; Chairman of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on Doping Control; Past Co-Chief Arbitrator for
ADRsportRED, a body dealing with Canadian sports at the national level; Past Chairman of the
Association of Tennis Professionals Anti-Doping Tribunal; Co-founder of Sport Solution, an athlete
advocacy association.
The author would like to acknowledge the assistance of his researchers to the development of
this paper. My thanks to Geoff Cowper-Smith, Sharon Kour, Alana Shepherd, and all of the Western
Law Class of 2009. Without their assistance, this paper could not have been wntten.
1. USADA v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 0084 06 (Sept. 2007) (majority opinion).
2. For a discussion of those challenges, see Richard H. McLaren, Revised or New Test
Procedures: What CAS Requires, 3-4 INT'L SPORTS L.J. 36 (2006).
3. Lazutina v. IOC, CAS 2002/A/370; Danilova v. IOC, CAS 2002/A/371; Lazutina v. FIS, CAS
2002/A/397; Danilova v. FIS, CAS 2002/A/398; Lazutina & Danilova v. IOC, Swiss Federal
Tribunal, 4P. 267/2002 (2003); Muehlegg v. IOC, CAS 2002/A/374. Danilova and Lazutina appealed
the CAS decision in the FT, Switzerland's supreme court, although they had been advised to suspend
their appeal until the conclusion of Lazutina's appeal of her FIS suspension. The appeal of the CAS
decision hinged on the fact that darbepoetin was not on the list of prohibited substances and that the
test used was not IOC certified. The appeal was dismissed. Lazutina was stripped of her Olympic
silver medal, although Danilova was permitted to retain the gold. Canadian Beckie Scott was
awarded the Olympic silver medal as a result of Lazutina's suspension.
4. USADA v. Hamilton, AAA No. 30 190 00130 05 (2005); Hamilton v. USADA & UCI, CAS
2005/A/884.
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The history of drug testing dates back nearly a century to 1928 when the
International Amateur Athletics Federation, now known as the International
Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF), banned the use of performance-
enhancing drugs, which at that time were all exogenous. The IAAF was the
first international federation to do so. This paper traces the recent history of
doping tests in sport and the issues arising from drug-testing standards
associated with the use of the "B" sample. The exploration of this history
culminates in a discussion of twenty-first century cases that have focused on
drug-testing standards and the methodology of testing for performance-
enhancing drugs. These cases highlight an interesting and ever more
sophisticated course of challenges to the increasingly technologically-
sophisticated anti-doping analytical arsenal.
II. DRUG TESTING STANDARDS FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1980S
The early 1960s to late 1980s book-ended a period where the apex in
testing for performance-enhancing drugs came with the announcement that
Ben Johnson, the Canadian 100-metre sprinter who smashed the world record
at the Summer Olympics in Seoul, had tested positive for the anabolic steroid
stanozolol. Never before had a marquee athlete been caught at a competition
and disgraced for engaging in the use of performance-enhancing drugs. It was
the marker event that set off the drug-testing trend still evident today. The
fallout in Canada was nothing less than overwhelming anguish and anger,
resulting in the most extensive inquiry into drugs in sport by the former Chief
Justice of Ontario, Charles Dubin.5 On the horizon, the forthcoming Major
League Baseball Inquiry under Senator George Mitchell will mark the next
chapter of self-examination by sport into the chemical warfare waged inside
the bodies of athletes.
In the wake of a series of doping related scandals and deaths in the 1960s,
sports authorities and nations alike finally stepped up to the challenge in the
form of a more thorough intervention to prevent the use of performance
enhancing substances. In 1965, France and Belgium each passed anti-doping
laws in sport.6 A few months later in 1966, the IAAF made a decision to
subject athletes to random doping tests at all future track-and-field
competitions taking place at the Olympic Games or European
5. DUBLIN COMM'N, CANADA, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE USE OF
DRUGS AND BANNED PRACTICES INTENDED TO INCREASE ATHLETIC PERFORMANCES (1990).
6. Jan Todd & Terry Todd, Significant Events in the History of Drug Testing and the Olympic
Movement: 1960-1999, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT: THE POLITICS OF DRUGS IN THE OLYMPIC
MOVEMENT 67 (Wayne Wilson & Edward Derse eds., 2001).
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Championships. 7 That same year, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
formed the IOC Medical Commission. 8  The Medical Commission
promulgated the first formal rules for Olympic competition in the form of IOC
Medical Commission Anti-Doping Rules that were applied for the first time at
the Winter Olympic Games in Grenoble, France, in 1968.
Even in light of these new measures, the scandals continued. It seemed
that each time testing authorities amplified their efforts, a new doping agent
appeared or the accused athlete's positive sample was simply ignored.
Unsatisfactory chain-of-custody procedures9  and unreliable testing
methodology' 0 resulted in both false positives and false negatives. This made
it extremely difficult to put forth watertight cases. The result was that some
competitors were gaining an unfair advantage by altering their physiology by
means of chemical manipulation. In essence, athletes were playing the doping
game far more adeptly than the testers and not getting caught. One athlete was
quoted boasting that "when they get a test for that [new doping substance]
we'll find something else. It's like cops and robbers."]' I
Sample collection and laboratory testing procedures had to be
standardized and regimented to counter this seemingly irreverent attitude that
doping athletes displayed toward the testing process. Sports authorities with
anti-doping programs required that the laboratories adhere to documented
procedural standards for collection and testing. One of the landmarks of this
push towards stricter procedure was the IOC's recognition in 1977 of a need
for the accreditation of designated testing laboratories. 12  The IOC
requirements for accredited laboratories eventually became the de facto
standard for even non-Olympic sports testing laboratories.13 Of the numerous
procedural requirements that would be formalized through anti-doping
programs, one in particular has become a noticeable source of controversy-
the "B" sample test. The purpose of this confirmatory test was originally to
verify the initial adverse finding before an athlete's appointed delegates. 14
This purpose, however, may have changed over the past three decades. The
motivation behind the requirement of this test may have now
metamorphosized over the years from scientific necessity to psychological
7. Id. at 68.
8. DRUG CONTROVERSY IN SPORT 26 (R.S. Laura & S.W. Wute, eds., 2005).
9. ROBERT VOY & KIRK DEETER, DRUGS, SPORT, AND POLITICS 78 (1991).
10. Id. at 77.
11. Todd & Todd, supra note 6, at 69.
12. Id. at 76.
13. BARRIE HOULIHAN, DYING TO WIN 155 (2nd ed., 2002).
14. DRUG CONTROVERSY IN SPORT, supra note 8, at 28.
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crutch and has now become an athlete's right. It also appears that the "B"
sample test may be used for little more than grounds for procedural tactics in
the ensuing arbitration-for both the accused 15 and accuser. 16
Where exactly the "B" sample requirement of the testing process had its
origins is difficult to pinpoint. Unreliable doping tests were perhaps the initial
motivation for the "B" sample confirmation test, and so the origin may have
been at the beginning of the 1960s. In the early days of testing in the 1960s
and 1970s, laboratory technology was relatively unsophisticated and tests were
based solely on the analysis of the athlete's urine sample. This single line of
analysis often provided unreliable results. 17 At the time, it appeared that the
testers were wary of announcing a positive test due to the potentially
destructive impact the allegation would have on the athlete's career. Scientists
were reluctant to provide potentially inaccurate results as evidence used to fuel
a fire. 18 They were also concerned that the legal system might overturn
laboratory results and were only willing to expose the laboratory to the legal
system if there was certainty of a favourable outcome, preferably the
confirmation of a positive test.
Given the poor accuracy of early laboratory testing techniques, the "B"
sample emerged as the reasonable solution. Completed in front of various
scientific, legal, and athletic delegates of the impugned athlete's choosing, the
"B" sample test allowed for a level of certainty that had heretofore been
absent. Since the athlete's hand-picked representatives were allowed to
observe the process, "B" sample testing procedures made it more difficult to
15. A case in point may be the recent one of Marion Jones. Jones is a U.S. sprinter who won five
medals at the Sydney Summer Olympics. Her "A" sample was positive for EPO in late June 2006 at
the U.S. Track and Field Championships. However, she was cleared two-and-a-half months later,
when her "B" sample came back negative. In October of 2007, Jones admitted to having lied to a
federal agent about her past steroid use. A screening for EPO in a sample needs to be completed
within a few days of acquisition in order to be reliable. The long delay between the "A" and "B"
sample tests could have been the reason the "B" sample was sufficiently deteriorated to prevent
confirmation. See further discussion of the Marion Jones case infra IV.A.iii.1.
16. See USADA v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 0084 06 (Sept. 2007). In Landis, there were seven
frozen "B" samples from other stages of the Tour de France aside from the sample taken at the 17th,
where he had tested positive. Id. In an interlocutory award, the arbitration panel indicated that the
remaining "B" samples could be tested by Carbon Isotope Ratio (CIR) testing using an IRMS
instrument to determine if there was any exogenous testosterone present in the retained "B" samples.
The accompanying "A" samples, which related to the seven frozen "B" samples, had never been
subjected to the CIR test because in the initial screening of all prohibited substances the T/E ratio had
not exceeded 4:1, the ratio which is the trigger point when a CIR test would normally be performed.
Four of the seven results revealed exogenous testosterone and were used by USADA as collaborative
evidence to rebut shifting burdens under the cycling anti-doping rules.
17. Michele Verroken & David R. Mottram, Doping Control in Sport, in DRUGS IN SPORT 334
(David R. Mottram ed., 3d ed. 2003).
18. VOY & DEETER, supra note 9, at 79.
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dispute the positive "A" sample test. Any allegations by the athlete that the
testing procedures were inadequate would be subject to rebuttal in arbitration
proceedings, since the presence of the athlete's representative at the "B"
sample test allowed the athlete the opportunity to record and dispute
inadequate testing techniques at the scene of the test itself. The "B" sample
test also provided the testers assurance that the initial findings were
scientifically correct. At that early stage of anti-doping development, the
procedural requirement of the "B" sample was more a function of the
unreliability of laboratory testing techniques than of the athlete's right to
review. In 1977, the IOC Medical Commission Chair, Prince de Merode,
commented that in the future, the "B" sample test would be automatically
performed, 19 implying that the "B" sample test would be performed regardless
of the athlete's stance, if for no other reason than to ensure reliable test results.
The future of the "B" sample was solidified.
Today, the "B" sample survives, partially because impartial peer review
was not, and is not even today, a formal component of the testing process.
This is one of the flaws of the integrity of testing programs. 20 The "B" sample
requirement provides an informal process comparable to formal peer review.
Although the athlete's own experts cannot perform the testing procedures
themselves for reasons of perceived conflicts, they can keep a watchful eye
over the entire process, assuring the athlete that no step was skipped and no
result was reached unfairly from the standpoint of methodology. This
informal "peer review" made test results harder to dispute, as the athlete had
taken part in the review process. The prescribed method for the collection and
handling of the "B" sample is found in the International Standard for Testing
v. 3.0.21 Section C.4 prescribes the requirements and method of urine
collection, including the steps required to create "A" and "B" samples. The
"A" and "B" samples are created from the same batch of urine as excreted by
the athlete at a certain point in time.22 The onus is on the athlete to ensure that
testing equipment is sealed and that seals have not been tampered with. 23 The
19. Todd & Todd, supra note 6, at 72.
20. David L. Black, Doping Control Testing Policies and Procedures: A Critique, in DOPING IN
ELITE SPORT, supra note 6, at 31.
21. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, THE WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: INTERNATIONAL
STANDARDS FOR TESTING 1 (3d ed. 2003), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/
document/testing.v3_a.pdf.
22. Id. at Annex C, art. 4.13.
23. Id. at Annex C, art. 4.4. On the point of the onus, see CCES v. Adams 2007 (Sports Dispute
Resolution Centre for Canada), available at http://www.adrsportred.ca/resource-centre/pdf/English/
NR-387788.pdf.
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athlete is also to retain control of all samples until they are sealed.24 This
measure provides the athlete assurance that samples are correctly identified
and that no contamination could have occurred without the athlete's
knowledge before sealing. However, the fact that the athlete controls the
samples places greater burden on the athlete to prove the source of an adverse
analytical finding (AAF), especially where the athlete is alleging possible
contamination. With increased protection of the athlete's right comes a
greater burden of proof in arbitration proceedings following an AAF.
The "B" sample has always served as reassurance to the athlete with
regard to the identity of the urine sample. The athlete is able to confirm that
the urine sample is the sample given by the athlete and that the sample was not
tampered with. The athlete has the ability to compare and confirm that the
number stenciled in the glass of the sample bottle corresponds to the one on
the athlete's copy of the doping control form. The "B" sample, if handled
properly with impeccable chain-of-custody documentation, allows the athlete a
modicum of confidence in the testing process.
III. ENTER GAS CHROMATOGRAPH/MASS SPECTROMETRY TECHNOLOGY
Testing technology has evolved to the extent that test results are rarely
incorrect. 25 On this basis, it has been argued that the original purpose of the
"B" sample has lost relevance. No longer is there a significant worry about
the gross unreliability of testing techniques. Under these circumstances, one
has to wonder why the "B" sample is really required at all any more.
Technology has improved by leaps and bounds over that which existed in the
1970s and 1980s. The breakthrough moment in anti-doping testing was the
1983 Pan-American Games, where the power and reliability of new techniques
was demonstrated.
This event saw the official introduction of gas chromatography/mass
spectrometry technology, which was capable of identifying performance-
enhancing substances through urine samples in quantities as low as one part
per billion.26 The result of the technology was that twenty-one medals were
stripped for doping violations, including eleven gold medals. Scores of
athletes decided to not even bother competing. 27 Some athletes may have
even purposefully diminished their performances to avoid reaching the
24. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, supra note 21, at Annex C, art. 4.5.
25. R. Craig Kammerer, What Is Doping and How Is It Detected?, in DOPING IN ELITE SPORT,
supra note 6, at 20.
26. VOY & DEETER, supra note 9, at 88.
27. Id. at 85-86.
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podium, as they would then have been required to provide a sample. 28
The sensitivity of the gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry technology
brought the fight against anti-doping to a new level. 29 False positives and
false negatives are no longer a result of unreliable equipment and
methodology, so much as simple human error. By this point, the "B" sample
was no longer required to confirm that scientific testing methodology worked
as it should, but rather existed in order to provide a further control against
human error in the testing process.
In 2003, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) became the recognized
governing body over doping in Olympic sport as well as a majority of
international competitions. A press release in 2002 illustrated WADA's
position on the purpose of the "B" sample. WADA Director General David
Howman explained that the "B" sample was intended to protect the rights of
athletes by confirming a positive test. He explained further that the
confirmation procedure was used to protect individuals.30 This indicated that
by this point, the "B" sample testing process had moved away from scientific
need to the protection of the athlete's rights. Furthermore, the knowledge that
a positive finding will have to be replicated before a critical audience provides
an added push to make sure the process is completed in accordance with all
the rules.
IV. CHALLENGING THE TESTING METHODOLOGY
The initial reaction to testing by athletes alleged to have used a
performance-enhancing substance was to attack the procedural aspects of the
testing regime. Tactics included challenging the chain-of-custody and the
methodology of sample collection. Today, the challenges lay more and more
28. Id. at 85.
29. In a note to the author dated 20 September 2007 from Dr. Francesco Botre, the Director of
the WADA accredited laboratory in Rome, Dr. Botre advised as follows:
[T]he reliable and correct identification of a specific compound required the
development of highly specific methods, in order to distinguish a synthetic steroid
from an endogenous one, naturally present in the body. The success was achieved
by a combination of specific procedures for the pretreatment of the sample with the
availability of bench top "GC/MS" stations, i.e. instruments in which a gas
chromatographer (GC), that is an instrument that allows to separate the components
of a complex mixture, is interfaced to a mass spectrometer (MS), that is a detector
by which is theoretically possible to identify any substance, provided a reference
compound is available.
Letter from Dr. Francesco Botre, Dir. of the WADA accredited laboratory in Rome, to author (Sept.
20, 2007) (on file with author).
30. World Anti-Doping Agency, WADA Clarifies B-Sample Procedure, Nov. 22, 2006,
http://www.wada-ama.org/en/newsarticle.ch2?articleld=3115361.
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in the scientific methodology of drug testing. Attacks on the scientific
methodology of various doping control tests have included calling into
question the reliability of specific testing methods and have sparked changes
in testing to keep up with the latest doping methods used by athletes. An
athlete can call both the substantive and the procedural scientific aspects of
drug testing into question because of the continuously evolving nature of the
testing, where tests for substances like nandrolone and testosterone have been
improved or new tests have evolved to identify blood transfusions, use of
EPO, or even designer steroids like THG. As science progresses and testing
procedures are refined, new information can be used to rebut existing testing
procedures.
A. Substantive and Procedural Challenges: Doping Methods Examined
i. Erythropoietin
Erythropoietin (EPO) is a hormone that naturally occurs in the body and
stimulates the production of red blood cells. Pharmaceutical EPO was
developed in the late 1980s to treat anemic and critically ill patients. As a
performance-enhancing agent, EPO is used by athletes to increase stamina and
aerobic capacity, primarily in endurance sports such as running, cross-country
skiing, cycling, and triathlon. There are several types of synthetically
produced EPO, including recombinant EPO (rEPO), which is produced by
splicing the human EPO gene with cultured animal cells, and darbepoietin,
which is produced by a similar process, but uses a specially engineered EPO
gene sequence. Naturally produced EPO is referred to as endogenous or
urinary EPO (uEPO).
The IOC Medical Commission banned the use of EPO as a performance-
enhancing substance in the early 1990s. In some cases, an athlete has a
naturally-occurring high red blood cell count that could skew the EPO test
results, and the athlete will have to demonstrate this with a series of
confirming tests that measure the relative concentrations of red blood cells in
the body. The presence of rEPO or darbepoietin in an athlete's body is
indicative of its intentional administration of the substance because these
synthetic forms are not naturally produced in the body. The evolution of the
testing procedure for EPO illustrates the constant cops-and-robbers game
between athletes that are one step ahead of the testing methods and
laboratories struggling to produce scientifically viable procedures to detect
them. The newly-developed tests are often subject to scientific attacks from
athletes challenging AAFs in these developing areas, such as EPO.
In 2000 following the Sydney Olympic Games, EPO testing was first
[Vol. 18:1
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introduced by the Laboratoire National de D~pistage du Dopage (LNDD), and
the new test was adopted as the laboratory standard. The test was
revolutionary in that it could purportedly distinguish between naturally
occurring hormones present in the athlete's urine and synthetic pharmaceutical
EPO. This "direct urine" test for EPO was used together with an indirect
blood test. First, the laboratory would conduct an indirect blood test as a
preliminary screening method, and if it suggested possible use of rEPO, the
laboratory would then conduct a direct urine analysis. The direct urine test
consists of several individual procedures. Essentially, rEPO and uEPO are
separated based on their differing electrical charges by examining an image
called an electropherogram. Endogenous uEPO molecules occupy a range in
the central region of an electropherogram, and synthetic rEPO occupies the
basic range of an electropherogram. Though the two forms can overlap on the
image, it is usually readily observable whether or not rEPO is present in the
sample. To account for the potential overlap between rEPO and uEPO,
interpretation criteria were developed. In the early cases dealing with EPO, it
was primarily these interpretation criteria that were contested by athletes.
The first case dealing with the validity of rEPO testing was that of the
Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Meier v. Swiss Cycling.31 The CAS
Panel in Meier established that the direct urine test could be applied to
distinguish rEPO from uEPO and was valid in determining an AAF. Meier
was the first athlete convicted of a doping offense based on the new direct
urine test. Subsequently, in UCI v. Hamburger,32 CAS examined the
interpretation technique of the 80% basic area percentage method (BAP) 33
method used by the laboratories. Though the laboratory in Hamburger was
not required to use the BAP standard, it elected to do so in its analysis of the
"A" sample. Though his "A" sample satisfied the 80% BAP standard, his "B"
sample fell just short of the acceptable range. This rendered the initial AAF
inconclusive, and Hamburger was exonerated.
The BAP method of interpreting EPO tests was challenged in IAAF v.
31. Meier v. Swiss Cycling, CAS 2001/A/345.
32. UCI v. Hamburger, CAS 2001/A/343 (2001).
33. The basic area percentage (BAP) method of interpreting the EPO test was described as
follows in IAAF v. MAR & Boulami, CAS 2003/A/383:
[O]ne of the 100% r-EPO control samples is used to establish a horizontal dividing
line ... drawn at the bottom of the most acidic rung of the 100% r-EPO sample....
The EPO ladder of the athlete urine sample in question is then examined relative to
the horizontal baseline .... [A] machine then measures what percentage of the
surface area of these rungs appears above the horizontal baseline in the basic area of
the gel.
This percentage figure is the BAP. It is one of several methods of interpreting the electropherograms
although in the early testing days it was the predominant method.
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Boulami34 and USADA v. Sbeih,3 5 and was ultimately rejected by CAS in
USADA v. Bergman.36 Bergman, an American cyclist, was charged with a
doping offence by USADA though both his "A" and "B" samples were below
80% BAP range. The CAS Panel held that the 80% BAP range was never
absolutely required for a conviction and that recently developed tests also
suggested that Bergman's samples were positive. CAS, in holding that the
80% BAP was not required, found that the Panel merely had to be satisfied
that the risk of a false positive was at an acceptably low level so as to establish
the doping offense. The current WADA testing procedure for EPO is
described in the technical document TD2004EPO, 37 which eliminates the 80%
BAP threshold for interpreting rEPO tests.
1. "Active" and "Effort" Urine
In addition to challenging interpretation procedures, athletes have called
attention to rare phenomena that alter the profile of endogenous forms of
uEPO. The case of Bernard Legat called attention of the anti-doping
community to the previously unrecognized "active urine" phenomenon, and
Rutger Beke's case elucidated what is now known as the "effort urine"
phenomenon. These two recently recognized phenomena describe situations
in which the spontaneous restructuring of chemical compounds found in an
athlete's urine in rare circumstances can skew EPO test results.
The active urine phenomenon was first publicized in the case of Kenyan
middle distance runner Bernard Legat. Legat's "A" sample tested positive for
rEPO in 2003 prior to a competition, and his "B" sample, tested a month later,
exhibited the active urine phenomenon. Legat was subsequently exonerated.
It was recognized in his case that the active urine phenomenon may occur in
limited circumstances where the sample is stored at high temperatures,
contains enzymatic activity, or is subject to bacterial contamination. 38 The
presence of one or more of these factors could change EPO molecules in such
a way that they would not appear on the test results as they normally would,
thus creating the potential for a false positive result. Subsequently, the EPO
34. IAAF v. Boulami, CAS 2003/A/452.
35. USADA v. Sbeih, AAA No. 30 190 001100 03.
36. USADA v. Bergman, CAS 2004/0/679.
37. See WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD-ANTI DOPING AGENCY TECHNICAL
DOCUMENT TD2004EPO: HARMONIZATION OF THE METHOD FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF EPOIETIN
ALFA AND BETA (EPO) AND DARBEPOIETIN ALFA (NESP) BY IEF-DOUBLE BLOTTING AND
CHEMILUMINESCENT DETECTION 1 (2004) (hereinafter TD2004EPO).
38. See HANS HElD, REPORT OF B-SAMPLE TESTING IN THE LABORATORY OF PROF. W.
SCHANZER, INSTITUTE OF BIOCHEMISTRY, GERMANY, SPORT UNIVERSITY, COLOGNE (2003),
available at http://www.letsrun.com/2003/lagatfull.doc.
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testing procedures were refined to include an additional "activity test" to
screen for the active urine phenomenon, the procedure for which is also
described in WADA Technical Document TD2004EPO.
39
Belgian triathlete Rutger Beke tested positive for EPO in September 2004
and was suspended from competition by the Flemish Disciplinary
Commission. He was reinstated to competition after he successfully argued
before the Commission in 2005 that his test results had been skewed by an
internal process that changed EPO molecules following intense physical
activity. This is now known as the "effort urine" phenomenon. In order to
explain this newly recognized phenomenon was indeed occurring in his
sample, Beke was subjected to vigorous testing with Belgian scientists. They
discovered that Beke suffers from proteinuria, where unusually large amounts
of protein are excreted in his urine during intense exercise. This could cause
the EPO antibodies to bind to unrelated proteins and skew the test results.
This is similar to the effort urine phenomenon that has been recognized by
WADA in connection with nandrolone testing, as discussed below. Effort
urine is a developing area of inquiry within EPO testing that likely only
applies to very few athletes who display existing medical conditions similar to
Beke's.
2. Salt Lake Developments
EPO testing took a dramatic turn during the Salt Lake City Winter
Olympic Games of 2002. The testing procedure for EPO was altered during
the course of the Games as CAS heard the famous cross-country skiing
trilogy40 of cases dealing with a brand name synthetic version of EPO.
Darbepoietin is a wholly synthetic version of rEPO that was referred to by the
brand name Aranesp. The manufacturer designed the substance to be readily
detectable through a simple visual test free of the possible interpretation
problems associated with testing other forms of rEPO.
The first two cases of the trilogy dealt with Russian cross-country skiers
Larissa Lazutina and Olga Danilova and were heard simultaneously by CAS.
The Lazutina and Danilova cases challenged the validity of the new test based
on the fact that the detection of darbepoietin had not been legally or
scientifically accepted, and that the existing test for rEPO should not be
applied for the detection of darbepoietin, a different substance. CAS rejected
these arguments in favour of the testimony of expert scientific witnesses in
39. TD2004EPO, supra note 37.
40. Lazutina v. 1OC, CAS 2002/A/370; Danilova v. 10C, CAS 2002/A/371; Lazutina v. FIS,
CAS 2002/A/397; Danilova v. FIS, CAS 2002/A/398, Swiss Federal Tribunal, 4P. 267/2002 (2003);
Muehlegg v. lOC, CAS 2002/A/374.
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
support of the test. Notably, CAS found that the existing test for rEPO could
be applied to the detection of darbepoietin completely unaltered. For this
reason, the test results for Lazutina and Danilova were upheld by CAS.
The third case in the trilogy was that of Spanish cross-country skier
Johann Muehlegg, who also tested positive for EPO during the Salt Lake
Games. Muehlegg's defense expanded on that of Lazutina and Danilova and
was heard by a different panel than the first two. Muehlegg challenged the
classification of darbepoietin as a prohibited substance, and this was rejected
as darbepoietin was considered an analogue of a prohibited substance, and was
thus prohibited itself. Muehlegg also argued that the Salt Lake City laboratory
lacked the accreditation to perform the test at the time Muehlegg's sample was
tested. CAS determined that the lack of accreditation was not prohibitive of
the laboratory's testing for darbepoietin during the Games, so long as it was
established to the satisfaction of the Panel that "the testing procedure ... was
in accordance with the prevailing standards and practices of the scientific
community." CAS examined the existing scientific scholarship on the subject
and determined that the test as it was performed did fulfill this requirement.
Muehlegg finally challenged the test based on its ongoing development and
the lack of specific thresholds. The athlete claimed that these factors showed
that the test was unreliable as it was still in a trial stage. CAS also rejected
these final arguments as the test reliably established Muehlegg's use of
darbepoietin regardless of whether or not objective thresholds were used or the
test was still being refined.
3. Current Trend: Negative "B" sample
Apart from faulty testing procedures, the short half-life of EPO could be to
blame for a recent trend of negative "B" samples. Synthetic EPO has a short
half-life, and delays in the testing of a "B" sample following a positive "A"
sample for EPO could allow the degradation of EPO over time to the point
where it is no longer present in any significant quantity in the sample.
There are a handful of examples in which the "B" sample's negative
results have exonerated an athlete after an initial adverse analytical finding for
EPO. The most recent high-profile case is that of American sprinter Marion
Jones, who tested positive for EPO in 2006. Jones, a five-time Olympic
medalist at the Sydney 2000 games, had been implicated by the press in the
BALCO scandal through the involvement of her coach, Trevor Graham.4 1 She
was also under suspicion of doping based on her ties to Ben Johnson's former
41. Mark Fainaru-Wada, Graham Admits BALCO Role, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Aug. 23, 2004,
at D5, available at http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/chronicle/archve/2004/08/23/
SPGK88CPARI .DTL.
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coach and admitted drug-provider, Charlie Francis, as well as her former
partners C.J. Hunter and Tim Montgomery, both of whom have admittedly
used performance-enhancing drugs. Victor Conte, founder of BALCO,
claimed to have provided Jones with illegal substances, and C.J. Hunter
claimed to have witnessed her using them. At the time, Jones adamantly
maintained that she did not use performance-enhancing drugs. Jones' "A"
sample taken at the USA Track and Field Championships on June 23, 2006,
tested positive for EPO. The results of the "A" sample test were leaked and
reported in the Washington Post.42 Jones withdrew from the next upcoming
meet in Switzerland citing "personal reasons." On September 6, 2006, Jones'
"B" sample tests came back negative. The leak, combined with Jones'
exoneration through "B" sample testing, was widely viewed as a blow to
public perception of the reliability of drug testing. That perception may have
been damaged even further when, in October of 2007, Jones testified before a
U.S. District Court judge that she had lied to federal investigators about her
past steroid use and admitted having used them until at least 2002. The price
she paid was personal bankruptcy from the legal costs of fighting the charges
and forfeiture of all medals and awards she received since September 1, 2000,
including her five medals won at the Sydney Olympics.
Bernard Legat, a Kenyan-born U.S. distance runner, tested positive for
EPO in Tubingen in August 2003. Legat, competing for Kenya at the time,
was encouraged to withdraw from subsequent competitions by Athletics
Kenya, who decided to keep the test results confidential until the "B" sample
testing was complete. The results of the "A" sample tests, however, were
leaked to the press before "B" sample testing was initiated. The results of the
"B" sample were released a month after the "A" sample, with a negative
finding. Legat then brought legal action against the IAAF for lost earnings,
but was denied an award.
Additionally, cyclists Fabrizio Guidi, Massimo Strazzer, and Bo
Hamburger-as described above-along with Spanish track gold medalist
Juan Llaneras, have been acquitted of doping with EPO due to negative "B"
samples. Triathletes Virginia Berasategui and Ibdin Rodriguez were also
acquitted when "B" samples from the Ironman Lanzarote 2005 were deemed
unusable after WADA changed the testing criteria in the middle of the
challenges to the AAFs. Olga Yegorova was eventually exonerated from
charges of EPO doping when her "A" sample tested positive for EPO at a
Paris meet in July 2001, at which she won the 3000 metre event. Paris
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officials neglected to take a blood sample from her at the time that would
corroborate the positive result. Though the results of the positive test were
leaked to the press, she was allowed to compete because the laboratory could
not corroborate its findings.
The history of EPO testing examined along with the current challenges it
presents shows the ongoing tension between athletes pushing the boundaries
of doping, scientists developing reliable methods, and governing bodies
searching for consistency and accuracy. Testing for EPO has been scrutinized
since its inception in 2001 and will likely continue to be until the science in
the area ceases to evolve. Allowing multiple, discrete challenges to testing
methodology through CAS is an inefficient and prohibitively expensive way to
refine the scientific and legal aspects of an emerging area such as EPO.
ii. Nandrolone
Nandrolone (19-nortestosterone) is an anabolic androgenic steroid used to
enhance performance through the building of muscle mass. It is a prohibited
substance under the WADA Code. Nandrolone precursors such as 19-
norandrostenedione, 19-norandrostenediol, and norethisterone are commonly
available as athletic supplements and are also prohibited substances.
43
Precursors, once ingested, can be metabolized into nandrolone and utilized by
the body in the same manner as nandrolone. The use of nandrolone in sport
was banned by the IOC in 1976.
The test procedure for nandrolone was originally based on the premise that
there was no endogenous production of nandrolone in the human body.44 The
major metabolite of nandrolone is 19-norandrosterone (19-NA). It was
initially thought that 19-NA was not produced endogenously in the body.
Based on this premise, the presence of 19-NA in a sample, in any amount, had
indicated the administration of a prohibited substance. However, in 1996,
with the introduction of gas chromatograph/mass spectrometery (GC/MS)
technology that could detect even minute quantities of substances such as 19-
NA, it was quickly realized that low concentrations of 19-NA could be
produced endogenously. 45 Published scientific studies later confirmed the
43. The 1OC Medical Code Prohibited Class of Substance under anabolic agents (class C) was
expanded to include these substances as of January 31, 1999. See IOC MEDICAL CODE (Jan. 1999 &
Supp. 2000); EXPERT COMM., NANDROLONE REVIEW (2000) (report to UK Sports Council by
Professor Vivian James, chairman of the Expert Committee, in January of 2000) (hereinafter
NANDROLONE REVIEW); UK Sport, http://www.uksport.gov.uk.
44. As discussed in Bernhard v. ITU, CAS 1998/222, 10.
45. Id.
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endogenous production. 46 The endogenous production of 19-NA was first
recognized in pregnant females, 47 but eventually it was determined that
endogenous 19-NA could be produced in males as well. 48 As the scientific
understanding of 19-NA grew, guidelines emerged, developed by various
laboratories such that a positive result would not be reported unless the
concentration of nandrolone in a urine sample exceeded set levels.49 When it
was found that nandrolone could be produced endogenously in the human
body in small amounts, the discovery resulted in the implementation of a
threshold for the substance in testing standards.50
In 1999, UK Sport established the Nandrolone Review Group in response
to an increased number of athletes testing positive for nandrolone. More
recently, a spate of positive tests for nandrolone in the track and tennis
communities has prompted anti-doping bodies to re-examine testing
procedures. The legal challenge came when Greg Rusedski, a British tennis
player, argued that the Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) acted in a
hypocritical manner in exonerating a series of tennis players after their AAFs
showed the use of nandrolone. Rusedski's argument revolved around Bohdan
Ulihrach, a Czech player who, along with six other unnamed players, was
cleared when the ATP admitted the possibility that trainers could have been
handing out tainted supplements. 51 It was argued that Rusedski's AAF carried
the same analytical fingerprint as the seven previous cases. Rusedski was
46. B. Bizec, F. Monteau, I. Gaudin, & F. Andre, Evidence for the Presence of Endogenous 19-
Norandrosterone in Human Urine, 723 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY B: BIOMEDICAL SCI. & APPLICATIONS
157-72 (1999).
47. Y. Resnik, M. Herrou, L. Dehennin, M. Lemaire, & P. Leymarie, Rising Plasma Levels of
19-Nortestosterone Throughout Pregnancy: Determination by Radioimmunoassay and Validation by
Gas Chromatography-Mass Spectrometry, 64(5) J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY & METABOLISM
1086-88 (1987).
48. Bizec et al., supra note 46, at 157-72.
49. These guidelines, which established thresholds for the presence of 19-NA, were initially set
out in 10C MEDICAL COMM'N SUBCOMMITTEE, ANALYTICAL CRITERIA FOR REPORTING Low
CONCENTRATIONS OF ANABOLIC STEROIDS (Aug. 1998). They can be found as an appendix to
NANDROLONE REVIEW, supra note 43; see also UK Sport, http://www.uksport.gov.uk. These
guidelines had the nature of a recommendation addressed to the IOC laboratories and did not
constitute a legal rule. See Bernhard, 11.
50. For scientific papers recognizing human production of nandrolone in small quantities, see
Bizec et al., supra note 46, at 157-72; L. Dehennin, Y. Bonnaire, & P.J. Plou, Urinary Excretion of
19-Norandrosterone of Endogenous Origin in Man. Quantitative Analysis by Gas Chromatography-
Mass Spectrometry, 721 J. CHROMATOGRAPHY B: BIOMEDICAL SCI. & APPLICATIONS 301-07 (1999).
To view WADA's detection limits for Nandrolone, see WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD-
ANTI DOPING AGENCY TECH1NICAL DOCUMENT: REPORTING NORANDROSTERONE FINDINGS 2
(2004) (hereinafter REPORTING NORANDROSTERONE FINDINGS).
51. Rusedski Cleared, Mar. 10, 2004, BCC SPORT, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/
hi/tennis/3547917.stm.
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exonerated in 2004, and his challenge has diminished the integrity of the anti-
doping testing process. The challenge this time was a legal one. Without the
advanced technology required to match chemical fingerprints, Rusedski's legal
argument would have failed. This is a prime example of advancing scientific
standards increasing the stakes in the war against doping.
As a result of the series of positive findings for nandrolone, tests on
commonly available supplements were also performed by the IOC at the IOC
accredited laboratory in Cologne under the supervision of Dr. Wilhelm
Schanzer. These tests found that a significant number of available
supplements were contaminated with nandrolone. It was possible, therefore,
for athletes to ingest nandrolone while using a supplement that was not
prohibited. Warnings were issued to athletic associations to inform athletes of
the possibility of ingesting nandrolone even when using non-prohibited
supplements. The warning from the IOC shifted the legal burden to the athlete
to ensure that the athlete did not inadvertently ingest nandrolone. This
buffered the IOC's position, allowing anti-doping authorities to pursue doping
athletes even where the defense alleged is that of "no fault"-in this case, the
IOC's warning establishes that the athlete should have been aware of the
possibility of nandrolone content in allowed supplements. The Cologne
findings do not change findings of guilt or innocence, but do place the degree
of guilt into some context. 52 As a result of the Cologne study, athletes such as
UK runner Mark Richardson, who had been previously found guilty of doping
with nandrolone, have been reinstated by the IAAF. 53
Further controversy surrounding nandrolone has arisen around a particular
study that has found that nandrolone metabolites may be produced even
without the ingestion of nandrolone. Professor Ron Maughan at Aberdeen
University found that athletes using allowed dietary supplements that did not
include nandrolone as an ingredient produced higher concentrations of
nandrolone metabolites in their urine when combined with vigorous exercise,
stress, and dehydration. Thus, it was shown that nandrolone metabolites could
be produced without the ingestion of nandrolone. This was termed "active
urine phenomenon." The University of Aberdeen study is the only study that
has resulted in this finding. The study has been criticized for using too small a
control group to produce accurate results. It was discounted by an IAAF
arbitration panel for a variety of scientific reasons, as well as the fact that
Professor Maughan was not independent-he subsequently participated in the
UK Athletics disciplinary committee that favoured track athletes Linford
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Christie, Dougie Walker, and Gary Cadogan who had tested positive for
nandrolone. The athletes claimed that nandrolone could be produced under
circumstances of high stress, vigorous activity, and the ingestion of certain
food supplements. The bans on these athletes were later reinstated by the
IAAF. 54 Despite the flaws that this argument has displayed, athletes have not
been prevented from forwarding it in doping arbitrations. It is unlikely that
arbitration panels will look favourably on this argument, given that it has
already been discounted by an IAAF panel.
The threshold for nandrolone remains a rule under the WADA Code. The
2006 WADA Prohibited List clearly states that an AAF with respect to 19-NA
will be considered to be proof of exogenous origin of the metabolite. The
threshold for reporting an AAF for 19-NA is 2 ng/mL. The original limit for
women was 5 ng/mL, but this has recently been reduced and is now 2 ng/mL,
as it is for men.55 This accounts for the established finding that natural
occurrence of nandrolone peaks at 0.2 ng/mL in men and 0.6 ng/mL in women
due to the use of birth control and other allowed medications. Despite the
clear acceptance by CAS of the 2 ng/mL threshold for 19-NA, athletes
continue to challenge that limit. In addition to arguing that the threshold is
simply unreliable, athletes have also asserted that certain factors such as
intense exercise can cause temporary production of nandrolone over the
allowable limit. Other athletes have made challenges alleging errors in the
way that the concentration of nandrolone metabolites is reported and
calculated.
The nandrolone issue is wrought with controversy. Any attempt at
infusing the field with clarity is welcome. However, the "B" sample fails to
offer that clarity. Assuming that the reportable threshold for 19-NA can be
disputed as being inaccurate, the athlete gains no legal protection from the
testing of the "B" sample, as the levels of 19-NA in both the "A" and "B"
samples should not differ if testing methodology is effective since nandrolone
is not known to deteriorate as quickly as EPO. The testing of the "B" sample
thus solely serves to confirm the "A" sample finding. Unless the "A" sample
was subject to improper procedure resulting in a false positive, correct
handling by laboratories in accordance with the International Standard for
Laboratories should result in no benefit to the athlete from the existence or
testing of the "B" sample.
54. Walker to Fight on, BBC SPORT, Aug. 22, 2000, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/
sport2/hi/scotland/891340.stm.
55. These limits with respect to an Adverse Analytical Finding for 19-NA are set out in
REPORTING NORANDROSTERONE FINDINGS, supra note 50. The change to the limit for 19-NA in
females occurred in August 2004, the effective date of the Technical Document.
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iii. Human Growth Hormone
One of the most controversial performance-enhancing substances in sport
today is human growth hormone (HGH). Doping authorities believe that HGH
is abused on a wide-scale, and the testing methodology has yet to be
established definitively. HGH appears to have been used by athletes for
decades and was first banned by the IOC in 1989.56 Research did not produce
the first potentially useable screening process until a blood test was introduced
by WADA at the 2004 Summer Olympic Games in Athens.57 Yet, after
approximately 300 athletes 58 were tested at the Games for the hormone, not a
single test was reported to be positive. There has never been a positive test
reported at any other major sporting event where testing for HGH has been
implemented.
WADA has explained the lack of positive results to be a function of the
time the blood sample is taken in relation to the time of administration of
HGH. Testing for HGH is most likely to be reliable when the sample is taken
without warning and out-of-competition. 59 Indeed, it appears that the window
for the detection of HGH is extremely small. Oliver Rabin, WADA's Director
of Science, admitted that the current blood test for HGH can only detect
synthetic HGH in an athlete for approximately two days after injection. 60 The
short window of opportunity explains the slew of negative findings for HGH
at the Athens games. Since athletes were aware ahead of time that WADA
planned to test for the hormone at Athens, HGH users had merely to
discontinue its use two or more days before arriving at the Olympic Village.
HGH was also screened for at the Turin Games with no positive results
reported. Doubts about the reliability of the current HGH blood test will
continue until a conclusive test can be developed.
In the summer of 2007, Sydney's Garvan Institute of Medical Research, a
WADA-supported facility, announced a new HGH test. Like its predecessor,
the test is performed on a blood sample but differs in that it identifies protein
markers triggered by abuse of the hormone rather than the presence of a
synthetic version of HGH. WADA hopes to use the test in conjunction with
56. Drug Testing; Doping Test Expected for Athens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2003, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9BO2EODD 153BF932A I5752C IA9659C8B63.
57. World Anti-Doping Agency, Q&A: Human Growth Hormone Testing, http://www.wada-
ama.org/rtecontent/document/QA-hGH-En.pdf.
58. Blood Fuels Feud over Growth Hormone Testing in American Team Sports, INT'L HERALD
TRIB. (Paris), Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articIes/ap/2007/02/01/sports/NA-SPT-
US-HGH-Testing.php.
59. World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 57.
60 Blood Fuels Feud over Growth Hormone Testing in American Team Sports, supra note 58.
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the one already in play in order to increase the probability of detecting the
illegal administration of synthetic HGH. 61
Some professional sports not under WADA jurisdiction have recognized
HGH as a performance-enhancing substance and have accordingly banned it.
However the enforcement of such a ban is little more than a smoke screen.
The National Football League (NFL) and Major League Baseball (MLB), for
instance, have decided to embrace a urine-sample test for HGH rather than the
one currently in use and sanctioned by WADA.62 However, the overriding
problem with a urine sample test for HGH is that no effective urine test
actually exists. According to Don Catlin, the Chief of the WADA-accredited
laboratory at UCLA, an effective urine test is years away.63 Furthermore,
numerous international scientific experts maintain that the most effective way
to test for HGH is by way of blood sample, reasons for which lie in the fact
that the HGH concentration in urine is less than one percent of that found in
blood. 64 MLB has been under pressure to pass more stringent anti-doping
measures to protect the credibility of the league. MLB is looking into using a
blood test developed by WADA as it becomes commercially available-likely
in late 2007.65 The test was used on a limited basis at the 2004 Summer
Olympics and the 2006 Winter Olympics.
It appears that testing for HGH in both Olympic and professional sport
may not be a deterrent to an athlete's use of the substance at all. The WADA-
sanctioned blood test is only effective within two days of administration of the
hormone, and the urine test supported by professional sport is utterly
unreliable. Since, to date, no athlete has been reported to have been using
HGH as result of in-competition testing, if athletes are using HGH on the
wide-scale basis they are believed to be, then the testing programs have
failed.66 Consequently the HGH ban is actually enforced only as a matter of
conscience and ethic on the part of the athlete.
61. New Test to Detect Human Growth Hormone May Catch Doping Athletes Experts Say, INT'L
HERALD TRIB. (Paris), June 18, 2007, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/06/18/
sports/EU-SPT-Human-Growth-Hormone.php.
62. Blood Fuels Feud over Growth Hormone Testing in American Team Sports, supra note 58.
63. Id.
64. World Anti-Doping Agency, supra note 57.
65. Bob Nightengale, Baseball on HGH. "We're Doing Everything We Can, " USA TODAY,
Sept. 19, 2007, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/2007-09-13-baseball-hgh-
policyjN.htm.
66. However athletes have been caught either in possession of or acquiring HGH.
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iv. Blood Doping
Blood doping is a prohibited method under the WADA Code. 67 In
addition to EPO, synthetic oxygen carriers and blood transfusions are
performance-enhancing doping methods banned by WADA. Synthetic oxygen
carriers are proteins or chemicals that have the ability to carry oxygen, and
like EPO, increase stamina and aerobic capacity in athletes when utilized by
the body. There are two types of blood transfusions used for doping:
autologous transfusion of one's own blood and homologous transfusion of
blood from a compatible donor. Tests for both synthetic oxygen carriers and
homologous blood transfusions were introduced by WADA in 2004.
Homologous blood transfusions are detected by measuring surface markers on
blood cells that are unique to each person.
The test for homologous blood doping was developed by Dr. Michael
Ashenden's team at Science and Industry Against Blood Doping and
implemented at the 2004 Tour de France. The test includes a method called
flow cytometry, where cells are shuffled through a detection-tube and a laser is
used to identify antigens that have been marked with fluorescent dye. Blood
from a single person will show an inherent antigen set, while the transfusion of
blood from any other person will result in a test with more than one "spike."
A positive test for homologous blood doping results where a significant
number of different markers exist and are shown on paper as different
"spikes." 68  WADA is currently developing testing procedures to detect
autologous blood transfusions.
The flow cytometry test is sensitive, yet the potential for false positives
exist. 69 The test uses polyclonal serum containing antibodies that react with
several minor blood antigens. Polyclonal sera are less specific than
monoclonal sera and may detect different substances. The result is a wider net
cast, but also a larger ratio of false positives. Laboratories have moved to the
use of monoclonal sera for commercial test, resulting in a more specific test,
but also run the risk of false negatives, since monoclonal sera do not attach as
well to antibodies as the polyclonal variety. A more accurate test would
involve the testing of mitochondrial DNA instead of surface antigens. This
test has yet to be developed for use in the fight against anti-doping.
67. WORLD ANTI-DOPING AGENCY, WORLD ANTI-DOPING CODE: THE 2007 PROHIBITED LIST
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD 1 (2006), available at http://www.wada-ama.org/rtecontent/document/
2007ListEn.pdf.
68. M. Nelson, M. Ashenden, Langshaw, & H. Popp, Detection of Homologous Blood
Transfusion by Flow Cytometry: A Deterrent Against Blood Doping, 87 HAEMATOLOGICA 881
(2002).
69. M. Nelson, H. Popp, K. Sharpe, & M. Ashenden, Proof and Homologous Blood Transfusion
Through Quantification of Blood Group Antigens, 88 HAEMATOLOGICA 1284-95 (2003).
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Further criticism of the flow cytometry test at the point it was
implemented by anti-doping bodies included the fact that the Haemotologica
article reported results on a very small set of tests and required further testing
if results were to be considered accurate enough for use in anti-doping
enforcement. Legally, however, WADA is adamant that the athlete is
protected. WADA states that there must be "a distinct peak for two different
markers on the histograms before it is concluded that a blood sample contains
a mixed population of RBCs." 70 In normal medicine, only a single peak with
a shoulder or tail is necessary to indicate that there are mixed populations of
RBCs. Thus, the standard is higher in anti-doping testing than in normal
medical testing.
Tyler Hamilton, a U.S. cyclist, tested positive for homologous blood
doping at the 2004 Olympics, then again at the 2004 Vuelta de Espana. The
initial AAF at the Olympics failed to result in a confirmed doping case
because of the deterioration of the "B" sample. The "B" sample had been
frozen, resulting in an unusable sample that could not be tested to confirm the
findings of the "A" sample. The incident was an example of the "B" sample's
potential to clear athletes from liability should due process not be followed.
The "B" sample cannot implicate an athlete although it holds the potential for
the athlete's exoneration.
In the 2004 Vuelta de Espana time trials, Hamilton again tested positive
for homologous blood transfusion. This time, the "B" sample findings
confirmed the initial AAF, and Hamilton was suspended by an AAAICAS
tribunal. At the arbitration proceedings, Hamilton's team questioned the
accuracy of the tests and procedures as well as Ashenden's test itself.71 The
argument was rejected, although one of the panelists held that WADA had
failed to accurately document the risks of false positives in the Ashenden
blood test. WADA was criticized by the arbiter for not relying on objective or
verifiable standards with regard to the issue of false positives.72 Although
Hamilton was ultimately suspended for doping, the criticism of WADA as
raised during his arbitration remains relevant. The athlete's ability to raise
arguments based on science and technology will be carefully considered by
arbitration panels and may impact the ultimate finding of guilt or innocence.
The science behind an AAF is rebuttable. In this case, the athlete challenged a
thirty-year-old test to no avail. Still, the potential for a successful rebuttal
70. USADA v. Hamilton, AAA No. 30 190 00130 05 (2005); Hamilton v. USADA & UCI, CAS
2005/A/884.
71. USADA v. Hamilton, AAA No. 30 190 00130 05 (2005); Hamilton v. USADA & UCI, CAS
2005/A/884.
72. USADA v. Hamilton, AAA No. 30 190 00130 05 (2005); Hamilton v. USADA & UCI, CAS
2005/A/884.
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argument by the athlete does exist.
Cycling has been the sport most plagued by allegations of blood doping.
The recent Tour de France has resulted in a rash of positive tests from various
cyclists. From his sample taken in July 2007 after stage thirteen of the Tour
de France, Alexander Vinokourov of the Astana Team tested positive in both
his "A" and "B" samples for homologous blood transfusion. Vinokourov
challenged the testing procedures of the laboratory that handled the sample
testing (LNDD), particularly the flow cytometry instrument that the laboratory
had used. Vinokourov's team withdrew from the competition after his
teammate Andrej Kashechkin also tested positive for homologous blood
transfusion. Vinokourov was subsequently fired from Astana. 73 While it is
unknown how Vinokourov will challenge the findings at the point this paper
was written, representatives have stated that the rider has denied doping and
believes that the blood anomalies in his body were the result of his crash a
week prior to the test. 74 Thus it seems that the rider will challenge the fault
requirement, rather than the science behind the test.
V. THE PENULTIMATE CHALLENGE
The Landis case is the high water mark to date of a case challenging the
laboratory testing process not just in its methodology, which athletes certainly
have challenged in relation to EPO, nandrolone, and blood transfusion, but
also on the basis of the scientific procedures practiced in the laboratory itself.
Landis challenged the analytical procedures and process of the laboratory as
measured against the requirements set out in various technical documents
produced by WADA.
The screening test for testosterone involves the use of the GC/MS test to
determine levels of testosterone and epitestosterone in order to calculate a
ratio. If that ratio exceeds 4:1, then a further test, taking two days and as much
expense as testing of the entire Prohibited List, is carried out using carbon
isotope ratio analysis. In the Landis case the majority of the Panel determined
that the international standard for testing75 had not been complied with in the
analytical chemistry steps taken by the testing laboratory. As a consequence,
it was found that the presumption in favour of the laboratory result was
73. Astana Fires Kashechkin After "B" Sample Tests Positive for Blood Transfusion,
USATODAY.COM, Aug. 13, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/cycling/2007-08-3 1-
277911670_x.htm.
74. Tour de France Will Go on Despite Latest Doping Bombshell, ESPN.COM, July 25, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/oly/tdf2007/news/story?id=2947358.
75. See WORLD-ANTI DOPING AGENCY, WORLD-ANTI DOPING AGENCY TECHNICAL
DOCUMENT TD2003IDCR: IDENTIFICATION CRITERIA FOR QUALITATIVE ASSAYS - INCORPORATING
CHROMATOGRAPHY AND MASS SPECTROMETRY 1 (2003).
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rebutted and the burden to show that breach did not cause the AAF shifted to
the prosecuting agency, USADA. Since there was no evidence to refute the
breach of the rules, the T/E ratio aspect of the doping allegation was dismissed
in the Landis case. 76
The Landis team of legal experts also carried out an extensive attack on
the analytical chemistry steps taken by the testing laboratory in using its
GC/C/IRMS instrument and testing procedure to determine that there was an
AAF for exogenous testosterone. There was a wide range of challenges to the
steps, and some breaches of international standards were found to have
occurred. 77 In the Panel's view, the difference with this test was that even
though the presumption in favour of the laboratory was rebutted, there was
evidence to indicate that the breach of the standards did not cause the AAF.
This was largely due to the fact that the Tour de France is a stage race and
seven other urine samples had been provided by Mr. Landis during the race.
While there were no more "A" bottles with urine for those seven samples
because the laboratory had used up the urine on the screening analysis, 78 there
did remain in the freezer the companion "B" samples. In an interlocutory
award, the Panel did not preclude USADA from having these seven samples
analyzed. The results of those analyses showed that a further four of the seven
"B" samples contained exogenous testosterone. These tests were not flawed
by the same analytical procedures for there was a strong and experienced team
of scientists representing Mr. Landis present when the testing of the "B"
samples was carried out. Furthermore, the parties had agreed to the extraction
of the electronic data files and the re-running of that data under the supervision
of the Panel's scientific expert, Dr. Francesco Botre. The results of this re-
running of the data files, including re-analysis on the most updated IRMS
software, confirmed the original results. Thus, with the testing of the "B"
samples and the re-running of the prior results, there was evidence to confirm
that the breaches of the international laboratory standards had not caused the
AAF. If they had done so there would have been an acquittal.
VI. CONCLUSION
The WADA-accredited laboratories have always been targets in the anti-
doping defense of athletes. This is not surprising since they generate the
evidence that is presumed to establish an anti-doping rule violation. While the
scientists and the laboratories have continuously improved their techniques, as
76. USADA v. Landis, AAA No. 30 190 0084 06, 172-73 (Sept. 2007) (majority opinion).
77. See id. 225.
78. It is a standard procedure in most WADA accredited laboratories to not do any IRMS
analysis unless the T/E ratio exceeds 4:1. See id. 1 174.
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this paper outlines, they continue to be tested as to the reliability and validity
of their testing procedures. The scrutiny of the laboratories reached a new,
higher plain with the Landis case in that the testing methodology was not the
primary challenge. Instead, the analytical chemistry procedures were alleged
to be flawed. This new sphere of engagement is costly but apparently has
some validity, for the WADA-accredited laboratory did not emerge from the
Panel's decision with a clean bill of health and an unscathed reputation.
A STUDY OF DIVISION I ASSISTANT






Collegiate athletics has become big business in America, generating
billions of dollars each year. Division I-A' football and men's basketball are
among the most popular sports in America, and they are the revenue
generators in collegiate athletics. Central Broadcasting Systems (CBS) and
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) are currently under an
eleven-year, $6 billion contract for the television broadcast rights for the
NCAA Men's Basketball Tournament.2 Fox is paying $330 million for the
right to broadcast the Fiesta, Sugar, and Orange Bowls from 2007-2010 and
the right to broadcast the college football national championship games from
2007-2009. 3
With so much money spent on collegiate football and men's basketball, it
appears that successful programs in these sports offer universities an
opportunity to generate significant revenue. The collegiate athletic programs
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1. The terms "Division I" and "Division I-A" will be used interchangeably in this article.
Division I-A refers to the top division in collegiate football; whereas, Division I is the top division in
collegiate basketball. There is no Division I-A in collegiate basketball.
2. Steve Wieberg, When NCAA Games Are on the Line, so Are Big Bucks, USA TODAY, Mar. 21,
2006, at IC.
3. Larry Stewart, Fox Lands BCS Deal for $330 Million, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2004, at D4.
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that generate the most revenue are usually those with powerhouse football
programs. In 2005-2006, the five schools generating the most revenue were
Ohio State, Texas, Virginia, Michigan, and Florida, in that order.4 However, it
is debatable whether winning programs really earn universities more money or
provide them with other tangible benefits. As of 2001, only 40 of 117
Division I athletic programs reported that their athletic departments were self-
sufficient.5 Regardless, every school strives for successful programs, and in
recent years, most Division I schools have significantly increased their athletic
spending as they attempt to achieve success. From 1995-2001, spending on
Division I intercollegiate athletics increased about twenty-five percent, while
general university spending increased only about ten percent after inflation.6
The heart of any successful collegiate athletic program is good coaching.
In order to create and maintain winning athletic programs, schools need the
best coaches they can hire. Coaches are vital to the success of the athletic
program in every aspect. They are responsible for coaching the team and
ensuring the success of the student-athletes on and off the field. The coaches
also recruit the athletes, and the talent of the recruited athletes obviously has a
direct correlation to the on-field success of an athletic program.
Head coaches receive most of the credit and criticism for the success of an
athletic program or the lack thereof. Head coaches are the face of each athletic
program, and they are well compensated for the high-pressure and high-profile
positions they hold. Numerous Division I football and men's basketball
coaches earn over $1 million per year. For example, some of the top earning
men's basketball coaches include Florida's Billy Donovan, Marquette's Tom
Crean, and North Carolina's Roy Williams, who make approximately $3.5,
$1.65, and $1.6 million per year respectively. 7 In college football, salaries are
even higher with at least fourteen head coaches making $2 million or more per
year, including four coaches who earn over $3 million per year.8 College
football coaches' salaries recently reached a new plateau with Nick Saban
4. College Athletic Programs Ranked by Revenue, SPORTS BUs. J., June 4, 2007, at 18.
5. MaryJo Sylwester & Tom Witosky, Athletic Spending Grows as Academic Funds Dry Up,
USA TODAY, Feb. 18, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2004-02-18-
athletic-spending-coverx.htm.
6. Id.
7. Andy Katz, Donovan, Magic Work Out End of Fleeting Relationship, ESPN.COM, June 7,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2895999; Robbi Pickeral, $2M Question: Where
Does Cash Come From?, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Apr. 12, 2006, at Cl; Todd Rosiak,
Crean Gets Extension: He'll Guide Eagles Through 2016-'17, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 20,
2006, at C1.
8. Bill Vilona, Alabama's $32 Million Man, PENSACOLA NEWS J., Jan. 4, 2007, at IA; Highest
Earning College Football Coaches of 2006-07, COLLEGESPORTSREPORT.COM, Sept. 3, 2006,
http://www.dopke.com/ArchivesPages/Coaching-Changes?DIACoachesComp2006.htm.
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agreeing to a contract with the University of Alabama that will pay him $4
million per year.9 Some of the other highest paid football coaches include
Urban Meyer ($2 million), Tommy Tuberville ($2.231 million), and Steve
Spurrier ($1.75 million).'0 However, it is important to remember that these
salary figures include the coaches' entire compensation "package," which is
further defined in Section III of this article. In addition to base salary, the
package includes fringe benefits, outside income opportunities, and various
perquisites. In addition to their lucrative contracts, head coaches also usually
have lengthy contracts that provide them many legal protections.
While a head coach is the centerpiece of an athletic program, assistant
coaches are also critical to the success of the program. Assistants perform
numerous functions. For example, West Virginia assistant football coach
Jeffrey Casteel's contract provides a list of ten duties, which includes
coaching, budget administration, travel coordination, recruiting, media
interviews, marketing of the football program, student-athlete discipline,
tracking student-athlete academic progress, and compliance with NCAA,
conference, and university rules." Head coaches need competent assistants
whom they can trust. Without quality work from top-notch assistants, athletic
programs cannot be successful.
In recent years, there has been increased recognition of the importance of
good assistant coaches. Pay to assistants has increased, and many assistants
are now given written contracts that provide them some legal protections.
However, many assistants still do not receive the recognition and protection
they deserve. Their skills are crucial for the athletic program and the
university as a whole, yet many do not receive adequate legal protections.
Many assistants are highly paid employees in a volatile industry, and
therefore, they should have written employment contracts that provide
sufficient legal protection. Even those assistants who are not highly paid
should receive a written employment contract because the continuity of their
jobs is still very uncertain.
This article will identify the current legal rights and contract protections of
Division I-A football and men's basketball assistant coaches regarding many
important aspects of their employment, including compensation, perquisites,
incentives, outside income, form of contracts, term of contracts, and
termination provisions. This article will also explain what changes should be
made to improve the legal rights and contract protections of assistant coaches.
9. Vilona, supra note 8.
10. Highest Earning College Football Coaches of 2006-07, supra note 8.
11. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN WEST VIRGINIA UNIVERSITY AND JEFFREY A.
CASTEEL (June 30, 2005).
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Finally, this article will illustrate why all assistant coaches should have written
contracts that resemble the written contracts usually given to head coaches.
The information in this article was derived from a study of assistant
coaches' contracts. The contracts and other information used for the study
were received through public universities' responses to open record requests.
Open record requests can be made for any government documents that are
available for public review. Because coaches at public state universities are
state employees, their contracts are available for review through open record
requests. Generally, contracts for coaches at private schools are not available
for public review. Therefore, all of the contracts included in this study are
from public universities.
The information came from fifty-three schools representing ten of the
eleven conferences with Division I-A football and men's basketball.' 2 All of
the schools included in the study compete in football and men's basketball at
the Division I-A level. Most schools provided information for both sports;
however, some did not. Additionally, some schools do not have written
employment contracts for some or all of their assistant coaches.
The open record requests were made during 2006 and early 2007. The
information in this article reflects what was contained in those contracts and
the other materials received in response to the open record requests.
Additionally, this article includes information derived from newspaper articles
and various other sources. Note that some of the information might no longer
be accurate. For example, some coaches may have received new contracts
and/or pay raises since we received this information. Other coaches might no
longer be in the positions reflected herein. Regardless, all of the information
reflects assistant coach employment information for the last two years and is
current enough for purposes of this article.
II. ASSISTANT COACH COMPENSATION
Quality assistant coaches are in high demand in collegiate athletics, and
the salaries paid to football and men's basketball assistant coaches have risen
rapidly in recent years. Coaches' salaries have also increased at a much faster
pace than sports revenues at universities. Average coaching compensation at
Division I schools increased eighty-nine percent from 1997 to 2003, while
sports revenues rose only sixty-six percent during the same period.' 3 The
12. No contracts or other information were received from Mountain West Conference schools.
13. Curtis Eichelberger, Coaches' Pay Surge Roils Colleges: $230,000 to Train Runners,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 29, 2005, http://quote.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid ifea&&sid-
aC2XHZdyzqN8#.
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inflation of assistant coaches' salaries at some universities has been even more
dramatic. Current Purdue University (Purdue) head men's basketball coach
Matt Painter earned $190,000 during the 2004-2005 season, while he was still
an assistant coach under Gene Keady.' 4 His $190,000 salary marked a 154%
increase from the $74,880 Purdue paid its top assistant in 2000.15 Former
University of Texas A&M defensive coordinator Carl Torbush earned
$250,000 for the 2004 season, which was an eighty-five percent increase over
what Texas A&M had paid its top assistants only five years earlier.' 6
Assistant coach salaries have skyrocketed because top assistants are being
pursued like never before, and therefore, head coaches and universities are
forced to outbid the competition in order to assemble high quality coaching
staffs and retain their coaches.' 7  The competition for assistant coaches
includes other universities and professional teams. Some top assistants make
lateral moves, taking the same or similar assistant coaching positions at other
universities that offer increased compensation. For example, Mack Brown
persuaded Gene Chizik to join his staff at Texas in January 2005.18 Chizik
made the move from Auburn to Texas because Brown offered "him a
$295,000 salary and the title of assistant head coach."'19
Assistant coaches are also leaving their positions to take head coaching
positions at other universities. Being a head coach is likely the ultimate goal
of most coaches; consequently, it is difficult for a university to retain an
assistant who has been offered a head coaching position. Additionally, the
coach will usually be compensated significantly better as a head coach, even if
the coach is moving to a smaller program. It has become difficult for coaches
at top programs to retain their top assistants because the smaller Division I
programs have come calling to hire these assistants as their head coaches.
Tom Izzo, the men's basketball coach at Michigan State University (MSU), is
a prime example of this. In twelve years as the head coach at MSU, Izzo has
seen six assistants move on to head coaching positions at other Division I
programs.20
If assistants are not lost to other universities, programs still face the




17. David Jones, Assistants Striking It Rich, FLA. TODAY, May 26, 2005, at D1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Jeff Shelman, Understated Izzo Spawns Underrated Coaches, ESPN.CoM, Nov. 9, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2216439&type=story.
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coaches search for assistant coaches in the collegiate ranks. Moving on to
become an assistant in the National Football League (NFL) or National
Basketball Association (NBA) is generally a career advancement for collegiate
assistant coaches; therefore, keeping these coaches in college is difficult.
Additionally, the assistant coaches will usually receive much better
compensation from professional teams. For example, former University of
Southern California (USC) offensive coordinator Norm Chow reportedly made
$500,000 during his final season at USC.21 In all likelihood, this salary made
Chow the highest paid assistant coach in college sports.22 However, in 2005,
Chow left USC to take the offensive coordinator position with the Tennessee
Titans for a reported $900,000 per year.23
It will always be difficult for head coaches and the universities they serve
to retain the assistants who receive offers for coaching positions in the
professional ranks. However, it is possible for universities to keep coaches.
The University of Wisconsin (Wisconsin) recently managed to keep offensive
coordinator Paul Chryst, despite the fact that the Dallas Cowboys offered
Chryst their quarterbacks coach position.24 Family reasons may have been the
most significant factor keeping Chryst at Wisconsin, yet he still received a
large pay increase and a longer contract to stay with the Badgers.25 Wisconsin
gave Chryst a new five-year contract that increased his pay from $200,000 to
nearly $300,000 per year.26 The contract also includes a $50,000 annuity for
each season Chryst stays at Wisconsin.27 Chryst's situation shows how a
school was able to keep a coach who was offered a job with a professional
team. However, keeping Chryst was an expensive proposition for Wisconsin,
and his pay raise is a reflection of how much assistant coaches' salaries are
rising.
Paul Chryst was not the only Wisconsin football assistant coach to receive
a substantial raise during 2007. The following table shows the pay increase
and base salary of several Wisconsin assistant football coaches.
21. Jeff Caplan, This is Why They Pay Them the Big Bucks, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM,
Apr. 20, 2006, at D12.
22. This seems to be a reasonable assumption considering that LSU's offensive and defensive
coordinators are believed to be the highest paid assistants in the nation currently, making $400,000
each. Id.
23. Id.
24. Jeff Potrykus, Chryst Decides to Stick with Badgers: Assistant Turns Down Offer from
Dallas, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 22, 2007, at C2.
25. Id.
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New Salary
Coach2 8  Title Raise Base
Paul Chryst Offensive Coordinator $83,333.33 $283,333.33
Bob Bolstad Tight Ends Coach $32,000 $135,000
Kerry Cooks Secondary Coach $20,000 $130,000
Henry Mason Receivers Coach $20,000 $150,000
Dave Doeren Co-defensive Coordinator $17,500 $192,500
Randall McCray Defensive Line Coach $13,000 $116,000
John Settle Running Backs Coach $8,000 $112,000
Mike Hankwitz Defensive Coordinator $7,500 $192,500
Bob Palcic Offensive Line Coach $7,500 $182,500
Universities will continue to face the challenge of keeping their coaches.
Competing with professional teams for coaches will always be difficult for
universities. Universities should focus more on preventing assistants from
making lateral moves to other programs. The rapid escalation of assistant
coach salaries will likely continue because quality assistant coaches are
increasingly important to universities as collegiate athletics continues to grow
as big business in America.
Despite the rapid growth of assistant coaches' salaries, assistants' salaries
still pale in comparison to the salaries head coaches receive. Naturally, head
coaches are entitled to more compensation. They are in control of the team
and the athletic program. Additionally, they are in the spotlight and receive
the bulk of the pressure and criticism. Still, assistants usually work just as
hard as head coaches and are nearly as important to the success of the
program. Yet, top assistants often receive a small portion of the compensation
paid to head coaches. For example, University of Iowa (Iowa) head football
coach Kirk Ferentz reportedly made $2.84 million coaching Iowa in 2006.29
Ferentz's top assistants, Norman Parker and Kenneth O'Keefe, had contracts
with Iowa in 2004 that paid them $153,442 each.30 Parker and O'Keefe have
likely received pay raises since 2004, yet they still probably make less than ten
28. UW Football Salaries on the Rise, JSONLINE.COM, July 12, 2007,
http://www.jsonline.com/story/index.aspx?id=632317.
29. Highest Earning College Football Coaches of 2006-07, supra note 8.
30. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA AND NORMAN J. PARKER § 3
(July 1, 2004); EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA AND KENNETH T.
O'KEEFE § 3 (July 1, 2004).
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percent of Ferentz's total compensation.
At most universities, the situation is very similar to that at Iowa. With pay
this disproportional between head and assistant coaches, it appears that
assistants are entitled to the increasing salaries seen in recent years. This is
not to say that head coaches are overpaid or that their salaries should be
reduced. Instead, universities should give assistants pay raises in an effort to
close some of the gap between head coach and assistant coach compensation.
Pay discrepancy among assistants is another problem with assistant coach
compensation. There is a large gap between what assistants make at Division
I universities with major athletic programs and those universities with smaller
programs. In analyzing contracts from fifty-three universities, we found a
large pay range. In football, we found salaries ranging from $56,300 for the
offensive coordinator at Ball State University3' to $400,000 each for the
defensive coordinators at Georgia Tech and Louisiana State.32 The basketball
salaries that we surveyed ranged from $31,827 at Bowling Green State
University 33 to $165,230 at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
(UNC).3 4
Obviously, the pay discrepancies are primarily the result of "major"
athletic programs generating far more money than the smaller programs. It is
logical that larger programs pay their coaches more. However, for many
coaches at smaller programs, the pay is too low. These coaches are full-time,
year-round employees of the universities, yet many of them are paid like part-
time employees. Many assistants could probably make a better salary in a
profession or vocation other than coaching. The importance of these assistants
necessitates that they receive better compensation from their universities.
In this section, we have stated the salaries of some Division I assistant
football and men's basketball coaches. The lists below provide several more
assistant coaches' salaries. The lists should help to further illustrate the
current state of Division I assistant coaches' salaries.
31. LETTER OF APPOINTMENT BETWEEN BALL STATE UNIVERSITY AND STANLEY P. PARRISH
(Mar. 4, 2005).
32. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN GEORGIA TECH ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND
JONATHAN TENUTA § III (Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter TENUTA CONTRACT]; EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT
BETWEEN BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY AND AGRICULTURAL AND
MECHANICAL COLLEGE AND MARK A. PELINI § 3 (Feb. 1, 2005).
33. LETTER OF APPOINTMENT BETWEEN BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY AND MARTIN
RICHTER (June 16, 2006).
34. LETTER OF APPOINTMENT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL
HILL AND JOE HOLLADAY (Oct. 4, 2005).
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James Carr Rutgers $100,000
Andre LaFleur Connecticut $89,456
George Blaney Connecticut $125,156
Thomas Moore Connecticut $140,456
Howard Moore Wisconsin $90,802
Greg Gard Wisconsin $133,532
Gary Close Wisconsin $133,532
Scott Garson UCLA $100,000
Kerry Keating UCLA $162,000
Donald Daniels UCLA $162,000
Dedrique Taylor Arizona State $120,000
Ryan Archie Arizona State $120,000
Mark Phelps Arizona State $135,000
Many assistants are highly paid employees, and all assistants work in a
volatile industry where they are highly susceptible to termination because of
the constant pressure to produce winning teams. The combination of high pay
and an insecure job makes a comprehensive employment contract vital for
assistant coaches. Even those coaches who are not highly compensated should
receive ample legal protection in the form of a multi-year contract with
termination provisions because they have inadequate job security. Legal
protection and lengthy contracts might be even more important for those
lower-paid coaches because they usually will not have wealth built up to
provide for their families in case of sudden unemployment.
III. PERQUISITES, INCENTIVES, AND OUTSIDE INCOME
For college coaches, compensation does not only include base salary.
College coaches' compensation is usually measured in terms of the total
"package." The package is composed of the institutional pay, outside income,
fringe benefits, and perquisites. Many different forms of compensation can
fall within these categories.
Institutional pay generally is restricted to base salary, annuities/longevity
bonuses, and contractual bonuses. Outside income most commonly comes
from shoe/apparel endorsements, television and radio shows, speaking
engagements, personal and public appearances, and summer camps. In some
situations, outside income and institutional pay will overlap because the school
will contract with third party vendors instead of the coach doing so directly.
The university then pays a portion of the vendor contract to the coach as
guaranteed outside income for the coach. Universities do this because it gives
2007]
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them increased control over the coaches' relationship with third parties.
Fringe benefits frequently include life and health insurance, paid vacation,
retirement plans, and tuition waivers. Perquisites can include a variety of
things, such as housing allowances, complimentary tickets, country club
memberships, automobile usage, and moving expenses.
Most football and men's basketball head coaches have many opportunities
for perquisites, bonus incentives, and outside income. In fact, base salary is
not even the main source of income for many head coaches. For example,
Steve Spurrier received a base salary of $250,00035 for the 2006 season, but
Spurrier's total compensation from South Carolina was approximately $1.3
million for the year, exclusive of incentives, benefits, and perquisites. 36
Spurrier's contract guarantees him $500,000 of income from television, radio,
and commercials and an additional $500,000 of income from athletic apparel
companies. 37
Most football and men's basketball coaches have similar arrangements to
Spurrier. Oklahoma football coach Bob Stoops earned approximately $3.45
million in 2006. 38 Stoops' income of $2.5 million is accounted for in his
contract; however, only $200,000 of it is base salary. 39 Stoops earned $1.7
million for performance of "personal services," such as radio and television
appearances, shoe and apparel endorsements, and recruiting. 40 Oklahoma paid
Stoops another $600,000 for "appearance and speaking engagements on behalf
of the University, unrelated to athletics for general University fundraising and
promotional purposes."'41 Ohio State football coach Jim Tressel earned just
over $2 million in 2006.42 Tressel received a base salary of only $366,000, 43
but he was paid $524,000 for radio and television appearances and $429,000
for equipment and apparel agreements. 44
35. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH CAROLINA AND STEPHEN 0.
SPURRIER § 4.01 (Nov. 23, 2004) [hereinafter SPURRIER CONTRACT].
36. Jodi Upton, Colleges Troubled by Coaches' Rising Salaries, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2006, at
1C.
37. SPURRIER CONTRACT, supra note 35, § 10.02(c) & 10.03.
38. Compensation for Div. I-A College Football Coaches, USATODAY.COM,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/graphics/coachescontracts/flash.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2007).
39. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA AND ROBERT ANTHONY
STOOPS § IV(A) (Jan. 1, 2002) [hereinafter STOOPS CONTRACT].
40. Id. § III(C)(4).
41. Id. § IV(B)(2).
42. Compensation for Div. I-A football Coaches, supra note 38.
43. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND JAMES P. TRESSEL
§ 3.3 (June 16, 2003).
44. ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND JAMES
P. TRESSEL 3-4 (June 16, 2003).
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University of Tennessee (Tennessee) head basketball coach Bruce Pearl is
a good example of a basketball coach who earns most of his pay from sources
other than base salary. For the 2006-2007 season, Pearl earned a base salary
of $300,000.45 Tennessee paid him an additional $300,000 for radio and
television appearances; $300,000 for equipment, shoe, and apparel
endorsements; $150,000 for other endorsement contracts; and $50,000 of
guaranteed basketball camp revenue. 46 These figures equal $1.1 million of
annual compensation; however, when perquisites and bonuses are added to the
equation, Pearl's total compensation is probably around $1.5 million per year.
Under Pearl's original contract, he was to make $1.5 million in the final year
of his contract, 2011-2012, exclusive of any bonuses or perquisites. 47
However, in July 2007, Pearl agreed to a one-year contract extension that will
keep him with the Volunteers through the 2012-2013 season. The new
agreement increases Pearl's annual total compensation package to $1.3 million
for the 2007-2008 season, with $100,000 increases in each of the following
five years.48
The total compensation numbers reported above also include income from
outside the university. For example, Stoops' salary and bonuses only account
for nearly $1.7 million of Stoops' $3.45 million of total compensation. 49 The
remainder comes from outside sources. The NCAA requires coaches to report
their outside income annually. It should also be noted that these compensation
figures do not include incentives, benefits, or perquisites.
The situation for assistant coaches is much different. For most assistants,
base salary is the main source, and sometimes the only source, of
compensation. Some assistants do have bonus incentives in their contracts,
but the amounts available are relatively small. Furthermore, bonuses are
generally not available for the many assistant coaches who do not have
contracts. Assistants do receive normal employment benefits, such as health
insurance and vacation time. Some assistants also receive perquisites, but not
to the extent of head coaches. Finally, assistants usually are not guaranteed
any outside income, and for those assistants who do have outside income
guarantees, the amounts are generally small. 50
45. AMENDMENT No. 1 TO THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF
TENNESSEE AND BRUCE PEARL art. II (Mar. 29, 2006) [hereinafter PEARL AMENDMENT].
46. Id §§ III-V.
47. Id. §§ II-V.
48. See id.
49. Compensation for Div I-A Football Coaches, supra note 38.
50. In some situations, head coaches share the outside income with the assistant coaches. This
most frequently occurs with respect to athletic shoes and apparel contracts and summer camps.
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
Former University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) offensive
coordinator James Svoboda had a clause in his contract guaranteeing him
$40,000 for royalty rights.5' However, Svoboda gave up his rights to "accept
compensation or gratuities of any kind, directly or indirectly, from any athletic
shoe, apparel, equipment, or other manufacturer in exchange for the use of
merchandise manufactured by such person or entity during practice or
competition by the University's student-athletes. 52 This clause eliminated a
potentially large source of income for Svoboda.
Generally, the assistants at the "major" programs have the best
opportunities for perquisites, incentives, and outside income. These coaches
have these opportunities because they are provided in written form either in an
employment contract or a letter of appointment. Those assistants who do not
receive any type of employment agreement will usually not receive the
perquisites or incentives available to other coaches. These "at will"
employees receive standard university employment benefits, such as health
insurance and vacation time, but usually will not receive anything else.
Normally, employment letters are also less advantageous for the coach than a
regular contract. What follows are examples to illustrate the differences
among assistants in relation to contractual perquisites, incentives, and outside
income.
Former University of Maryland defensive coordinator Gary Blackney,
who retired in November 2005, had a full-length employment contract that
provided him several opportunities to earn money other than his base salary
($146,728).53  First, the contract guaranteed Blackney over $100,000 of
outside income. 54 The university guaranteed him $94,101 for radio and
television appearances. 55 He was also guaranteed $4000 for other personal
appearances, 56 and another $4000 for performance of fund raising activities.5 7
Second, Blackney received many perquisites, much like a head coach. The
perquisites included travel expenses for work related activities, a $6000 annual
car allowance, six tickets to each regular season home and away Maryland
football game, and two regular season men's and women's basketball tickets.58
51. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AND JAMES SVOBODA § 4(c) (July 1, 2006).
52. Id. § 10(a).
53. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK AND
GARY BLACKNEY § 3.1 (July 1, 2005).
54. Id. §§ 5-7.
55. Id. § 5.1.
56. Id. § 6.
57. Id. § 7.
58. Id. § 10.
[Vol. 18:1
DIVISION I ASSISTANT COACHES' CONTRA CTS
Finally, Blackney had numerous bonus incentives available. If all of the
highest bonus levels were achieved, Blackney would receive $160,000 in
additional compensation per year.59
University of California Defensive Coordinator Bob Gregory is another
coach who benefits greatly from the perquisites, incentives, and outside
income provided in his contract. Gregory makes a base salary of $168,000 per
year.60 He also receives several employment benefits, including twenty
vacation days, twelve sick days, a retirement plan, health insurance (including
dental and optical), and life and disability insurance. 61 Gregory also receives a
$62,000 per year "talent fee" as compensation for appearing on television, on
the radio, and at alumni functions.62 He has the possibility of receiving an
additional stipend of up to $10,000 for work done in connection with
university football camps.63 The assignment to football camps and the stipend
are at the discretion of the athletic director.64  Like many coaches, the
university also provides Gregory with a vehicle. 65 Finally, Gregory has the
opportunity to earn several different bonuses, ranging from $1500 to
$25,200.66
Gregory's bonuses are based on the performance of the team and his
defensive unit. Up to seven different bonuses of $1500 can be earned for
Gregory's defensive unit achieving certain Pac-10 and national defensive
statistical rankings.67 Gregory can also receive a bonus based on Pac-10
conference games won.68 If they win five games, he receives a $5100 bonus,
$13,500 for six wins, $20,200 for seven wins, and $25,200 for eight wins.69
Finally, Gregory gets a $6000 bonus if the team participates in a non-Bowl
Championship Series (BCS) bowl game and $10,000 if it participates in a BCS
bowl game. 70
Coaches Blackney and Gregory benefit greatly from their contractual
situations. The compensation, benefits, perquisites, outside income, and
59. Id. §§ 10.5-10.7 (adding together the amounts from 10.5(a), 10.6(a), and 10.7).
60. CONTRACT ADDENDUM TO THE EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE REGENTS OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA AND ROBERT GREGORY § 2 (Mar. 16, 2006).
61. Id. §§ 3-5.
62. Id. § 9.
63. Id. § 7.
64. Id. §§ 7, 9.
65. Id. § 8.
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incentives they receive appear to be common among coordinators at major
Division I-A football programs; however, several assistant coaches are not so
fortunate. Basketball assistants at the major programs receive some of the
same perquisites and incentives as football coaches, but to a lesser extent.
Coaches ht smaller schools, in both football and basketball, rarely receive any
of the perquisites and incentives mentioned above. For example, several
schools we contacted reported that they do not have any type of written
employment agreement for assistant coaches. These schools included Utah
State University, Louisiana Tech University, the University of Louisiana at
Monroe, the University of Louisiana at Lafayette, Ohio University, Kent State
University, 7' the University of Toledo, 72 and surprisingly, the University of
Michigan. Without a written contract, the coaches at these schools likely do
not receive any perquisites, incentives, or outside income, with the exception
of standard university fringe benefits.
Coaches with shorter, less-inclusive contracts also face significant
disadvantages regarding perquisites, incentives, and outside income. Marshall
University offensive coordinator Larry Kueck is an example of this. Kueck
has a brief letter of appointment that is less than two pages in length.73
Kueck's salary of $130,00014 is somewhat high for a smaller program, but he
is given far fewer perquisites or incentives than many of the coaches at larger
programs. Kueck is given all of the regular benefits of Marshall staff
employees. 75 His only other benefits are a courtesy car and a mobile phone
stipend. 76 He is also eligible for attendance incentives, but only up to $3000
per year.77 He is not entitled to any other bonuses or incentives, and the
contract does not guarantee him any outside income.78
Even those assistants at smaller programs who are fortunate enough to
have full-length employment contracts, do not enjoy the same advantages as
their counterparts at the larger programs. University of North Texas defensive
coordinator Ron Mendoza has a comprehensive employment contract and a
71. Kent State provided a contract for defensive coordinator Pete Rekstis, but it reported that he
was the only assistant coach at Kent State with an employment contract.
72. Toledo provided a contract for defensive coordinator Tim Rose, but it reported that he was
the only assistant coach at Toledo with an employment contract.
73. LETTER OF APPOINTMENT BETWEEN MARSHALL UNIVERSITY AND LARRY KUECK (July 1,
2006).
74. Id. § 3.
75. Id. § 5.
76. Id. § 6.
77. Id. § 3.
78. Id.
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base salary of $93,000.79 However, Mendoza is not guaranteed any additional
compensation. Mendoza does receive a bonus of one month's salary if the
team participates in a bowl game. 80 The only other bonus compensation
available is "Merit Pay," which is given at the discretion of the athletic
director. 81 Mendoza does receive the regular University of North Texas
benefits and a courtesy car or a car allowance. 82 That is the extent of
Mendoza's perquisites and incentives, which are obviously far less than those
received by coaches at major programs, like Blackney and Gregory.
The following list provides some more examples of what perquisites,
bonus incentives, benefits, and outside income other assistant coaches receive.
FOOTBALL COACHES
COACH SCHOOL PERQS, INCENTIVES, ETC.
Craig VerSteeg* Rutgers Fringe benefits of supervisory
employee; $7200 annual car
stipend; Post-season bonuses
available (ex.: One (1) month's
salary for participation in non-
BCS bowl game, two (2)
month's salary for BCS bowl
game, three (3) month's salary
for National Championship
Game)
Mark Pelini** Louisiana State Standard university benefits;
Costs of moving to Baton
Rouge; Bonuses for team
performance available (ex.: 4%
of salary for participation in
SEC championship game, 16%
for BCS Bowl, 24% for winning
National Championship)
Dan Brown** Fresno State Standard university employee
benefits; Unspecified bonuses
for conference championships
79. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE
MENDOZA (Jan. 10, 2007).
80. Id.
81. Id. § 3.04.
82. Id. § 3.01(b).
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH TEXAS AND RON
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I_ and bowl games
Douglas Ruse* Arkansas State Standard university benefits
Paul Chryst* Wisconsin Standard "limited staff'
benefits; Use of one car or a car
allowance
Kenneth Wilson** Nevada $25,000 for television, radio and
personal appearances; Up to
50% of base salary ($84,770.40)
for camps; Air fare for spouse to
one away game and one
postseason game; Postseason
bonuses (ex.: Up to 50% of
monthly salary for postseason
play)
Pete Rektsis* Kent State Standard university benefits;
Use of an automobile; Several
bonuses for team performance,
GPA, attendance and graduation
rates (ex.: $2500 for division
championship, $5000 for
conference championship,
$6000 for bowl appearance,
$2500 for 15,000 or more actual
annual attendance, $500 for
team GPA of 2.5 or better,
$2500 for GSR of 80%)
Stan Parrish* Ball State None specified, but fringe
benefits are implied
Tim Rose** Toledo Standard benefits for
unclassified employee
Roy Wittke* Arizona State Standard university benefits;
Football season tickets for
immediate family plus six (6)
additional seats; Several bonuses
for graduation rates, GPA and
team performance (ex.: $15,000
for scholarship athletes' GPA of
2.80 or GSR of 85%, $25,000
for BCS bowl game, $5000 for
final nation ranking of 1)
Victor Koenning** Clemson Fringe benefits; Unspecified
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bonuses; Courtesy car
Jonathan Tenuta** Georgia Tech Fringe benefits; Unspecified
performance bonus available;
Use of one (1) car and auto
insurance; Six (6) season
football tickets; Four (4) season
basketball tickets;
Reimbursement for work related
travel and moving expenses;





COACH SCHOOL PERQS, INCENTIVES, ETC.
Greg Gard Wisconsin Standard limited staff benefits;
Car or car stipend
Dan Wilde Eastern Michigan Fringe benefits
Donald Daniels UCLA Fringe benefits; $4500 annual
car stipend
Cameron Dollar Washington Standard employee benefits;
Courtesy car and auto insurance;
Bonuses for team performance
and academics (ex.: Possible one
(1) month's salary for
participation in NCAA
Tournament)
James Carr Rutgers Fringe benefits; $7200 annual
vehicle stipend; Unspecified
bonus for post-season play




apparel; Use of one automobile;
Moving expenses to Tuscaloosa;
Bonuses for team performance
(ex.: 8.33% of annual salary for
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SEC regular or conference
tournament championship,
8.33% for NCAA Tournament
appearance)
John Treloar Louisiana State Fringe benefits; Social clubs
memberships; Cell phone;
Courtesy vehicle; Bonuses for
team performance, graduation
rate, and GPA (ex.: $10,000 for
NCAA Tournament selection,
$30,000 for Final Four
appearance, $20,000 for SEC
regular season championship,
$25,000 for 80% GSR, $12,500
for team GPA of 3.00 or higher)
Martin Richter Bowling Green Fringe benefits
Steven Flint Ball State None specified, but fringe
benefits are implied
Shawn Forrest Arkansas State Standard university benefits
Thomas Moore Connecticut Fringe benefits; Four (4) tickets
for all home, away and
postseason basketball games;
Two (2) tickets for any other
Connecticut home athletic event;
Reimbursement for work related
travel expenses; Bonus for
postseason (ex.: One (1)
month's salary for Big East
Championship, two (2) month's
salary for NCAA
Championship)
Joe Holladay North Carolina Fringe benefits; Postseason
bonus (One (1) month's salary
for post-season play)
Perquisites, bonus incentives, and outside income are very important for
assistant coaches because they can greatly improve the compensation package
for a coach. Two factors seem to affect the level of perquisites, bonuses, and
outside income that an assistant coach receives. First, the level and size of the
program are significant because the assistants at the major programs usually
have the best perquisites and bonuses. Secondly, the existence of a written
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contract and the length of the contract are also important. Assistant coaches
with full contracts will normally receive better perquisites and bonuses.
Considering these factors, it is clear what can be done to improve assistant
coaches' rights in this area. First, all assistants should demand full contracts
where they can negotiate perquisites, bonus incentives, and outside income.
Next, all assistant coaches, particularly at schools with smaller programs,
should ask to receive better perquisites and bonus incentives. The schools
with smaller programs often will not have the money to increase a coach's
base salary, but they might be more willing to give the coach more
opportunities to receive bonus incentives. Bonuses are tied into some type of
success within the athletic program, and success usually equals increased
revenue for the school. Therefore, when the bonuses are achieved, the school
is usually in a better position to pay coaches more money.
IV. FORM OF CONTRACTS
In the past, few assistant coaches had any level of job protection. Like the
vast majority of the American work force, assistant coaches did not have
employment contracts. Without contracts, these coaches were "at will"
employees. As "at will" employees, universities could terminate assistant
coaches at any time without consequence, as long as the termination did not
violate employment statutes. Today, most assistant football and men's
basketball coaches at major universities have some form of contract. Whether
that contract offers them any more protection than they would receive as an "at
will" employee is another question that depends on the particular contract.
Assistant coaches' contracts are truly "all over the board" and come in a
variety of forms. The contracts surveyed ranged from twenty-two pages
(University of Alabama) to non-existent (several). Some assistants only have
a letter of appointment, while others have an actual contract. For example, the
University of Connecticut (Connecticut) has contracts that run ten pages or
more with each of nine top assistants.83 These contracts cover a variety of
issues and resemble the contracts of Connecticut head coaches. On the
opposite end of the spectrum are the University of North Carolina assistant
basketball and football coaches. Their contracts are in the form of a one-page
letter of appointment. The letter briefly discusses the coach's salary and
rights, but does not address many of the issues covered in the Connecticut
employment contracts.
The following table provides information about the length of some of the
contracts we surveyed. Note that exhibits, addendums, and collateral
83. The nine assistants included three assistant coaches each from men's basketball, women's
basketball, and football.
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agreements are included in the length of the contract, but amendments are not.








































































































For purposes of comparison, the tables below provide some examples















































While contracts for assistant coaches have become common, not all
coaches have contracts. The University of Michigan (Michigan), which has
one of the largest athletic departments in the nation, does not have contracts
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requests stated, "Confirming our telephone conversation today, I advised you
that contracts for assistant coaches do not exist but that we will be providing
current salary information. '84 Michigan's approach has become very rare at
schools with major football and men's basketball programs. However, this
approach is common at the smaller Division I programs. As was mentioned in
the previous section, several smaller programs we contacted do not have any
type of employment contract with assistant coaches. The following are the
responses received from some smaller Division I programs.
Utah State University
All assistant coaches at Utah State University are considered
"AT WILL" employees and do not have written contracts.
Only our head football and men's and women's basketball
coaches have written agreements. 85
Kent State University
Coach for basketball, the University has made a good faith
search of its files and presents that Pete Rektsis is the only
Kent State University coordinator and the only Kent State
University assistant football coach who has a contract. No
assistant men's or women's basketball coaches have contracts
at Kent State University.
I have attached Coach Rektsis' contract. There are no other
records responsive to your request. Please contact me if you
have any questions. 86
Louisiana Tech University
Louisiana Tech University President, Dr. Dan Reneau, has
asked me to respond to your recent correspondence and
inform you that we do not have contracts for the coaches
mentioned in your letter. There are no assistant coaches at
Louisiana Tech University at this time with a contract. 87
84. Letter from Patricia J. Sellinger, Freedom of Info. Act Coordinator, Univ. of Mich., to Martin
J. Greenberg, Attorney, Greenberg & Hoeschen LLC (July 12, 2006) (on file with author).
85. Letter from Ken Peterson, Senior Associate Director Business Operations, Utah State Univ.,
to Martin J. Greenberg, Attorney, Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC. (Feb. 1, 2007) (on file with author).
86. Letter from David L. Ochmann, Associate University Counsel, Kent State Univ., to Martin J.
Greenberg, Attorney, Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC. (Feb. 6, 2007) (on file with author).
87. Letter from Jim Oakes, Athletic Director, La. Tech Univ., to Martin J. Greenberg, Attorney,
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University of Louisiana at Monroe
In response to your recent request for copies of our contracts
of our Assistant Coaches for Head Offensive Coordinator and
Head Defensive Coordinator for football and the Assistant
Coach for basketball, the persons who hold these positions at
our University do not have contracts. These persons only
receive their annual appointment letters. 88
Univeristy of Louisiana at Lafayette
This is in response to your request for a copy of the contracts
of the following coaches: 1) Assistant Coach - Head
Offensive Coordinator for football; 2) Assistant Coach - Head
Defensive Coordinator for football; 3) Assistant Coach for
basketball.
All three of these coaches are one-year or "at will"
appointments, the same as members of the teaching faculty.89
All assistants should have the right to a comprehensive contract, covering
the full-range of issues pertinent to the coaches' employment. If the contract
covers all the relevant issues, at least the coach has the opportunity to
negotiate these issues. The coach should obtain legal counsel who can assist
the coach by reviewing and possibly negotiating the contract. With a
comprehensive contract and the assistance of legal counsel, an assistant coach
should be able to get an employment contract that provides fair compensation
and all the necessary protections.
We determined that there are five different types of assistant coaches'
contracts, and that we can roughly fit each assistant coach contract we
received into one of these groups. We have labeled the five groups of
contracts as follows: (1) Short Letter of Appointment, (2) Long Letter of
Appointment, (3) Short Contract, (4) Intermediate Contract, and (5) Full
Contract. The appendices to this article provide good examples of each group.
The Short Letter of Appointment is a one-page letter of appointment, which is
common among those smaller schools that use contracts. The Long Letter of
Appointment is a longer and more comprehensive letter of appointment,
Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC. (Jan. 30, 2007) (on file with author).
88. Letter from Dr. Richard Hood, Executive Assistant to the President, Univ. of La. at Monroe,
to Martin J. Greenberg, Attorney, Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC. (Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with author).
89. Letter from Ray Authement, President, Univ. of La. at Lafayette, to Martin J. Greenberg,
Attorney, Greenberg & Hoeschen, LLC. (Jan. 25, 2007) (on file with author).
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usually two to four pages in length. The Short Contract is an actual contract,
but a short version that ranges from one to three pages. The Intermediate
Contract is a medium length contract of about four to seven pages. The Full
Contract is usually eight pages or more and resembles those contracts usually
received by head coaches.
V. TERM OF CONTRACTS
The term of collegiate coaches' contracts is a very important aspect of
coaches' legal rights and protections. Most collegiate assistant coaches have
only one-year contract terms. Under these one-year contracts, assistants must
wait for the university to renew their contracts each year. The situation is
much different for most Division I football and men's basketball head coaches
who have multi-year contracts. Currently many head coaches are under
contract for a term of at least five years. For example, in September 2006,
Marquette University gave basketball coach Tom Crean an extension through
the 2016-2017 season, giving Crean a ten-year term. 90 Bruce Pearl is in the
midst of a six-year contract that is set to expire at the conclusion of the 2011-
2012 season. 91 Some examples of football coaches with contracts exceeding
five-year terms are Ralph Friedgen (ten years), 92 Bob Stoops (seven years), 93
Steve Spurrier (seven years), 94 Bill Callahan (six years), 95 and Karl Dorrell
(six years). 96
The term of some head coaches' contracts constantly remains at its
original length. This happens because the coach has a "rollover" provision.
With a rollover provision, every year the term of the contract is extended by
one year in order to keep the term of the contract the same as was originally
agreed upon by the coach and the university. UCLA Head Football Coach
Karl Dorrell is an example of a coach who has a rollover provision. Dorrell's
rollover clause provides:
Commencing January 1, 2004, between January 1 and January
31 of each year this 2003 HC Agreement remains in effect,
90. Rosiak, supra note 7.
91. PEARL AMENDMENT, supra note 45, art. XVI.
92. AMENDED EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND
COLLEGE PARK AND RALPH FRIEDGEN § 2 (Jan. 1, 2002).
93. STOOPS CONTRACT, supra note 39, § 11(A).
94. SPURRIER CONTRACT, supra note 35, § 3.
95. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEBRASKA AND WILLIAM CALLAHAN § 1 (Jan. 9, 2004).
96. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA
AND KARL DORRELL § 3(a) (Aug 29, 2003) [hereinafter DORRELL CONTRACT].
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the parties may mutually agree in writing to extend the Term
of this 2003 HC Agreement for one additional year. This
right may not be exercised if either party has advised the other
that he/it is exercising any of his/its rights to terminate this
2003 HC Agreement or if this 2003 HC Agreement has
terminated. Except as expressly provided for herein,
"termination" means that the rights and obligations of the
parties under this 2003 HC Agreement shall cease to exist as
of the date of termination.97
Rollover provisions are beneficial for coaches because they provide them
with increased job security and other protections. If assistant coaches are able
to get multi-year contracts, they should strive for rollover contracts in order to
receive more protection.
In recent years, there has been a trend toward giving some assistant
coaches longer-term contracts. 98 Longer-term contracts are far from prevalent
among collegiate assistant coaches; however, it has become increasingly
common, primarily among football assistants at major programs.99 In the past
few years, assistant football coaches at many programs, including Florida,
Oklahoma State, Arkansas, and LSU, have received multi-year contracts. 00
The same forces driving up assistant coaches' salaries are also leading to
longer-term assistant coach contracts. Giving assistant coaches longer-term
contracts helps schools to keep assistants who might otherwise be lured away
to a different coaching job. Additionally, top head coaches, such as Phil
Fulmer, Mack Brown, and Bob Stoops, have pushed for longer-term contracts
for their assistant coaches. 10'
The following table lists some of the assistant football coaches who have
multi-year contracts and the length of their contracts.
COACH SCHOOL TERM 10 2
Mark Pelini** Louisiana State 3 years
Paul Chryst* Wisconsin 3 years
Mike Hankwitz** Wisconsin 2 years, 5 months
Bob Gregory" California 2 years
97. Id. § 3(b).




102. Note that the length of the term is rounded to the nearest month when necessary.
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Victor Koenning** Clemson 2 years
Jonathan Tenuta** Georgia Tech 2 years, 6 months
James Franklin* Kansas State 3 years, 3 months
Kevin Cosgrove** Nebraska 2 years, 5 months
Mike Levenseller* Washington State 3 years, 4 months
*Offensive Coordinator
**Defensive Coordinator
For purposes of comparison, the following table displays the terms of
some head coaches, including those from the schools listed in the table above.
COACH SCHOOL TERM103
Les Miles Louisiana State 7 years
Bret Bielema Wisconsin 5 years
Jeff Tedford California 8 years
Tommy Bowden Clemson 7 years
Chan Gailey Georgia Tech 5 years
Ron Prince Kansas State 5 years
Bill Callahan Nebraska 6 years
Bill Doba Washington State 5 years
Nick Saban Alabama 8 years
Urban Meyer Florida 6 years
Mark Richt Georgia 7 years
Jerry Dinardo Indiana 5 years
Dan McCarney Iowa State 7 years
Jim Tressel Ohio State 6 years
Dennis Franchione Texas A&M 6 years
Gary Pinkel Missouri 5 years
Richard Rodriguez Virginia 7 years
Mike Davis Alabama-Birmingham 5 years
William Brown Albany 5 years
Jim Calhoun Connecticut 6 years
Jim Larranaga George Mason 6 years
While there is a trend toward giving assistant football coaches multi-year
contracts, one-year contracts are still the standard among assistant coaches.
Even some head coaches at large state universities still do not receive multi-
year contracts. An example of this is Montana, where the Board of Regents
only recently decided to allow the University of Montana and Montana State
103. Note that the length of the term is rounded to the nearest month when necessary.
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University to give the head football and basketball coaches multi-year
contracts. 04 It also appears that multi-year contracts for assistants have not
yet become part of college basketball. Top-notch basketball programs, such as
North Carolina and Maryland, still only provide their assistant coaches with
one-year agreements.
Multi-year contracts for assistant coaches may only occur at Division I-A
football powerhouse schools now, but it appears that there is a growing
movement toward providing all football and basketball coaches with more job
security. Montana's recent move to allow multi-year contracts for its head
coaches is something that is becoming increasingly common at smaller
universities, as these universities try to hold onto their coaches. Assistant
basketball coaches are also likely to start receiving multi-year contracts in the
near future. It is probably a necessary move for universities, as they try to
retain assistant coaches and maintain continuity in their coaching staffs.
All assistants should receive multi-year contracts because this will provide
them with a greater level of security. If assistants get multi-year contracts,
they will not need to worry whether their employment will be renewed each
off-season. Multi-year contracts, combined with a liquidated damages
provision that is tied to a termination without cause provision, will give
assistant coaches a significantly increased level of job security and protection.
VI. EFFECT OF TERMINATION OF HEAD COACH
The job of coaching Division I football and men's basketball is a volatile
position, considering the intense pressure to win that exists. College coaches
do have better job security than their counterparts in the professional ranks;
however, college coaches still work in an unpredictable industry where
terminations occur each year. The following table displays the high volume of
turnover among head football and men's basketball coaches in recent years.
Note that the football statistics include Division I and I-AA schools.
BASKETBALL COACHING FOOTBALL COACHING
CHANGES CHANGES
104. Regents Approve Multiyear Contracts for UM, MSU Coaches, KXNET.COM, Sept. 28, 2006,
http://www.kxma.com/getARticle.asp?Articleld=49738.
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Many football coaches at high profile schools were fired following the
2006 season, including Mike Shula at Alabama, Glen Mason at Minnesota,
and Larry Coker at Miami. When head coaches like Shula, Mason, and Coker
are dismissed, generally their whole staff of assistants is also left unemployed.
The fate of assistant coaches is usually tied to that of the head coach. The
assistants' contracts usually call for automatic termination when the head
coach is fired, or in the alternative, the contract gives the university "cause" to
terminate the assistants if the head coach is terminated. This clause is
included in the contracts because the universities want to give the new
incoming head coach an opportunity to compile his own staff.
The following are a few examples of provisions in assistant football
coaches' contracts that make their continued employment contingent on the
head coach's employment.
James Franklin - Kansas State
IAC hereby employs Employee as an Assistant Football
Coach at Kansas State University for the period beginning the
3rd day of January, 2006, and ending the 31st day of March,
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2009, contingent upon Ron Prince's continued appointment as
Head Coach and subject to the provisions contained herein.10 5
Tim Rose - Toledo
If the Head Coach is removed, terminated or his contract or
appointment expires or is terminated for any reason, then this
agreement will automatically terminate effective as of the
same date of the termination of Head Coach. 10 6
Lyle Setencich - Texas Tech
Coach acknowledges that this Employment Contract will
automatically terminate immediately at such time as Mike
Leach ("Leach") is no longer the Head Football Coach at
University. If this Employment Contract is terminated
pursuant to this provision as a result of resignation by Leach,
Coach will be paid his monthly base salary through May 31 of
such contract year, provided, however, that University shall be
entitled to a credit for any compensation received by Coach
for any employment or independent contractor services
performed by Coach (the "Credit") during the period from
termination of this Employment Contract through May 31 of
that contract year. If this Employment Contract is terminated
as a result of Leach being terminated by University, Coach
shall be entitled to the base salary for the term remaining on
this Employment Contract, provided, however, that University
shall be entitled to the Credit for the remainder of the term of
this Employment Contract. University shall be entitled to, and
Coach shall provide upon request, any documentation
University deems necessary to determine the amount of the
Credit. University shall be entitled to reduce its monthly
payment to Coach by the amount of the Credit. If the amount
of the Credit is greater than the monthly base salary otherwise
due to Coach, no payment shall be due to Coach by
University.107
105. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC COUNCIL OF
KANSAS STATE, KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, AND JAMES G. FRANKLIN § 1 (Jan. 3, 2006).
106. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO AND TIM ROSE § 2.0
(Mar. 24, 2005).
107. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY AND LYLE SETENCICH §
V(D) (Dec. 31, 2005).
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Often the clauses connecting the assistant coach's employment term to
that of the head coach are not necessary. Terminating the assistants is usually
easy for the universities and without consequence because most assistants
operate under a one-year contract; therefore, the university simply does not
renew the assistant's contract in the off-season. There are also several
assistant coaches who are "at will" employees, and consequently, can be
terminated at any time by the university.
For those few coaches who do have multi-year contracts, the clause
connecting the employment term of the assistants to the head coach is
important. Without this clause, the university would not have cause to
terminate the assistant. If the university still terminates the assistant, it would
be without cause, and in most situations, the university would need to pay the
coach liquidated damages. Obviously, this will depend on each individual
contract and the rights provided to the assistant coach.
It is possible for assistant coaches to retain their jobs when the head coach
is terminated, but this is rare. A situation where this could happen is if the
head coach is terminated and dismissed during the season. If the head coach is
terminated during the season, the assistant coaches will usually retain their
positions for the remainder of the season. Usually, one of the assistant
coaches will be promoted to replace the head coach for the remainder of the
season. The university usually will not dismiss the assistants along with the
head coach because replacing a whole staff in the middle of the season would
be virtually impossible and would create chaos for the athletic program.
However, in collegiate sports, head coaches are not normally dismissed during
the season, so this situation does not occur often. If a head coach is terminated
during the season, the assistant coaches are also usually let go when the season
is over.
The other way assistant coaches can keep their jobs is to be selected for
the new coach's staff. The new coach will usually have the option to choose
his or her staff. If the new head coach likes a particular assistant coach or
coaches, he can extend them a job offer to remain at the university. This can
be a good situation for an assistant coach, but it also might be a difficult
situation. Some assistant coaches might feel compelled to reject the job offer
in order to remain loyal to the recently terminated head coach. This will be
particularly true of long-time assistants who have worked with a particular
head coach for many years. As a rule, however, assistant coaches usually will
find themselves unemployed if their head coach has been terminated.
It is difficult for assistant coaches to contractually protect their position
against a head coach termination. Most universities want the freedom to
terminate the assistant coaches when the head coach leaves for any reason.
However, some coaches have been able to achieve some protection against
automatic termination. For example, termination of the head coach does not
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give Georgia Tech freedom to terminate Defensive Coordinator Jonathan
Tenuta. Georgia Tech "may terminate the employment of Coach without
cause if the Head Coach resigns voluntarily."' 108 This clause protects Tenuta
against termination if the head coach is terminated. It also appears to provide
him liquidated damages in the event the head coach resigns, and consequently,
Tenuta is terminated. The contract states that the head coach's resignation
gives Georgia Tech the right to terminate Tenuta "without cause," not "for
cause." If it is classified as a termination "without cause," Tenuta is entitled to
liquidated damages.
Tenuta's situation is rare. Usually, assistants can be freely terminated
when the head coach is terminated or resigns. It is more common for assistant
coaches' contracts to provide liquidated damages if the head coach is
terminated. For example, University of Nebraska Defensive Coordinator
Kevin Cosgrove would be automatically terminated upon termination of the
head coach, but Cosgrove would continue to receive his salary and fringe
benefits, subject to mitigation, for the remainder of his contractual term. 09
Cosgrove's situation is more common than Tenuta's. Cosgrove's contract
also reflects the type of protection assistants should try to attain. Assistant
coaches do not want the termination of the head coach to provide the
university "cause" to terminate the assistant. Instead, assistants want their
termination to be treated as "without cause" and the contract should provide
for liquidated damages.
In an earlier section we stated that the longer the term of the contract, the
better the protection for the coach. This is again true in the situation of a head
coach termination. The contract should be multi-year so that the university
cannot simply deny renewal of the assistant coach's one-year contract. The
longer the term, the lesser the chances are that the assistant coach's contract
happens to be up the year the head coach leaves his or her position. A longer
remaining term also increases the liquidated damages the school will need to
pay the coach.
VII. UNIVERSITIES' EARLY TERMINATION RIGHTS
Probably the most important reason for assistant coaches to have written
employment contracts is to provide them some level of protection when the
university wishes to terminate them. Considering the minimal job security
that exists in the coaching industry, contracts that provide assistants with
protection in termination situations are vital. Most head coaches' contracts
108. TENUTA CONTRACT, supra note 32, § VI.
109. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
NEBRASKA AND KEVIN COSGROVE § 1 I(B) (Feb. 1, 2006).
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address termination and provide the coaches some legal protection. Usually, a
head coach's contract will limit the situations when the university has cause to
terminate the coach. The contract will also allow the university to terminate
the coach at any time without cause, but generally, the contract will provide
the coach with some form of compensation if the university terminates the
coach without cause during the term of the contract.
Most assistant coaches have very limited legal protection when it comes to
termination. First, any coach without a contract has the most limited legal
protection because he or she is an "at will" employee. Generally, employers
can terminate "at will" employees with or without cause at any time, and
usually suffer no consequences.' 10 Second, some assistant coaches with
contracts have the same limited termination rights as those coaches without
contracts. This is because these coaches' contracts do not address the issue of
termination; therefore, they are also treated like "at will" employees in
termination situations. Assistant coaches without contracts or with contracts
that do not address termination are at risk of termination at any time, for
virtually any reason.
Other assistant coaches are more fortunate because their contracts address
termination. Generally, the contracts that address the subject of termination
are those contracts that are longer and more comprehensive. Most of the
contracts that address termination will provide the assistant coach with
stronger legal rights and protection. These contracts will usually limit what
constitutes "cause" for the university to terminate a coach. They will also
provide the coach with some form of liquidated damages when he or she is
terminated "without cause."
The following provisions are examples of termination "for cause" and
termination "without cause" provisions from assistant coaches' contracts.
TERMINATION "FOR CAUSE" PROVISIONS
Jon Tenuta - Georgia Tech (Defensive Coordinator)
The Association may suspend or terminate the employment of
Coach for cause. For purposes of this Agreement "cause"
shall be understood to include, but not be limited to any of the
following:
A. Conviction of (or entry into pre-trial intervention as a
result of) a crime involving moral turpitude or conviction for a
110. There are limitations on when employers can terminate employees at will. Employers will
possibly suffer consequences when a termination violates employment statutes or public policy.
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felony for which the penalty for conviction is more than one
(1) year in prison and a fine of more than One Thousand
Dollars ($1,000.00) or involvement in conduct that the
Association or the Georgia Institute of Technology may
consider injurious to the reputation of the Association or the
Institute.
B. Coach's failure to substantially perform any of the
duties as set forth in this Agreement.
C. The committing of any major violation of NCAA
Legislation by Coach while at the Institute or while previously
employed at another NCAA member institution, or the
committing of a series or pattern of secondary violations of
NCAA Legislation while at the Institute.
D. The committing of a major violation of NCAA
Legislation while Coach is at the Institute by any
representative of the Institute's athletics interest with
Director's actual knowledge.
E. Any cause adequate to sustain the termination of any
other non-classified Association employee.
The Association may terminate the employment of Coach
without cause if the Head Coach resigns voluntarily. I
Craig Ver Steeg - Rutgers (Offensive Coordinator)
The University may impose discipline upon the Assistant
Coach, up to and including termination of employment, for:
(i) material breach of any provision of this contract, (ii)
neglect of duty, (iii) willful misconduct, (iv) acts of moral
turpitude, (v) conduct tending to bring shame and disgrace to
the University as determined by the Director, (vi) violation of
University rules, regulations, policies, or directives not
remedied after thirty (30) days' written notice thereof to
Assistant Coach, (vii) violation of the rules and regulations of
the NCAA, Big East, or any other intercollegiate athletic
organization with which the University may affiliate, (viii) a
criminal conviction that would be the equivalent of a felony
111. TENUTA CONTRACT, supra note 32, § VI.
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conviction, or (ix) absence from duty in excess of thirty (30)
days without the Director's consent.
Should the University elect to terminate the Assistant Coach's
employment under this Section VII. A, payment of salary and
benefits shall cease as of the date of termination. In addition,
and independent of any action that may be taken pursuant to
the foregoing provisions of the Section VII. A, the Assistant
Coach, if found in violation of NCAA regulations, shall be
subject to disciplinary or corrective action as set forth in the
provisions of the NCAA enforcement procedures, including
suspension without pay or termination of employment for
significant or repetitive violations.
Failure to impose disciplinary or corrective actions in any
particular instance of breach or violation, or with respect to
any particular conduct or incident, shall not act as a waiver of
the University's right to later discipline or correct the
Assistant Coach in connection with any breach, violation,
conduct or incident, whether the same or different in degree or
type.112
Kent Baer - Washington (Defensive Coordinator)
This contract may be terminated by mutual agreement of the
Parties at any time. The University may terminate
Employee's employment under this Agreement for good
cause. Good cause shall include, in addition to and as
examples of its normally understood meaning in employment
contracts, Employee's failure to perform or comply with the
duties or terms of this Agreement, significant or repetitive
violations of NCAA rules, or significant or repetitive acts that
are materially prejudicial to the best interests of the
University.' 13
Tim Buckley - Iowa (Assistant Men's Basketball)
112. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN RUTGERS, THE STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW JERSEY
AND CRAIG VER STEEG § VIIA. (July 1, 2006) [hereinafter VER STEEG CONTRACT].
113. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON AND KENT BAER §
8 (Jan. 1, 2005).
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The University may terminate or take any other disciplinary
action, as it deems reasonable and appropriate, for cause.
"Cause" as used in this Contract includes, but is not limited
to:
(a) A major violation or significant or repetitive violations, as
determined by the University, of an NCAA or other
Governing Association rule or regulation by or involving a
Coach;
(b) A major violation or significant or repetitive violations, as
determined by the University, of an NCAA or other
Governing Association rule or regulation by a coach of the
Team, any University employee for whom Coach is
administratively responsible or representative of the
University's athletic interest of which, in the judgment of the
University, Coach knew or should have known with
reasonable diligence and oversight.
(c) Multiple intentional secondary violations, as determined
by the University, of an NCAA or other Governing
Association rules and regulations related to the Team of
which, in the judgment of the University, Coach knew or
should have known with reasonable diligence and oversight;
(d) A charge by a federal, state or local law enforcement
authority or the commission any criminal offense by Coach
which, in the judgment of the University, would tend to bring
public disrespect, contempt or ridicule upon the University;
or,
(e) Any conduct, as determined by the University, which
constitutes moral turpitude or which would tend to bring
public disrespect, contempt or ridicule upon the University, or
which constitutes a substantial failure to perform in good faith
the duties required of Coach in Paragraph 2 above.
In the event of a termination under this paragraph,
University's sole obligation to Coach shall be payment of
his/her salary provided for herein in Paragraph 3 through the
date of termination for cause, and the University shall not be
liable to Coach for any collateral business opportunities or
other benefits associated with Coach's position as Assistant
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
Coach. Prior to termination for cause, University shall
provide written notice of the charges asserted against Coach
and a reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges.' 14
TERMINATION "WITHOUT CAUSE" PROVISIONS
Craig Ver Steeg - Rutgers (Offensive Coordinator)
1. The University may also terminate this contract as it deems
necessary to further the best interests of the University. In
such an event, and subject to Section VII. B.2 below
concerning the Assistant Coach securing other employment,
the University shall continue to pay the Assistant Coach's
salary and benefits, for the balance of the then-current term of
this contract. The Assistant Coach agrees to accept any such
payment as full settlement of all claims and demands which
may accrue to the Assistant Coach under this contract. The
Assistant Coach further agrees that the University shall not be
liable for any claims or demands for loss of collateral income,
business opportunities, expectations, or for any other direct,
indirect or consequential damage or loss.
2. If this contract is terminated pursuant to Section VII. B. 1,
the Assistant Coach shall be required to exert reasonable
efforts to secure other employment consistent with the
Assistant Coach's background, skills and experience. Upon
securing such employment,, the university's obligation to
continue salary and benefits pursuant to Section VII. B. 1
above shall cease and the University shall not be liable for any
other amount or item. 115
Jeff Casteel - West Virginia (Defensive Coordinator)
In addition to the provisions set forth above, there also is
reserved to University the right to terminate this Agreement
without cause at any time. In the event that Coach is
terminated pursuant to this section, University shall pay
Coach (1) all base salary and incentive compensation actually
earned and accrued but unpaid through the date of
114. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF IOWA AND TIMOTHY P. BUCKLEY
§ 10 (May 4, 2006).
115. VER STEEG CONTRACT, supra note 112, § VII.B.
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termination, and (2) an amount equal to the remaining base
salary during the term of this Agreement, which sum shall be
deemed to be liquidated damages and extinguish all rights of
Coach to any further compensation, benefits, incentives and
entitlements from University. Coach shall have no duty to
mitigate, nor shall University have any right of offset. 16
Michael Andrews - Florida State (Defensive Coordinator)
Subject to University approval, the University and SB shall
have the right to terminate this Agreement without Cause at
any time by paying to Coach such amount of money as is
equal to the then remaining present value of Coach's unpaid
base salary and other compensation as set forth in paragraphs
A. and B. of Section III of this Agreement, including a pro
rata share of compensation set forth in Sections III. A. and B.
earned or accrued but not yet paid or disbursed. For purposes
of this sub-section, "present value" shall be computed by
reference to commercially accepted standards as are mutually
agreed upon among the parties.' 17
Thomas Asbury - Alabama (Assistant Men's Basketball)
Unless the Contract is terminated pursuant to either Section
5.01(a) or Section 5.01(b), the University shall have the right
at any time to terminate this Contract without cause and for its
convenience prior to its expiration. Termination by the
University without cause shall be effectuated by delivering to
the Employee written notice of the University's intent to
terminate this Contract without cause, which notice shall be
effective upon the earlier of the date for termination specified
in the notice or fourteen (14) days after receipt of such notice
by the Employee. If the University exercises its rights under
this Section 5.01(e) to terminate this Contract without cause,
the Employee shall be entitled to damages only as provided
for in Section 5.01(f) below, and Employee shall not be
entitled to receive any further payments of base salary, talent
116. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN WEST VIRGINIA BOARD OF GOVERNORS AND JEFFREY
A. CASTEEL § VI.C. (June 30, 2005).
117. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA STATE AND MICHAEL
D. ANDREWS § V(A)(iii) (last amended Mar. 30, 2005) [hereinafter ANDREWS CONTRACT].
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fee, or any other sum, compensation, perquisite, or benefit
otherwise payable under this Contract, except Employee will
be entitled to continue such life or health insurance benefits at
Employee's own expense as required or permitted by law.
The parties agree that if this Contract is terminated without
cause, then Employee shall not be entitled to any hearing.
If the University terminates this Contract without cause prior
to its expiration in accordance with the provisions of Section
5.01(e) hereof, the University shall pay, and Employee agrees
to accept, as liquidated damages an amount equal to one-
twelfth (1/12) of Employee's current base salary then in effect
pursuant to Section 4.01 for each month or portion thereof
(pro-rata) in the period from the effective date of termination
to the end of the Contract term as specified in Section 3.01
above. The liquidated damages amount shall be paid to
Employee in monthly installments commencing on the last
day of the month in which the termination date occurs and
continuing on the last day of each succeeding month until the
date the Contract term would have ended as specified in
Section 3.01 above. To the extent required by law, the
liquidated damages amount shall be subject to deductions for
state and federal taxes. The University's obligation to pay
such liquidated damages shall be subject to Employee's duty
to mitigate the University's obligation as specified in Section
5.01(j) hereof. The Employee will be entitled to continue
such insurance benefits at Employee's own expense as
required or permitted by law, but Employee will not otherwise
be entitled to receive any further or additional compensation
or employment or other benefit described in Article IV hereof.
The parties have bargained for and agreed to the foregoing
liquidated damages provision, giving consideration to the fact
that termination of this Contract by the University without
cause prior to its expiration may cause the Employee to lose
certain benefits and incentives, supplemental compensation,
or other athletically-related compensation associated with
Employee's employment at the University, which damages
are extremely difficult to determine with certainty or fairly or
adequately. The parties further agree that the payment of such
liquidated damages by the University and acceptance thereof
by the Employee shall constitute adequate and reasonable
compensation to the Employee for the damages and injuries
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suffered by the Employee because of such termination by the
University. The foregoing shall not be, nor be construed to
be, a penalty. 18
Ideally, assistant coaches want their contracts to address termination "for
cause" and "without cause." First, assistant coaches will want the contract to
define cause by specifically enumerating all circumstances that will qualify as
"cause" for the university to terminate the coach. The contract should state
that "cause" is limited to those circumstances enumerated in the contract.
Second, the assistant coach will also want a termination "without cause"
provision that requires the university to pay the coach some amount of
continued compensation or liquidated damages upon early termination. Often
the measure of compensation will be the coach's base salary, or a portion
thereof, for each year remaining on the contract, subject, however, to
mitigation of damages.
Termination provisions have obvious importance; nevertheless, the
significance of these provisions is limited if an assistant coach is operating
under a one-year contract. Often coaches with one-year terms are not
terminated; instead, the university simply does not renew an assistant coach's
contract after the expiration of the one-year term. Termination provisions can
protect one-year term coaches against in-season termination, but in-season
terminations are not frequent. However, termination provisions are most
significant for coaches with multi-year terms. As we discussed in an earlier
section, multi-year contracts are preferential for assistant coaches. For
assistant coaches with multi-year contracts, termination provisions are very
important.
VIII. COACHES' EARLY TERMINATION RIGHTS
Assistant coaches should also be concerned with the right to terminate
employment early. Assistant coaches are often looking to escape their
contracts in order to pursue other coaching opportunities. This is common
among head coaches, but currently it is less of an issue among assistant
coaches because most assistant coaches operate as employees "at will" or
under a one-year term. Being an employee "at will" is beneficial for an
assistant coach who wants to leave his or her position for another position.
"At will" employees enjoy the right to leave a position of employment at any
time. This is the other side of termination situations for "at will" employees.
118. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
ALABAMA AND THOMAS S. ASBURY Art. V, § 5.01 (e)-(f) (last amended Nov. 15, 2006).
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"At will" employees can be terminated at any time, but they also enjoy the
right to resign from their position at any time without repercussion.
Assistant coaches with one-year terms will also usually not have an issue
with their "early termination" rights because their contracts expire each off-
season, leaving them free to pursue employment elsewhere. They will only
have a problem if they wish to leave during the middle of the season, but this
is highly unusual in collegiate athletics.
In practice, assistant coaches' early termination rights are only a relevant
issue for those assistant coaches with multi-year contracts. Assistant coaches
with multi-year contracts want to have the option available to leave if a better
career opportunity becomes available. Most assistant coaches' contracts will
provide the coach with this right, but the assistant will usually be required to
give the university notice. Some assistant coaches' contracts will also require
the coach to pay liquidated damages to terminate the contract early. The
liquidated damages amount will usually be relatively small, and in most
situations, the assistant coach's subsequent employer will pay this amount.
Hence, the assistant coach should not be overly concerned.
The following are examples of early "termination by coach" provisions
from various assistant coaches' contracts.
Michael Andrews - Florida State (Defensive Coordinator)
Upon thirty (30) days written notice the Coach may terminate
this Employment Agreement. Upon such termination by
Coach, the University and SB shall be under no further
obligation to Coach, except to pay him such amounts as are
due him for actual services already rendered up to the date of
the termination, including a pro rata share of compensation set
forth in Section III. A. and B. but not yet paid or disbursed,
and the guarantee of Coach's compensation hereunder by SB
shall be extinguished.1 19
Dana Holgorsen - Texas Tech (Offensive Coordinator)
Coach may terminate his employment with University by
giving written notice to University, subject to Article V. F.
NON-COMPETE CONSIDERATION below.120
119. ANDREWS CONTRACT, supra note 117, § V(B).
120. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY AND DANA HOLGORSEN §
V.C. (Dec. 31, 2005).
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Victor Koenning, Jr. - Clemson (Defensive Coordinator)
Coach may terminate this Agreement by furnishing the
University three (3) days written notice to accept other
employment, provided that Coach shall also tender to the
University liquidated damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00). Likewise, Coach's act of
accepting another position shall be deemed to automatically
terminate this agreement and shall release the University, its
employees, officers, and trustees from any obligation
hereunder.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, should Coach secure a
position that a reasonable person within the football coaching
profession would believe to be a professional advancement, or
with the express written permission of the Head Football
Coach, and approved by the Athletic Director, said amount
shall be waived. Further, should Coach not receive a written
intent to renew the terms of this employment agreement at
least one year prior to the expiration date, then liquidated
damages shall be waived should Coach accept other
employment. 121
Most head coaches' contracts require a payment of liquidated damages if
the coach decides to leave early. In head coaches' contracts, the amount of
liquidated damages will usually be much higher than it is with assistant
coaches. The following are examples of liquidated damages provisions from
head coaches' contracts that apply when the coach terminates the contract.
Thad Matta - Ohio State (Basketball)
If Coach is employed or performing services in a coaching
position for another NCAA Division I school or for a
professional basketball team, Coach will pay Ohio State as
liquidated damages, and not as a penalty, $500,000 to
reimburse Ohio State for expenses including, but not limited
to (i) searching for, recruiting and hiring a new head
basketball coach and coaching staff, (ii) relocating a new head
basketball coach and coaching staff, and (iii) buying out the
121. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN CLEMSON UNIVERSITY AND VICTOR E. KOENNING,
JR. § 4(f) (Feb. 13, 2006).
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contract, if necessary, of the new head coach. Coach shall pay
all such amounts to Ohio State within thirty (30) days after the
date of Coach's termination.122
Bill Self- Kansas (Basketball)
In the event Self should terminate this Agreement, for
whatever reason, after the first twelve (12) months of the
Agreement, Self shall pay or cause to be paid $1,000,000 to
KUAC as liquidated damages. The parties agree that such
liquidated damages are reasonable compensation for losses
that KUAC will incur and are not a penalty, and shall be due
and payable within sixty (60) days following Self s
termination or resignation. 123
Karl Dorrell - UCLA (Football)
In the event Coach terminates this 2003 HC Agreement and
accepts employment at another PAC-10 Conference athletic
program (including without limitation, any University of
California PAC-10 institution) before January 31, 2009, or
any extension of the Term, whichever is later, Coach agrees to
pay UCLA liquidated damages in the amount of $1,000,000
(one million dollars) within 90 (ninety) days of his acceptance
of such employment;
In the event Coach terminates this 2003 HC Agreement and
accepts employment at non-PAC-10 Conference NCAA
Division A-1 athletic program or with a professional football
team before January 31, 2009, or any extension of the Term,
whichever is later, Coach agrees to pay UCLA liquidated
damages in the amount of $600,000 (six hundred thousand
dollars) within 90 (ninety) days of his acceptance of such
employment. 124
122. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY AND THAD M. MATTA
§ 5.3(c) (Mar. 8, 2005).
123. EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT BETWEEN THE UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS ATHLETIC
CORPORATION AND BILL SELF § 6(C) (Apr. 21, 2003).
124. DORRELL CONTRACT, supra note 96, § 8(c)(i)-(ii).
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The table below provides the amount of liquidated damages other coaches'
contracts require them to pay.
Tommy Tuberville Auburn (football) $6 million
Billy Donovan Florida (basketball) $100,000
Mark Richt Georgia (football) $2 million/year
Steve Spurrier South Carolina (football) $500,000/year
Urban Meyer Florida (football) $150,000/year
Tubby Smith Minnesota (basketball) $3 million in 2007-2008;
$2 million in 2008-2009;
$1 million in 2009-2010;
$500,000 in 2010-2011;
nothing after that
Assistant coaches will want their contracts to provide them with the right
to terminate their contracts. Preferably, there will be no consequence for the
assistant coach terminating the contract early. However, universities
sometimes will require liquidated damages because they want to deter
assistant coaches from leaving. If the university does require liquidated
damages, the assistant coach should negotiate that the liquidated damages will
not apply if the assistant coach is leaving for a better position, such as a head-
coaching job. Generally, there is no need for assistant coaches to object to a
notice requirement, so long as the notice period is reasonable. Overall, the
assistant coach wants to ensure that he or she and the university have similar
rights to terminate the agreement early.
IX. CONCLUSION
This article examined the varying rights and legal protections of collegiate
assistant football and men's basketball coaches through a study of numerous
Division I assistant coaches' employment agreements. From this study of
employment agreements, several conclusions about assistant coaches' legal
rights and contract protections were reached. Below is a list of the major
conclusions:
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* There is no pattern or consistency among assistant coaches'
contracts.
" Assistant coaches' contracts differ greatly in length and
sophistication.
" Many assistant coaches do not have written employment
agreements.
• Most assistant coaches without employment agreements coach at
smaller programs.
* There is an increasing recognition of the value of assistant
coaches, which has resulted in rising assistant coach
compensation.
* There is a compensation disparity between larger and smaller
programs.
* There is a compensation disparity between football and basketball
assistant coaches.
* Division I football coaches' compensation is rising fastest.
* Football coaches at major programs receive the best perquisites,
incentives, and outside income opportunities.
* Most contracts are for a one-year term.
* Currently, multi-year term contracts only exist among assistant
football coaches.
* Termination rights are essentially meaningless unless the contract
is for a multi-year term.
* By virtue of the one-year term, liquidated damages are also
basically meaningless.
From these conclusions, it is apparent that assistant football coaches at
larger programs are in the best position among assistant coaches. Most
basketball coaches and football coaches at smaller programs have lesser rights
and protections. In general, assistant coaches do not have the rights and legal
protections they should, and overall, assistant coaches appear to be an
underrepresented group.
In order to attain these rights and protections, all Division I football and
men's basketball assistant coaches should have competent legal representation
that can assist them in reaching an employment agreement with the university.
Assistant coaches should have full-length, comprehensive written contracts
that are negotiated with the help of a legal professional. Ideally, assistant
coaches will have multi-year term contracts that provide them substantial
compensation and opportunities for perquisites, bonus incentives, and outside
income. The contracts should address all relevant aspects of the assistant
coaches' employment, particularly termination situations. Through the help of
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a legal professional, all assistant coaches can attain all the rights and legal
protections that they deserve.
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Assistant Football Coach
Dear
It is my pleasure to confirm your recent appointment as Assistant Football Coach. This appointment is subject to provisions
ofthe University Personnel Policies for Designated Enolovees xenomt from the Personnel Act (EPA). A copy ofthis
document was given to you when you were hired.
Your appointment will be fora specific term beginning nd ending" Your
appointment may be renewed at the option ofthe Director of Athletics and/or the Cancellor of ' ' or his
designee. In that this appointment is for twelve (12) months or less, no further notice is required should it be determined that your
appointment win not continue.
Your position is contingent upon the continuing availability offunds from the Department of Athletics' budget If'this
finding is terminated, or redirected for other uses by the funding source, your position may end without notice. Every effort will be
made, where possible, to give you no less than thirty (30) days notice that the funding has terminated and your position will end. If it is
determined by the Director of Athletics and the Chancellor's Office that the program to which your position is assigned is to be
curtailed or elfiinated, your position also may end with every effort made to give you proper notice as indicated above Please note
that you will be expected to perform your duties in accordance with all applicable policies and procedures of the NCAA, Confertx e
and Department of Athletics, and to conduct yourself according to acceptable standards of performance and conduct for EPA
employees at ECU.
Your annual salary is' ,ad will be paid in semimonthly increments of Your salary is subject to
adjustments (annual increments) that may be authorized by the General Assembly of: . mu to the compensation policies
of the Board of Trustees and the University Administration of in its annual review and evaluation of EPA employees.
You will earn sixteen (16) hours annual leave and eight (8) hours sick leave per month. Any leave that you take must be
reported to the Director of Athletics' office as soon as possible on a Form LR-4. In the case of annual leave, it should be requested in
advance of its occurrence, unless emergency situations dictate otherwise. By accepting this appointmnt you agree to the provision
that your twenty-four (24) days of annual leave are to be exhausted during the contractual term. The Director of Athletics or his
designee reserve the right to direct you to take leave in order to assure that no leave is accumulated at the end of the term or for any
other reason"
please sign the enclosed Agreement designting your acceptance of the terms and conditions of this offer and return
the original to my office as soon as possible. I look forward to your employment in the Department of Athletics and of your successful
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sun providtd you rtemployd as ourv Coam hwtoat, on-such date
You eI.ll also bevnt# g to, recivopoaseaon bonue eanod In gourdauilt wi th iind rubjetto estab l. NO, and ACO pol c!lon tnd AhIeto depaeanfgUldelinds. Wi pdorThOV21 Of the Athecs Direcr and Chariosor, andsueo i omplnarad wit) t "Policy on
x atemmL Or o trtnal A*A for Pay of the 6=4 of Governors and-Un .Ityrse oardof Tsrytes, NM regutaoh govring ricelptofathlnetiWiy relatedfnoiric .and benltfrdrn sow e outdds the Univrsiy, sri ll other roe antt# ed federalpom ,cs end lae oncerning cbfllat of Interest you may ea-t other-ovinue while employed by
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the Unfrlty. SUoh.".vits erg lide sndent-of your Univear employment and the.
Untvefty shall have. ri V ponsililty' rny do Mssring-ot related-to ouchbmployment..
Tls hhallinoudo arigaglng thi any ja1lo, eevilwoh. r6tlon lclu% .stage wilttgo" any Wm90a.r
am', PeTe.eomo e,,xliJ endorueannta, snd-foothoarnmp.' Subjeotlo..
apsoilwreportg requlrament estabilhtud b- the hvia,, no. 4,tse A. tI'WI 11.be1.
Bli w! d without tiav on Ofitsf~e Ath~let6ic rii o,,-tnigned approvaltothe 'Notioe ofinteritt Ehgage In. ExternaI es.anui. Acfle$ ,1brP. .pr Or to engagln~g in thoe act~tes.
T h T mt ed d a. m ag s r o v sion s to. o a. f Y•na e . " u r. .oy m n t M th ot I
cause pr10rto'the xprbn-0 ther*r the Uftveij wMi pq yoq liquidated damages I , lau of
a.arnd all other'legal romedlie, or aqjytlbl*eief. in to anlctunt of the al1ry remaining under
.the term Ofyou" appolntmsnt such amount to. be paid o ar annust.basis, Tlb-niversityVwil
notbdablet oyou for any calftia- business opportuno of ofter.benefti as0odated with
yoar p Itlon. In accepting i appokintment you oknowledg.l that thi .Is an agreement for-
poronal services and that termina ton o'ftle agriement by the.Unlverai y pr1oro Ita natural
expiraon could cause you to lose certain benefit iupplemoriti compensation or. outside
compansaborv Mat h toyour employment at the Urlvwuity vhfah damages are difficult to
soartdil with cetaInty. Therefoe you and t1ir UhIversty a4jr4 to-t I,liquidated. demages:
prvilon. Further, not tonridng te aboVyou agree to rrI1tgate'the Univeralty'e obligatign.
to pay lig Idate damagi. a 1ollow. s1f yOu obtafn new soloyrnent, th.UrlversWy's flaondal
obligations ihal be to pa youthedf'renc between fhe sral you would have reoeived as
OflOlave C0*c Mdiato, and the esjiy In youriiowjob. Ifyof. rnalary in-a new Job exceed* that
whlch you would have bWen.paid at' fthe Unvers.*t' e financial obligatons to you shall
oeGase,.Uder no circ tacaes shall. be.llabeit yvuaorany colliteral business
opportunities ot other baneat ' ,
Thetarme regarding yourtermlrffnan with pm'levion and rawai by the University ore as
follow In ac i- athis ppointment you sgmetatm=u hviw gpeda, exoeptlonalahd unicus_
knbW0edge, W1 and abIlly ea-s. footbll mob A whloh* hI ,drin to the oontlnuing aequalto of
coaching experlene. at ..- U"rsly,- a we1 at-th Ur Verali epJa I need or
continuity In its footbaifprogtir,, nrb. dr yourservioilunique. You renognie that the loss of
your eerc.s, to the Uivallythout -.mority.apoy vuL an-ralsede.pflor to the ex.traon of
the term of .lh appointmnt or any rnewai thereof, would jause an therent loss to the
University whioh cannot be eStirnated With oertalntyorldy o edequatsiy:oampensatsd by
money dan-tge. -You thsrif agrve notto naotNelyek, igotlate for or mccept aiployment,
undrl any 00uteraoi,.wlthout first o bMingwrtten perr ;aioriof theohanvollor and theAthlael Director,. a a football. coach t any nstitution ofhlr/h ereducalln whlch le a merber of
the NCAA orfor any profesional team puaidlpsting In any jircieselonal league or con rwome In
the Unted'SWts 'or ersewvnirs requlrlng.performanoe fdduas pdior.to the expirationof the term
of this apponient or any exnso thiereof, If aftr-d&c0sfon, you wish to accept . •
employment elsewhere as def ied b wve, you must fld"oblal . release of this agreement from
the Ohancellor-and Athletics Direoior, Including aiiegotiated seternent to terminate tile
ontmot. Such ref6e s ind settement shall not.be valld urr'I accepted In writing by y6u ahd the
Chanellor and the Athletl Dicer.,ton Permilslon to doacuss unother position, relsaie of this .
agreement or a. negbtlated settlement will be pursued In good faith and the unlverstlw-ll -not
unreasonably withhold Its approval or execution of a reloaao for noeotlated settlement.
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~ou ~kn~t.~o anr~&hat~en p~U~ab~r ot Un~vraly,. upon-youra~oote .c soth nb2olent,. tttltfr an h p nw'famnounts n other trlms e,.d..
.mndVona- ntald-tvl not bv cMnftdenlatiand sWhl-Ij Wadrnedrapub recor Within.hemai 0 l= anfna b~eo i NLa..N .S. g 324 t q, • .
Thl ofer s ~~oo t theappM ~tt.noe~otUntvirA'. Upon that
appnmvl, you wlrocs4v wnfffaSotlaw oum ilmitnt ?s lo~t O Ph oard
of Governm ifaid .-ad of TMM&em9nWfoMnetFWf Plcsfor -UnIvaNdy ft~iaa
leemt fromth AbeStt. Per=onnei. AoVwhthn b found m-
f you do not. hae twia to the Internet. pe-,io.
co~lto ne~ ta =op ,-Errioyent~ soutl; iubject the laws of the State of NoMt
.-Caril6ia and alKpolldeiaaf the xyllen and Unirslt.. In
additon, you im obtlat lt f (rac o tmply with the:prlnclplem, polk4e0, and ragulaon5 ofthe.NaUl~nat Collegll.te AseMOlaein and the AtSJntIO Omit Confsisnce.
This letter con 1t wtha N.ltamm of or enloyrruoffer an upj'mes all othdr
ormment.either witte or viitl 1,t rny b6 ma . to , To socapt thl offer, pleae date
end 8Iofl lopy of this loter andrtjm to re "sm oo * uapcs= Is but not later than
. We.ooktf ardi w ng'u adtionahl. If| miy-be.of help, pique Jet fl6
• koepttho Otrofr e*myorent damald In the above lettr ind uwidrstaetn thed R Is not
offectve.untUl approved by the *riollor o Unlyralty.
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT AND NOTICE OF APPOINTMENT
FOR ASSISTANT MEN'S BASKETBALL COACH
This Employment Agreement and Notice of Appointment (CAppointment") confirms
the conditions offered and accepted for the appointment of (hereinafter
ASSISTANT COACH) as a member of the coaching staff of University in
the Department of Intercollegiate Athletics.
1. ASSISTANT COACH shall have duties and administrative responsibilities as
assistant coach of men's basketball. Those duties are further described in the
ASSISTANT COACH's Faculty Position Description, which is on file in the Athletic
Department and in the Office of Human Resources. ASSISTANT COACH's Faculty
Position Description may change from time to time during the period of this Appointment
at the discretion of the Athletic Director.
2. This Appointment is for a fixed term period beginning and ending
, at 1.0 FTE. This Appointment is subject to the rules of the University and of
the State Board of Higher Education, including all provisions that apply to fixed-term
appointments, except as otherwise provided herein.
3. The annual salary rate computed on a 12-month, 1.0 FTE basis shall be $117,312.
4. ASSISTANT COACH agrees that as a condition of employment by the University
ASSISTANT COACH will not engage in, support, .or knowingly tolerate any action
violative of any governing constitution, bylaw, rule or regulation of the Pacific 10
Conference (PAC-10) or the National Collegiate. Athletic Association (NCAA).
ASSISTANT COACH agrees to advise the Athletic Director immediately if ASSISTANT
COACH has reasonable cause to believe violations have or will occur.
5. ASSISTANT COACH agrees that as a condition of employment by the University
ASSISTANT COACH will not accept gifts, other than from immediate family, accept any
employment outside the institution, engage in any business transactions or commerce,
participate in any coaching clinics or camps, endorse any products or services, or
appear for payment on any radio or television programs, without having first notified and
secured the written approval of the Athletic Director and the President or designee.
ASSISTANT COACH shall comply with the Policy on Outside Professional
Activities.
6. ASSISTANT COACH shall report to the Athletic Director on October 15 of each year
all athletically-related' income and benefits from sources outside the institution,
including, but not limited to, income from annuities, sports camps, housing benefits,
television and radio programs, and endorsement or consultation contracts with athletic
shoe, apparel, or equipment manufacturers, received in the previous 12 months. The
report shall be filed with the Athletic Director on October 15 of each year and shall cover
the period from October 1 of the previous year to September 30 of the current year. If
ASSISTANT COACH's employment with University initially commenced after October 1,
the report shall cover that portion of the reporting period for which ASSISTANT COACH
was employed. Reports shall be made on forms provided by the Director of
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Intercollegiate Athletics. The Athletic Director shall forward reports to the President of
the institution and a copy shall be retained in the faculty personnel file of the assistant
coach. This report of income is separate and distinct from the prior approval of gifts and
outside income required in Section 5.
7. This Appointment may be terminated prior to the end of the fixed-term period, or
sanctions may be imposed, for any of the causes set out in the State Board of Higher
Education's Administrative Rules. One of the causes, as defined by the State Board
Rules, is failure to perform the responsibilities of an academic staff member. For the
purposes of this Appointment, such failure shall include, but not be limited to:
a) engaging in, supporting, or knowingly tolerating any action violative of any
governing constitution, bylaw, rule or regulation of the NCAA or the PAC-10
Conference, during the period of this Appointment or at any time during the
2 years previous to the execution of this Appointment, whether at this or
another institution,
b) failure to comply with the attached Code of Ethics of the State Board
of Higher Education, which is incorporated herein by reference, and
c) failure to carry out faithfully and diligently all department-related duties and
responsibilities as assigned by the Director of Intercollegiate Athletics or
Head Coach or this Appointment.
In the event University terminates this Appointment for cause, University shall not be
liable to ASSISTANT COACH for any loss of collateral business opportunities or any
other benefits, perquisites or income.
8. At any time after commencement of this Appointment, University may terminate this
Appointment without cause by giving written notice to ASSISTANT COACH. The
termination shall become effective no earlier than 15 days after receipt of the written
notice. In the event of termination under this Section 8, and subject to the provisions of
Section 8(a), University shall pay ASSISTANT COACH the amount of ASSISTANT
COACH's annual base salary (as set out in Section 3) that would be due over the
remaining term of the Appointment if it were not terminated. This amount shall be paid
on a monthly basis prorated over the remainder of the term of the Appointment.
ASSISTANT COACH understands and agrees that if this Appointment is terminated
without cause, ASSISTANT COACH shall not be entitled to any benefits or
compensation other than that set forth in this Section 8.
a. In the event of termination under this Section 8, ASSISTANT COACH
agrees to make reasonable and diligent efforts to find new employment. After
ASSISTANT COACH obtains such new employment, University's obligation to pay
monthly salary shall cease unless ASSISTANT COACH's compensation in ASSISTANT
COACH's new employment is less, when computed on a monthly basis, than the
monthly obligation of University under this Section 8. In that event, University's
obligation shall be reduced on a monthly basis by an amount equivalent to the
compensation ASSISTANT COACH receives in his or her new employment. At any
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time ASSISTANT COACH no longer serves in the initial employment after leaving the
University, the University obligation, if any, under this Section 8 shall cease.
b. In the event of termination under this Section 8, ASSISTANT COACH
agrees not to apply for unemployment compensation.
9. ASSISTANT COACH certifies that he or she has not knowingly been involved in
violations of NCAA, PAC-10 Conference, or other intercollegiate athletic conference
rules or regulations at this or any other institution in the two years immediately
preceding the execution of this Appointment, and that he or she has not been the
recipient of any disciplinary action including, but not limited to, termination or
suspension from duties, by any other institution for violation of NCAA or PAC-10
Conference rules and regulations during the two years immediately preceding the
execution of this Appointment.
10. ASSISTANT COACH shall be eligible to receive additional compensation for post-
season competition in accordance with policies developed by the Athletic Director.
11. If ASSISTANT COACH participates in an sponsored camp, clinic or similar
instructional event, payment shall be made on an overload compensation basis. The
amount of payment shall be determined at the time the budget for the camp is approved
in accordance with Department policies.
12. Tickets for Athletic competition may be provided in accordance with provisions in
the Athletic Department Policies and Procedures Manual. University may cover the cost
for ASSISTANT COACH's spouse and dependent children who are still living at home to
accompany COACH to one away competition site that may include the PAC-10
Conference Tournament. University payment for such costs in all these cases shall be
in the sole discretion of the Athletic Director and shall require his written authorization.
"Costs" includes reasonable accommodations and meals at rates set by Athletic
Department policy. ASSISTANT COACH may participate in the University's courtesy
car program, subject to the provisions in the Athletic Department Policies and
Procedures Manual.
ASSISTANT COACH understands that these benefits, if received, will be reported and
likely are taxable.
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- MULTI-YEAR AGREEMENT
THis AGREMENT IB maderan'd ntarid into by sect.between-
University. hereinafter referred tod.
rdt'ed tois.Coaoh
WIrNESSETH: That hereby-employs Coach-as AssistantlFootball "
Coach at Univetsity and Coach accepts saldemployment under ife following
terms and conditions:
1. g Thef tn of this EmploymentAgreement
shalt be January 1, 2006 tough December 31, 2008.
.(a) BAsSar The annual base salaty rate shall be $
220,000.00 payable bi-weldy. Effective lanary, L 2007.
the aiual base salary rate shall be $230,000. Effective
January 1. 2008, the annual base salary shallbe $240,000.
The base salary may be amended upon mutual agreement
--of Coach and , by executlon ofa letter of
amendment signed by and Coach.
(b) E: Coach shall be entitled to partielpateln
the fringe benefits mailable to all athletio department
employees.
(q). Bowl Bonus: Coach may, from timeto time, receive 66nus
compensation, shold the Notball team
pari.cipate in a post-season bowl game, The- amount of
bonus compensation shall be agieed between the Head.
Football Coachand the Atletlc Director, but shall not.
exceed one-twelflh of his annual salary.
(d) Other Bonus: University, at Its sole discretion, may award
bonuses based-upon extraordinary achievements such as,
Page I of 6
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but-not limited .6, conference.ohmplonshl ps, divsional
'.. . oapohsipsots nln.a~ fm achlevernents,.eto,. '
The'amoulits shall be fromiegatly avallablf6. tnd andthe .....
a "mount of the.bonuses shllbeat the dficretion of -the
Unlvlrsity. -
(d) ciesxQA.: UnivetIty may provIdeat Its' solo
discretlon,'a 6ourtesy car'fbr use by Coah. -P.islon of
suoh case is not part of the consldoratlonof this contract
iind maybe revoked atay. time.
. 3. Coah'sDtei .-. :
"(a). The duties of Coach s'ill bido, usual.and cuslomnary
dutles'ofan assistani footbtll coaclh hIcluding, but not.
Ilihed 0~. siu4 t-athlete i*crutment, teaching -and
coaching football, monitoring and coaching the overall
athlaecand academic development of student-athletes. And
any such other reasonable duties of an athletdo nature as
may be assigned by.the. Head FootbalI Coach or the
Athletic Director of "Unlversity. Coach shall:
provide the University with his most'dedicated and
consolentious servlc, and shall perform his duties with the"
highest istandards of the:profbasion..
•(b)" Coach shi.l.pertbrm his duties In compllance with the
* ..policlesand ruls.of(he University.,the Stato
the NationalCollegiate Athletic A sociatlon.
(NCAA),. the Atlantic Coast Conference (AC-), and any
other assoclation, conference. or ike: organizatlon With.
which theUiversity Is. or may become, affiliated. Coach
shall report Any or suswected dolations of NCAA or ACC
* rules-by staff, studenat or other representativesof the
Uhiversity of which the coach.knows, suspects,'.or should
* have known, -Coach shall be liable to the university foe any
Page 2 of 6.
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* monetary damage sufftevd as-a result oftntenfloml.
violtLons of NC-AA ACC, or Univeity regulations. In
ad.ton, in a oordance wih NCAA Rul 112.2; -Coach
"agrees la piovide a written domiled account annually to the
c .hief exedutivefflooffor altihletically:relatd1ncom
andbenefits- iom ourcr&s outsde theinstftion. Approva
of all aiielicaltyfrel ated IWOmadb ssl=lrb "
income and benefits applicable to ali emiployees
4. Terminationby Univrsit'.
(a)Teffnilon for .u, ShouldCoach ll.to perbrmr any •
of his dutleasandobligadlons stated in Paragraph 3 above, or
found "ln vololIonofNCAA reguladtions shall be subject to
distplinai'yor corrective action as set fdrth in the
provisions of theNCAA enforcement p odedures, including
suspension without pay or termination of empoymet r
signiflcant or repetitive vlotions." N A Co"
Agreemen. Bylaw 1, .1. Should tenmintion occur
pursuant to Bylaw 112.1, Universit may terminate this.
agreement without further obligaton or liability upon thirty
(30) days written notice to Coach. Should Coach be
arrested or convicted of a felony or orime ofnoral
* turpitude, University may terminate Coach without any
further obligation..
(b) termInatfon at the Qenence of the UnveJrst.- By-
giving written: notice to Coach, the University shall have
the right to terminate this employment without oalqse at any
time. Coach agree& that any compensation remaining
under this Agreement Is subject to mitigation In the event
terminates this Agreement and shall be reduced
by any compensation from accrued leave..
Page 3 of 6
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(c) , Nowstaidl% the foregoing; oach
agrees to mflgate Univerity's obligatlons to'pay the
Sfor.golng payment elyWaking dlllgeit ffoft to obtain
.. .; .ime employment, busness of professinai.income (for
oxmmim¢, but iot Hinited torootball oachi meda.
* commehtatr; speaking engasements, ranching: r other
.- ; .'%44. Pea . -. . . ; . . .
academlcactiitica consuiting-or partlipatlon In b.usness
or-aity otherincome -poduong opportuat ). Coach shah
begin maldng sucihdgent efrts to obtain suchi income as
sooin as practicable but dot later than tht (30) days
following such termlnasilon and each thirty (30) days
* thereafter shall provide UnIversity ,ith a written report of
the spolio efforts ubde'taken In this regard including the
amount of income, fany, resu!lting directly or Indirectly'
therefroni. :Unlverity's financlal oblition under -this'
-contract shall cease or be reduced commen.suratelybyi the
amount of any such lcoine..
Failure to mnake such diligent efforts shall be a material
breach of thls agreement and shai relieve of its"
obligations to pay any liquidated damages.
(d) Ligu il.,Dwag: Alternatively, University at its-sole
dlscrtdon,-iay provide, in lieu of the provisions In
Paragraph 4(b) and 4(c). liqidated damages in the amount.
of one-lilf of anmal basesalaWytmes the number of years,
or portion thereof, then remaining in. this Agreement based
on these conditions,
I. The University shall not exercise 4(d) prior to
the end of the normal hiring period (April 30 of
the year following the effective date of
ternnnation),'unless Coach has not acted in
accordance with the provision of 4(by(o),
Page 4 of 6
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2. Should University.exerclso paragraph 4(d),
SUfilversI*) shalinot exeicise 4(o)at any future
time.
* 3; Once Coach securesfull-time mploym en and
. U.nivestyc.aco ep m.gatlon pursuant to 4(.),
-- "sUniv ty'ahallnot theiafter exercise
paragraph 4(d>*hIleCoach is galnftil.
employed.
(e) Consultafion: University, at Its sole discretion, may engage
the services of Coaches a consultant beyond the term of
*IthIs employment agroenen. Such ongagemen shall not
exceed o ie yea., Coach shall not bh entltled to participate
in fringe benefits availMble to other Athletic Department
employeqs.. Said consulting. contract Is separati and
distinct from the employment agreement.
(f) TerminatiOP by Coci- Liquidated Damaaes. Coach may
termnae this Agreement by furnishing the University three
(3) days written n6tice to accept other employment.
provided that Coach shall, also tender to the University
liq'uidated damages in the amount of Fifty Tiousand'
Dollar ($50,000.00). Likewise, Coach's act of accepting
anothetposition shall be deemed to automatically terminate
this agreement and shall release- the University. its
employees, officers, and trustees from any obligation
hereunder.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, should-Coach secure a
positiob.that a reasonable person within the football
coaching profession would believe to be a professional
advancement, or with the expres written perm.ission of the
Head Football Coach. and approvWd by the Athletic-
Director. said amount shall be wiied. Further, should
Page 5 of 6
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..Coach icot receiv.e a written intent t6ienw the tlihs of ths.
employ rent nag. meiitleust one yeas!Oror to the
expiraeflolidate. thenliquidated'daages. 4hal be .Wved
.shiould. Coach accept othir employmen ".
4. Elin~nsior o1y ate ,,c giiti Cophagres tbi s pa# of'th
coasideraton ~f bi' agr e6nenL CoAc wgives ein l! Irlayaw~e
.. as it .m ay,-be aiended..,. .. .. • .
th -sole and complete Agreemem betlweenth paries an.that all pior
.contracts mnd .g'oements'for persoal srvces between the prties.are.
hereby cancelled.
PTNESS y fie pariies hce to set their ands and seals tUis
CT -
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.R..Y F... ASS-ANT.COACHA
..This Agreement is: Made by and betwee -the University of. ("the.
University")and (the.Coach" . .. .
I- .. nconsidorationof the mutual co#- aats and.vndliiOns'conanedhee.n;tho Universityy and
the Coach agree asfollows: • - .. .
Emiovmet--,ubject. to the conditions state in theprolina of this-agreenrent, -the
Un.versty herebyemployi theCoach as anassistant coach of the men's varity footbalfteani
at the.University, and the Coach hereby agreesto and .d6es accept the ternms and conditions
'for said employment outlined heftin. The Coach shall perform such duties as, may be
assigied In connection with aupervision andad inlstraton of thfootbail progm, and such
other duties and rea ponslbilities usual and oustoinary to an aslsttnc]tead football coaching
position in ai in ,ollogiate program, as maybe assigned by the University. The Coach
shall work under the immediate supisiion oftand report dirctly -to, -the. Head Football
Coabh of the, University (".the Head Coach"), and shall confer with this supervisor on* all
matters req'iring adrinistrative.and technical decisions.
2. T.O.o--The teim of this Agreement shall begin ,and shall terminate6n
subject to the conditions herein. This employment agreement in no way grants the
Coach a clairi to tenure in employment, or any.yarsof employment attributable to tenure
within the University.
3. " Com nsation-In consideration for ervices andcontinuous satisfactory perfornnce ofthe
conditions of this Agreement byte Coach, the University promises to pay the Coach:
3.1. Asalar'y at the annual rate of effective , payable .in equalinstallmen.ts at the end of-each regular University pay period.
3.2. .Except as herein "prdvided, the Coach shall be entitled to the same non-financial
personnel benefits that am provided to the University's Exempt Faculty Non-tenured
Contract employees,-except for.annual leave which is not ahbe.efitprovidd under this.
agreement.
3.3. .Theforegoingcompensation shall be subject to 'the same payroll- deductions (for
exnample, state and federaltax&, F..C.A. with-holding,and retirement plans) that apply .
to tie .University's Exempt Faculty Non-tenured Contract employees,
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4. •Coaht uties-h consideration of the amnualsaiary and 0er benefits which may become
due-and payable.to the.Coach under provisoni.of this Agreement, the Coach does'piodise
and , - as follow ":,
4.1 Fat ly and consientously topeifonn the dutes assipedby the Head Coach and
h Director f Athletics of the Uiertyof ., irector
Department of nterblllate AthletiCat the Unfvesty.
4"2 •:To evote-such tie andattention' ndeorgyl. th dutieaof"ssistaffootblCoadh
a•. are required, to faithfully diichargw the duter as -det fbrth howrinj and as are
requW.i foi pro.motion, of. the Unveityer Athletic program; and to avoid any
business.orprofessional activities or ptirsu6 that Will conflict with thi performance
of the duties under this Agreement, or will otherwise intedferewlth the Universitrs
inte ts.
-4.3 To recognize ahd.comply with the laws, policies. rule., and regulations of the.
Depa tment .of lnthcolleglate Athletcs ("ICA"); the. Univeralty of , the
National Colleg.ate Athletic. Associton ('NC.A"),. and the Atlantic Coast
Conference 'ACCO) as now constituted or as may be amended during te term
hereof, IncludingNCAA bylaws 11.2 attached; This shall include adheiingl o ICA
policies. and predures in critical'areas, to include but nbt Ilolted to, recruiting,
compliance, university and ieam related travel, atsindlng coaches- m6etlngs, and
co1mpleting ippropriate compliance form. TheC6ach shall be responsible, through
"educatiop and m6t.ing,.to ensure all eniployees and other persona affiliated with
the football pfogram for which he, is. adinistratively Mr ovnaibie comply* with
afoeaid-polilos, rules and regulations. The Coach shall be accountable for
violationf by. any employee or-other pmsons affiliated with the foothall program for
whic'h he Is anitnlstiatvely-responsible for su evising or controlling;"provided,
with reasonabl foresight and knowledge he should have prevented the.occurr'nce.
The Coach shall Jmmediately Inform the Compliance OffiOer. of sny suspeocted.
violations.andassist in.the inyeigation .and roporting thereof, if requested.
4.4 To acquit. himself at all times in a professional and -sportsman-like manner.. The
' Coach recognizes he is a highly-visible representative of he Uniersity, whose
conduct,.both A. and offthe'field, affects the.ieputation of the institution, the
-viability ofits. athletic programs -and contracts, and the weil-beng of its -student-
athletes. -The Coach will avoJd:pi-ofane, discotteous, or lnsutingbehavlo towards
student-athletes, ieferees, spectatori, and members of the" media.
4.5 Except as may be authorized in advance by the University's Professional Sports
Counseling Panel- and thereifter repored to It, to avoid contact with any person
* knownto be acting or have a history of acting as:a sports agent, a "runner", or any
6ther individual employed by -or perforning services for them. The Coach wtl"
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e.onclentlousy observe and efore te regulations governing amateuri smnand the
relationship between spons agents, and student-athletes at the Universty of
4.6 ThLeCoach agrees that academic progrs and achievement of the studnt-athle*
und.. this :supeIVislon is of the highest impbrtance. The Coach ire.to adheie to
the Universlty' standards. and goals for pe cemic peulormnnce of Its student-
atbl.tes n hli'recrultmebt, supervisoi andoovhng of player , ThbeCoach agme.
". to follow dil-gentty riny direcves fomtb. *edCoacand the Diector of Athletics
•(6rD ee)con ringsuch matter."
4.7 -The Coach agrees to conscientiopsly observe all Uveri:y, NCXA, and ACC rules
pertaining to outside income. The Coach shall request in writingand must receive
the prior written annual approval of the iresid.nt of the Uidyersity before negotiating
for orreceiving any athletically-felatedincome or betiefita from the sources outside
the Uniersity. These sources include, but are not lmited from:
. Annuides;
b. Sports Camps;.
c. Housing Benefits (Including preferential houing arrangements);
d. Country-club memberships;.
e, Complmentary ticket sales,
f. Television and radio programs; and -
g. Endorsement or consultntioil contracts;-
h, Other promoions.
The Coachts request to the President shall Include the amount of income from each coitemplated
outside source.
4.8." With regard to outside ificome, the Coach reserves the sole right to control the use of
his'Image In any adveitsingof products or services. In oonnection therewith, the
Coach is. authorized to represent himself as "an Assistant-Football Coach of the
University during the term of this agreement andto appear In .clothing containing
University logs; and/or other insignia, both on and off Universitypremises.
4.19. The Coach shall submit a written report to the Dirictor.of Athletics descrbing any
athletically-related income and benefits from sources outside the University by June
30th of each year. The form of this report shall, be determiued by the Director of
Athletics. The Director of Athletics'may require reasonable additional or verifying
inf6rmation.
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5. ~Radio ndTeleviolon .
.. 5.. h-eTUnivemty, through the Departmentfi". tereollegiat e Athtiedc, wil..ex.rcise:
reasoable effoi'o obtain radio and tvls ' ppbarafea for the Coach." An
S " .vques gemted-byub apearances shalbelthsle and excuisve'pro. ity.of.
th- Un~vers ity In any yearthe Unversity xre ' the- personal appearan.of te
,oa.," -. onntion with any ralor television. g ethe Univetslty
guamnes qhe . aapaymen.of.
Payment for tese ervi0c-es ahall be made on
5.2. with reiga rd anyroioor'e o sfio w btainedbk ythe. Unveksity putuant to.
Paragaph 51., the Coach agree to mialpparancea, duringthe footbal'easo for.
such televisionafid radio.shows as am reasonably equid At such tiniesand places
as are mutuallyconvenient..
Yer .- Th ..,al be.alb o ei
6. Personal Aggearangea on Behalf of thoUnlverltv - Th*Coachhai b avalable for media
and otherpublic'.ot private prancosatsuch.time and plagea the Unlyerslty, through
th. Department of Intercollegiate Athletic., may reasonably requite and determine'to be
beneficial to pmmothng the UniVersity and its Inteircollegiate Athletic Program. TheCoach
shall comply in A material tspects with such req4ests... For these services faithfully
performed by the Coach duri.ng each fiscal year.th6 University will pay the Coach
Payment for these appueraneS shallbomadoon or about,
annally,.
7; Fund Raising Activitbes - The Coach shall beavailable for'publto and privait fund raising
and development activities at such tinas and places as the Unlerslty; through the
tbepatment of'Interollegiate Athletics, may reasonably requiie and 4dtennine to be
benfliial to the Univdatty and its IntercollegatoAthletfc Program. The Coach shallcomply
Inall baterial respects with. such requests, 'Fund raising shall include, but isnot limited to;
activities to foster .the cntinued growth of the' and Gridiron
Netork, to'cultivate potential doiors, and tos'oiicit major gift. It is understood that fund
raising may require the Coach totparticipate i events oranzd by contributors and u onsors
of-Intercolleglate Athleb.progrims. For fund raising services faithfully pkrformid by the
Coach during each fiscal year, the. University will pay the Coach
Payment for these appearances shall b6 made-on or.about annually.
8. .S,,ervm. &uipmot and ARparel Endorsements
8.1. The Univrsity reserves the excluslyelght to tpontract with commercial firms
. regarding the procurement or endorsemeit of setices, equipment, or apparel. that
maybe worn or usedby student-athletes or AthleticDepartment.personnel in
practices-and public performances. Any rvenue generated from such agreements
shall be the sole and exclusive property of the University.
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.. 2. Except as expressly providd in.paragraph .5 (nRadioand.Televlion" and.
paragah 8.1. ("Services, Equipment and ApparelEndorsements"). if.the.Coach
desires to engage in anpy endorsemeni, :consultiig, or.broadcasting aqtivities for a .
"fee, the Coach shall. first iotify the D1ror ofAtNeticsin writg .If the Director
of Athletics does not pohbit. in wi6ng ad ot n a ragonable basis, sue activity
•:w thin.7 days 6f notice.bythe Coach. the4Coach.shaji be entitled to engage in such
activity.
9. Football
.9.1. The Coach shall n6t endorse; sponsor. approye.or operate any sports camp on
University premises'without the specific written approval of the University.
10. Additional Financial Matters.
10.1. The Coach ihall codd'uct such-travel sls necessary to carry out his duties as assistant
.football coach, and shall beentitled to rembursement for travel expenses.pursuant to
the:University's rules and rats therefor.
10.2: The University. through the DeparteitoflatercollegiateAthletics. will provide the
Coach with a car allowance in'an annual amount of.
payable Ineqtal tjistallments.at the end of eaci regular Uhniversity pay period. during
the terr of this agreement to lease a late-model automobile for his personal use.
Anything to the contrary notwithstapding in this Paragraph 10.2. the Coach may use
any car allowance re.eived f n*m . University as he s&s fit.
10.1. The Coach shall receiveuse ofsix'(6) tickets:for reular aeason home football games
and six.(6) tickets forregular season away football games. The Coach will not offer
these tickets for tueby ape.rs n vorking (or who has Worked) as a sports agent or a .
person employed by or performing servies for a sport agint wiihout the prior
w*rtte.n aproval of the Director of Athletics,
.'0.4. •In addition to the tickets listed in 10.3. the Coach shall be eligible for the following.
coniplhnentary tickets jffing the termo rthis contract: ..
(a) RegularSeason Tickets.
Two (2) regular season tickets for home men's basketball games.
Two (2) regular .season ticbkets for-home women's basketball games.
(b) Post-Season Tickets - For 9ny post-season competitions in which the Coach
participates. he/she shall be eligible to receive six (6) complimentary.tickets for
his sport. .subject to availability.' The Coach may request the opportunity to.
purchase tickets at face value to post season competitions for other'.'
varsity teams. subjeO to availability.
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As maybe required by federalor state.tx prbvjsions, it shall be the .resonslbility of
theCoach tortport the valur of benefiu received under.this paragaph and to pay any
lal arising therefrom. .Subject tbo'CAA, Mel, .the use of these, trcketo is.eft to the
Coach' li'cretin' however, thesale rexchange.of these.tickets can..Wise iasts
under State-13thics laws,..including but not limited to, soliciting gifts. or
cieatnga conflict ofintieset; Ii. the responsibilityof *,Coach to consult with the
Unive sity'. legal.office ij/o the StatAMI6ot Cmmnijson befor .elng
or exchanging hiaher tickeis for any tible beaeflt.
•c)" Pas List" During t .toi 6f ths'o*.act.the Coach vjll'be eligible to:tlize.•
the rcritng pssilist dr compllmentary sdndssiofla to designated-yvarslty.
competitions, including but'not lImited to Mootbal, wonlen'. basketball and
1 menf9 basketbil..Tl heUmbt ofp-ss-list admisalons avalAlel to thde Coach
wilt be subjecfA46.'ailabiity and limited for use by high school or junior
college coaches, and high school 'orjunior college prospective student-atWletea
and their family, members. Family, -fien&s,, prospect donors, or businpss
associates ar not iligo ble for admiasion oi , the.t ecrrting 
p ,ass lt. Reue.t5
for incluston on a separate pass list for prospective donors and businesas.
a.SodateB will be .Vviewed and mianaged on -a ease-by-case bisis by an
adminfstrator a8signed toihatspo, All such requests shbuldbe submritedno
later than two hours prior to game time but preferably earlier.
10.5. The Universily shall pay ft.C oach a bonus in each year that. the football team is
selected-to compete in a.Post-Season Bowilgame. Said bonus will be as follows:.
a.- The coach will be paid a bonus of If the.
fbotbal team finishes th.e regular'season.in sole possession offirst plhce in the.
ACC football standings,
b. The coach will be. paid a bonus of I if the'
footbalteam finishes the regular season. in a two-way tie for firt place in the
ACC football stndingi.-
c. The co6ach will: be paid. a bonus of if 6e.
football team finishei the regular season in a thre-way.tie for first place in the
ACC football standings.
d. The coach wil be.paid a bonus of' if the
football. team finishes the regular season in afour-way tie for first place in the
ACC footbal standings,
e. The coach will be paid a bonus of if the
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f, T'ecoachWill bepaid a bonusiof if the football team
.fnls es the regularseasoni In atwo-way tie-for second plac-in the AC .. football.
g theoachil bea iaonus oft if the:
fdtball .am f.ni.hesh .. gularaeson in- itheway kie for secondplacein.the
,ACC f66iball tadings
h. The:voa.tl wi1 bpad. abonuiOf if thle
footb.-tem.. ".Oihes the regllarseson in a four-waydefor seeofid.ace lnthe-
A(JC foob4latandi9gP*
I e. Th coach I..be pad a bonusof ,if the
football team finshs, the regular season in sale posiesdon of third place in the
ACC fotball standings.
'. The coach will be paid a. bonis of . if the
football team finJahes the regla-s.s6n in. A two-way tit for third place In the
ACC footall standings.
k. The coach will be paid a bonius of ifthe
f6otall t6am finlshea theregular season in a three-way tie for third place In the
ACC f6otbaH statidings,
I. The coachwlll be paid a bonus of , if the
football' team finihes the regular season in a four-way tie for third place In the
ACC football standings.
mI The coach-will bepaid a bonus f ith.
football team hnfathes te regulars sr in sole possession of fouth-pac ii the'
ACC football standings or tied for fourth place in the ACC football standings.
n. T7eCoach will be, paid a.bonu of . . . ifootbal team finishes the regular season in a tWo-way tie for fourth place In the
SACC football standings.
o. The coach wil be paid a:bbnus of if
the football te minishes theregular'season in athroe-way tie for foflrtb -place in
the-AC football standings. 
.
p, .The coach will bepaida.bonus of ,ifthe
football team finishes the regular seaion in a four-way tie for fourth place in the
ACC football standings.*
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.
q. .The coach wll bapaida bonus:of " If the.
football team flnishes the regular &won i.sole p6adssion of fift place in. theA C.footba1I standings '
r. The coahw le paid a.onnsof ... )ifthe
fotball t6am fnigh es the regular'.easbn in a twd-way ti or 6fth plc in the
ACC football standinga.:
S. The coach will bepaid a bonus of if tbd
football team .tashathreg r season.in a hee-aya
ACC football -stanings.
tThe ooach will be paid a bonus of if the
football team finishes the regular season in a four-way..tie for fifth place in the
ACC football stindings.
U. The coach will be paid a'bonus of. tf tib
fo1otba.'team.finishes the regularsonin soleposaegson of sixth place in the.
ACC football stanidingg.
.v. The coach will be paid a bonus of if the
football team finishes the regular season In a two-way tie for sixth place in the
ACC football staridlngo.
w.' The coach. will beL paid. a bonus of if-the.
football team finishes theregular season in q three-way tie for sixth place in'thle
ACCfootball standings.
x. Th.e oach willbe paid a bonus of. if the football
team fiishes the regular ieuson in a four-way tie for sixth place In the ACC
football standings.-
The.University's obligation under this paragraph will be paid to the coach on
March I of each year didng the life of this agreement.
10.6. At the eind of each academic year, the Coach will be eligible to receive -a bonus
dependingon the graduation rates of student-athletes in the men' football progrn. .
a. 'The University shall pay the Coach a bonus of
provided that the graduation ite ofthe men's football program, as repoited by the
.. -NCAA for the most recent reporting period; Is 86% or higher.
b. The University sball pay the Coaeh a bonus of
if the reported graduation rate of the men's football program, as
reported by the-NCAA for the most recent reporting period, is less than 86%, but
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greater than -or equal to 76%..
CTe Univerfty shall pay the Coach - bonus of
if -th6 tepof.td gduadoe-rate of the men'8., football: program, as
orted. by th NCAA fithie mostrecent reporting period,Is less'than 76%, but
Sgftatethan-orequa.to65%. .
.* Paynt will 1,8 made On . followiilg hed tte NCAA report Is
available.
10.1. The Universi shall pay -the Coach a bonus of
provided that.-with regird to all football st-dent-athletes, the coach or. anyother
member of the football staff: -
a. There are no violations of the .nivemity's Code of Student Conduct or its Code
of Academic integrity; and,
b. Ther are .no arrgets, indictments, at convictions for any odinal or suspected
criminal conduct; and,"'"
c There hasoccurrednoeglect or willful conduct-which the Director of Athletics
concludes violaktes the NCAA Constitution or the NCAA Operating Bylaws,
'especially this peitaining toethical conduct.
Paymenti If eamed, will be made 0a
11.1: No tthatandlng-paragraph 2, this Agreement shall terminate upon the occurrence
of any of the following events,-and ex'ept for the payment of any salary or other
compensation, or installments thereof, which have acrued for services performed
as of the date of termination, the rights and oblgationr of the parties shall cease:
a. In the event of the Coach's.death or permanent disability. A disability shall. b
* presumed peranent for purposes of this paragraph- if the Coach Is unable to
perform his. normal and customary duties for a continuous period in excess of 180
days. -
b. In the event of the Coach's Tesignation from University emnployment or upon his
. acceptance of other.employment (subject to paragraph 12 herein). -
c. In the event of cause as determined by the Director of*Athletics; provided,
however, the Coach will first receive written notice and be -accorded an
opportunity to be heard In a meeting with the Di'rectoi of Athletics. The decision
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. of the Diector of Atedcashall be final.
Ctse .J8all Ihchllde matedal mhl'onuct, .morl turpitude' or a. pattern 'ofptainp'onai-like behavio, lzub..Ix natlo, reftisal, neglect, or" failure to render
.ser~i'es oroteaiwj.se ftkfill ooiletelydhedutle and 'obligations etablished i. thia
agreeet., Cap~selnoludes nflc 0 wllfiti coniduct'whiC~thO D eto1O6fAtkti
e in to is vio of.
.NCA,,r atonn,:he shallbe subet c d .. in or eti atsetfrth'
in the :pxbviaions of the..NCAA. wf6memnt: procedtur, Iicluding suspeflslo :
.ithout"pay or temination.of employment for sdgniflcant or reptive violations..
The Director of Athlet[ imay suspend (with or tdthout pay) or reiaal -the coach
pending an investigaion,.deplsion, ori thr matter relating to the existende of WLU4
for termination.
11.2,. In addition to thereasons for terminatim. set forth in the preceding paragraph, the
performance of'work undei thls.Agreement may be ternminted by the University.
whenever4he University determined that termination Is Iniis.bet intemsts,. Any such
terrinsion shal be effected by'deliv.iy to.the Coach of a written" Notice of
Termination specifying the date opn which such termination becomes effective. In
the event of a termination pursuant. 10 this paragraph, the Coach.shall be entitled to
continue to recelve-for the.remaining partion of the term of this agreement as if he
were still emp6yad:.
a. The salary as provided In paragraph 3.1;
b. The Radio and Televisionpaymentprovidedin Paragraph 5.1; and
c. T.e automobile payment provided in 10.2.
However., the Co~oh shall have an affi.mative duty to mitigate.amounts paid by the
University by.actively seeking employmnt in his profession during the remaining.
portion of the term fn th6 event the Coach secures other employnetit,.whether
cmpensated or uncompensated, duiiag the inalning portion of the term of thi.
Agreement, he is obligated tQ notify W- University in Wrlting of. the -terms of that'
employment- before. the first day of said employrment, including salary 'and any
additional compensation. The.University has theight to reduce continuing payment
obligations to the Coach'to theextent that he earns other salary and additional
compensation? In'the event of uncompensated enployment or employipent below'
the.fair market- value of such- einploymen.t (hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Volunteer Employment"), the University has the right to reduce the continuing
payment obligations to the Coach In tb amount of the fair market value of the
Volunteer Employment, plus the .mount of any other additional non-salary
compensation received. Fairmarket value shall be the salary received by similarly
situated coaches employed by the entity receiving. the Coach's Volunteer
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Eviployment services. hailUre to -notify the Univrsity. as required 5ndr this.
paragraph shall be corasiderad amaieial'breach of(his Agreement, and shall relieve
this Uhv ,rsyfi'om FA futur6 obligations to make-payments tolhe Coach underthis
12:1 . . . ,. .
Athletics'determines, the Coach. to have engaged in'material mlisconduct, moral
wpitud& or..a pattern of unprofessional-like behkvior, itiubordinadtion,"refusal,
neglet, or failurto. rander.-services or otherw..e fulf&ll comptely the dues aid.
.bliotio establ1,hedin thisagrenent itshall Rai tdiscretion of theDirector.
of Athletics to take actioi other than tenation; providedfiowever, the Coacrwill
fint receive rilttn notice and be accorded an opportnity. to 6e.heard in a me ting
with the Dir tor of Athletiac. The dedsion -of the Director of Athletics shAIJ be
:final.. Actions the Director of Athleticsmay take:include, but are not limited toIa
•w1tte .re.piimand, i suspension (with or without pay), a forfoliure of future'bonuses
orbeneflts'' ;as of a planned selarylncrment or miert raIse, probation, Orpermanent
reassignment.
1.2.2 'The Dhtqtqor of Athletics may suspend (with or without pay) oreassig the Coach
pending.an investigation,decision,or other matter relating to theexistence of cause
for ationund~r this paragraph.
12.3 In the. event that the Head Football Coach accepts other employmeit oroth rwse
-voluntarily tminates. his employment agricinent with. the 'Uhiversity, then the."
Dlrectpr of Athleticd.or* designee may modify the duties, responosbliles. and/or
reporting relatidnphip of the Assistant Coach, Such reasslgnment to another simllat
or comparable position shIl be made with: oonsideration of tho employee's
knowledge, slls, abilities, and saary, The Dfrectbr of Athlei s or designee shall
-provide the, Coach. With two. wieks wrItten notice of: reassignment prior to the
effective.date of the action. Fl.ure to.report to th'ereassigned position shall be,
cofsidered an Imnedlate voluntary rsigntion.
13. "t t pjo ""
13.1 The Coach hetrebyrepresents to have special,.exceptional, and unique knowledge,
skill, nd ability as a f. otball coach which, In addition io future acquistions of
coaching expeornce, at the Unive0ity, afs wellas the University's special need for
continuity in its football prograin, Will render.the Coach's services -unique. The •
Coach recogWzes' that the loss of, Coach's services to th6 Univerpity, without.
University hpproyal and release, prior to the expiration of the term 1f thjs contract
or anyrenewal thereof, would cause an ihherent loss to the University.which cannot
be estimated with certainty, or fairly or adequately compensated by money
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132 Ther'Cdach. themfref agznagrm and bAe~y specibaily hn5~ fot' to accept.
MP loy :n, r aa, Mstan6 , 8n a fooball coach- it. ,nY' Insti of
ihihe~r~ ucti hic I a. mebof die Ntional .e, iate.Athe.c
-Asociation, ir yfo tb ,p it tg. dany rofesonal 1 ."gon '
conference pri to the e0hadn'ds ofthis contract. or. any extension- thereof,
.without flintobtainiaaleao~tf th& 6fitracor~a aegtlae evt thereoI n witng acepe byt th eCoa and. the irecto of Athetics, which .sel.int
will nt be-unreasonbly &Wthhde ".
* 4, RlaiosinBewAgth a resTeeitnsp betwe th ioch and the University
shall be detemiind oolelyby :h terins and conditions of this contract.
15.• Umitafion of Remedleo-'The parties agre tat zelther paty shall be Uable for any colateral
or cohsequ0tlal dniage'.of any kind Including damages for.lost collateral, business
oppornitien, orcompematlon arrixcnts se forh herein, orifor costuandattorneys fees
In the event of a breach hereutder.
16. 8 -Neither party may assign, transfer, alienate, or encumber any of its rights or
obligations hemeunder wfthout.the express written consent of tie other party. "
17, o-this Agreement ahall be governed iy and constrned under the laws of the
Sovereign State of
* 18 Severabiliy- If aby provision of this Agreement shall be determined to be void, inva id,
"unenforceable, or iMegai for any reason, it shallbe ineffective only to.ihe extent of such
prohibion and the validiy and. enforceability of all the remaining provisions shall not be
afected thereby.
19. h -This Agreement oonstitdtie theentine understandfing betWeen the Oniversity
and the Coa6h and may notbe altered except by iwrltten amendment duly executed by both
.parties.
20.. - onfidnoality-Except'a required by law and the NCAA or ACC rulesth6 terms of ths
contract, exept for the term.of the eontract andthe-annual salary,shall not be disciosedlto
any outslde..party without the consent ofboth.partds hereto.
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N W Bs W Bop, d a Coahnd the athoriz.d ropontative of
.the University have execu-ted this agneent on this . day of______________
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University of
NIAA)M~w.11Z AthicticAiYA ~ helte inom
'ThIs form to to be used by atidetto doap1 t eta roomben; and. fb-Iyim coches (heador assistant) is.8 ineeno oB508 -I*
athletioaiiy related incomeaend baeiie as tofrovoures otsideate itItiton whch ki Hot f~~ielm ItlD9119 If agemOai cnfrac.
..........
'O CO.... LE' 'I ccc leIih. "pc Ieo h a J IIII II I evdfs ItobeyrIatdl Imfr h I
•.M. %2 I. . ..w., p ...... .., . .... ..... .. . .... . .....
. t to (he Office of~thietic Cnornnllaen ,
Source of Athletically Related Income Actual dollar ameount
Use of a Viklo -
Spealdng ieugagmcents
Sports Camp. or Clinics
Conmiptimutary Tict'ld Sale




Televislio Appearances or Commerdas
Radio Appearances or Commercials
Income from eorporotions In exihauge for charitable work
Annu~ties
Salary Supplement (Prom'eotslde the department)
Houcing Beeft
Country-Club Membcblp (fron outside thedepartuset)
Other (please spedy below)
1 6eereby.ertif, that theabove Information Is4rue and aecurata and onibme to aiINCAA, conference and Instltutional regtltorIa governing
outsfid income. I will notdfv the hlof execoutive offloe ofmny now Infoamuton or aonucoe f incom Ihat may occur on theture







AND CIVIL RIGHTS: EXAMINING





A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)
C. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
i. Title III: Public Accommodation
1. Generally
2. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
ii. Title II: Public Entities
iii. Title I: Employment
iv. Current Considerations
D. Athletic Employment
i. Physical Education Teachers or Professors
ii. Coaches
iii. Officials
Attorney in New York; Adjunct Assistant Professor, Hofstra University, New York; J.D., St.
John's University School of Law, 1980; B.A., cum laude, St. John's University, 1977.
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III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1964 (ADEA)
B. Intercollegiate Athletic Departments
i. Coaches or Athletic Directors
ii. Other Athletic Department Employees




ii. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
iii. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)





APPENDIX: CHART - FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS INVOLVING ATHLETIC
DEPARTMENT EMPLOYMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Athletic departments have always been unique fiefdoms within
educational institutions. This concerns not only the physical aspects, as they
are usually situated in a separate domain apart from the main area that houses
the typical classrooms, are the only departments that historically have operated
overwhelmingly segregated programs for male and female student-athletes,
and were given a legal patina, which sanctioned this status quo.' The 1960s
1. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2000)
[hereinafter Title IX] (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sex in educational programs and
activities that receive federal funds); see also the implementing regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 106.34
(2006) (recently revised regulation; however, its inception in 1975 broadly allowed for single-sex
physical education classes) (there has been no case law since Title IX's passage in 1972 challenging
this regulation's application to physical education classes); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b) (2006) (allowing
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and early 1970s ushered in a cornucopia of federal statutes aimed at
eradicating discrimination based on an individual's civil rights due to the
person's race, 2 religion,3 national origin,4 sex,5 disability, and age. This
includes the following statutes highlighted in this exposition: Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 19916 (Title
VII) (race, sex, national origin, and religion); the Individuals with Disabilities
in Education Act 7 (IDEA) (disability); Rehabilitation Act of 19738
for separate interscholastic, intercollegiate, club, or intramural teams where the sport is a contact sport
or competitive skill is triggered); 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (2006) (directing equal opportunity when
separate athletic programs are provided for males and females). There has been ample case law
contesting 34 C.F.R. § 106.41. See Diane Heckman, Women & Athletics: A Twenty Year
Retrospective on Title IX, 9 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1 (1992) [hereinafter Heckman,
Women & Athletics]; Diane Heckman, On the Eve of Title IX's Twenty-Fifth Anniversary: Sex
Discrimination in the Gym and Classroom, 21 NOVA L. REV. 545 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Sex
Discrimination in the Gym]; Diane Heckman, Scoreboard: A Concise Chronological Twenty-Five
Year History of Title IX Involving Interscholastic and Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 7 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 391 (1997) [hereinafter Heckman, Scoreboard]; Diane Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker: Thirty Years of Victories and Defeats Involving Title IX and Sex Discrimination in Athletics,
13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 551 (2003) [hereinafter Heckman, The Glass
Sneaker].
2. See infra note 6.
3. Id. For claims based on religion, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(e) (2000) (businesses or
enterprises with personnel qualified on basis of religion, sex, or national origin; educational
institutions with personnel of particular religion). See also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Nedra Rhone,
Ruling Says LI Teacher Bias Victim; EEOC: Coach Denied Posts Because He Isn't Italian,
NEWSDAY (N.Y.), Jan. 25, 2002, at A4 (EEOC ruled a Jewish physical education teacher was denied
a high school coaching position at a Long Island public high school due to his religion). For cases
involving a religion basis, see generally Diane Heckman, Educational Athletics and Freedom of
Speech, 177 EDUC. L. REP. 15, 15 n.2 (2003) [hereinafter Heckman, Freedom of Speech] (listing cases
involving freedom of religion and academic athletic employment) (the commentary provides an
exposition of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection involving athletic employees
working at educational institutions); Diane Heckman, One Nation Under God: Freedom of Religion in
Schools and Extracurricular Athletic Events in the Opening Years of the New Millennium, 28
WHITTIER L. REV. 537 (2006) [hereinafter Heckman, One Nation Under God].
4. For national origin claims, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2006)
(EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National Origin). While there is no case law
concerning educational athletic department employees, see generally Dowling v. United States, 476 F.
Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1979) (finding no Title VII violation in this case commenced by discharged
Canadian professional hockey referee who sought damages from the U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Labor, the NHL, and the World Hockey Association).
5. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688; 34 C.F.R. § 106.34; 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(b)-(c); Heckman,
Women & Athletics, supra note 1; Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 1; Heckman,
Scoreboard, supra note 1; Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1.
6. The most significant civil rights statute is Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000), which governs
the elimination of discrimination in employment based on an individual's sex, race, national origin,
and religion.
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2000).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
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(Rehabilitation Act) (disability); Americans with Disabilities Act of 19909
(ADA) (disability); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 196710
(ADEA) (age); and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964"1 (Title VI) (race).
All of these federal statutes would potentially target educational institutions. 12
This survey article profiles athletic employment at educational institutions
and its interaction with federal statutory civil rights laws prohibiting
discrimination based on disability, age, and race. 13 The exposition highlights
the significant elements of the applicable statutory laws and excavates the case
law rendered by the judiciary within the last forty years, with an emphasis on
recent decisions. While there has been an abundance of cases challenging the
elimination of societal and institutional sex discrimination involving athletic
endeavors,' 4 there has been minimal case law addressing the other areas of
discrimination concerning athletic directors, coaches, physical education
teachers, officials, and other athletic department support staff. Nonetheless,
educational institutions and athletic departments must be cognizant of the
panoply of federal statutes protecting individual citizens from discrimination
by others, which may include other individuals, governmental or public
entities, or private entities. Each statute has its own jurisdictional requisites,
which must be reviewed.15 A review should also be made to ascertain whether
there is any comparable state legislation. 16
The major issue in the formation of our country was determining the
power of the central federal government versus the sovereignty of the
individual states. The concept of federalism, recognizing this dual distribution
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000).
12. See Weaver v. Ohio State University, No. C2-96-1199, 1997 WL 1159680 (S.D. Ohio June 4,
1997), where the Ohio district court stated:
It is noteworthy that two of the pre-existing federal laws which prohibited discrimination
in employment were amended by § 906 of Pub. L. 92-318, the same statute which
contained the operative and enforcement provisions of Title IX (§§ 1681 and 1682).
These amendments to the Equal Employment Opportunities Act, Title VII ... and the
Equal Pay Act, . . . brought employees of educational institutions engaged in educational
activities within their coverage and prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
Id. at *6.
13. This article is a companion piece to one investigating sex discrimination. See Diane
Heckman, No Girls Allowed.- Excavating Forty Years of Sex Discrimination Involving Educational
Athletic Employment, 18 SET-ON HALL J. SPORT L. (forthcoming 2008) [hereinafter Heckman, Forty
Years of Sex Discrimination].
14. Id.
15. See id. at 4-7.
16. Id. at 3 n.8.
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of power, is present in the United States Constitution in a number of
provisions, including the Eleventh Amendment.17 The biggest land mine for
all the federal civil rights statutes is whether the express or implied statutory
ability of a citizen to commence a lawsuit in a federal court against a state
entity runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. Thus, the most significant
inquiry today becomes the operation of the Eleventh Amendment, which
would preclude citizens of a particular state from being able to sue a state or
an "arm of the state" 18 in a federal court for monetary damages based on the
governing federal statutes. For the first time in sixty years, during 1996, the
Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez19 ruled that a congressional statute
aimed at protecting the nation's youth attending schools, specifically by
regulating the possession of firearms near schools, was unconstitutional as not
having met the interstate commerce connection upon which the statute was
based.20 This followed with the Rehnquist Court emasculating a number of
other federal statutes by determining that they violated the Eleventh
Amendment by trampling on the sovereign immunity of states, starting with
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.21
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XI, which states, "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." This amendment
has been held applicable to citizens attempting to sue the state in which they reside. See Williams v.
Dist. Bd. of Trs. of Edison, 421 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11 th Cir. 2005) (stating, "The Eleventh Amendment
bars federal courts from entertaining suits against states . . . . Although the text of the Eleventh
Amendment does not appear to bar federal suits against a state by its own citizens, the Supreme Court
long ago held that the Amendment bars these suits.") (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890));
Diane Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment on the Civil Rights of Disabled Educational
Employees, Students and Student-Athletes, EDUC. L. REP. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 2, on
file with author) [hereinafter Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment].
18. Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to state entities and private entities
engaged in state action, the Eleventh Amendment pertains to a narrower subset containing states and
"arms of the state." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See Williams, 421 F.3d at 1192, wherein the Eleventh
Circuit identified four elements to determine if an arm of the state is involved, stating: "(1) how the
state defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the state maintains over the entity; (3) where the
entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgment against the entity." In Williams, the
court determined that the defendant-Florida community college was an arm of the state. Id.; see also
Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17, (manuscript at 8). See generally
Diane Heckman, Fourteenth Amendment Procedural Due Process Governing Interscholastic
Athletics, 5 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 4-5 (2005) (addressing whether the defendant is a proper party
defendant for Fourteenth Amendment purposes).
19. 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding the underlying statute, the Gun Free Schools Act of 1990, 18
U.S.C. § 922(a) (1990), exceeded the Congressional powers contained in the Commerce Clause of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3 allows Congress "[t]o regulate
[clommerce with foreign [n]ations, and among the several [s]tates, and with the Indian Tribes").
20. Id. at 567.
21. 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1996)); see
infra text accompanying notes 79, 109-14, 124-29 (ADA related); text infra text accompanying notes
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Oversight of the civil rights statutes can be triggered by the entities'
receipt of federal funds, such as with Title VI, Title IX, and the Rehabilitation
Act, or due to some specific activity that the defendant engaged in, such as
with Title VII and the ADEA, which apply to the employees of certain
employers provided the business has an interstate commerce connection; the
IDEA, which covers certain providers of specific educational services for the
disabled; and the ADA, which can apply to a multitude of entities. The Civil
Rights Remedies Equalization Act (Equalization Act)22 applies to a number of
civil rights laws that require receipt of federal funds, including the
Rehabilitation Act and Title VI. It states:
(1) A State shall not be immune under the Eleventh Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States from suit in Federal court for a
violation of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ....
[T]itle IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ... , title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . ,or the provisions of any other Federal
statute prohibiting discrimination by recipients of Federal financial
assistance.
(2) In a suit against a State for a violation of a statute referred to in
paragraph (1), remedies (including remedies both at law and in
equity) are available for such a violation to the same extent as such
remedies are available for such a violation in the suit against any
public or private entity other than a State. 23
Since the nation's educational system is permeated by public educational
institutions on the K-12 and post-secondary levels, the Eleventh Amendment
can operate as a fatal knockout punch for those employed there, including the
athletic department personnel, seeking remediation for violation of their
federal civil rights.
Part II introduces legislation governing the prohibition of discrimination
based on disability. Part III showcases the interaction between athletic
employment and age discrimination. Part IV transmits the statutory law and
case law barring discrimination based on an individual's race. The
accompanying appendix profiles the salient aspects of the federal civil rights
statutes.
229-36 (ADEA related).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7 (2000) (eff. Oct. 21, 1986).
23. Id. (Equalization Act).
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II. DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
Whether the increase in the number of disabled athletes nationally 24
coincides with the increase in the number of disabled physical education
teachers, coaches, officials, and other athletic department personnel remains
an open question due to confidentiality concerns. 25 It is still unusual to have a
physically disabled physical education teacher or coach on the K-12 or college
level unless that individual subsequently becomes disabled after being
employed. 26 Presently, there are three federal laws that may have an impact
on preventing discrimination involving disabled employees of athletic
departments in educational institutions: the Rehabilitation Act, the IDEA, and
the ADA. 2 7 For these statutes:
first, examine the jurisdictional requirements, including what
constitutes 'disabled' under the particular statute involved and
what is the needed basis to trigger the statute's application over a
particular [school or] athletic association; second, determine
what procedural requirements are imposed, including whether an
administrative complaint must first be filed with an executive
agency before commencing a federal lawsuit; and third, examine
what constitutes a primafacie case.28
While all three federal statutes have references to disabled employees, in
general, the ADA is the primary statute for positing disability discrimination
in employment. The three statutes are individually reviewed based on their
chronological enactment as law.
A. Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)
The IDEA, 29 a synthesis of two earlier statutes (one originally enacted in
24. For example, Aimee Mullins became a member of Georgetown University's track team
despite the use of two prosthetic limbs. See generally Kate Macmillan, Wonder Woman: Prosthetic
Legs Won't Slow Aimee Mullins Down, SI.COM, June 22, 2007,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/sioncampus /06/20/aimee.mullins/index.html.
25. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPPA), 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-2
(2000) (qualified privacy afforded individuals due to medical services provided).
26. See Viv Bernstein, Still Games to Coach, Players to Teach, Miles to Go, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2006, at D6 (successful women's basketball coach at North Carolina State University who is battling
cancer).
27. See Diane Heckman, Athletic Associations and Disabled Student-Athletes in the 1990's, 143
EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2000) [hereinafter Heckman, Athletic Associations] (for a detailed exposition of the
three statutes and resultant case law).
28. Id. at 3.
29. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1500 (2000); see also 34 C.F.R. pt. 300 & pt. 301 (2006) (new
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1970),30 is aimed at supporting special education to allow disabled students
the right to receive a free appropriate public education 3' (FAPE) "[tlhat
emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their
unique needs and prepare them for employment and independent living,"
among other goals. 32 The IDEA became effective on October 30, 1990. 33 On
June 4, 1997, President William J. Clinton signed the IDEA Amendments of
1997 into law. During 2004, further revisions were made during the George
W. Bush administration to fund and extend the IDEA legislation. 34 The
offering of physical education instruction is included, and the 1997
amendments now refer to extracurricular activities, which include
opportunities to participate in interscholastic athletics. 35 While this statute is
primarily directed toward students, embedded within the IDEA is one
provision directed toward employment. Section 1405 of the statute deals with
the "[e]mployment of individuals with disabilities" and states, "The Secretary
shall ensure that each recipient of assistance under this chapter makes positive
efforts to employ and advance in employment qualified individuals with
implementing regulations).
30. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. 93-380, 88 Stat. 579 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988)) (enacted in 1970; followed by amendments in 1974); Education for
All Handicapped Children Act, P.L. 94-142, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (enacted on Nov. 29, 1975); Heckman,
Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 9.
31. Free appropriate public education (FAPE) is defined to mean
[s]pecial education and related services that - (A) have been provided at public
expense, under public supervision and direction, and without charge; (B) meet the
standards of the State educational agency; (C) include an appropriate preschool,
elementary, or secondary school education in the State involved; and (D) are
provided in conformity with the individualized education program required under
section 1414(d) of this title.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(8); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.121 (2006) ("Each State must have on file with the
Secretary information that shows that, subject to 34 C.F.R. § 300.122, the State has in effect a policy
that ensures that all children with disabilities aged 3 through 21 residing in the State have the right to
FAPE, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or expelled from school.").
32. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d) (2000) (emphasis added).
33. Id. § 1403(c).
34. Pub. L. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2803 (Dec. 3, 2004) (known as the "Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act of 2004"); see also Susan G. Clark, Judicial Review and the Admission
of "Additional Evidence" Under the IDEIA: An Unusual Mixture of Discretion and Deference, 201
EDUC. L. REP. 823 (2005); Ronald D. Wenkart, An Essay. Unfunded Federal Mandates: The No
Child Left Behind Act and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 202 EDUC. L. REP. 461,
462 (2005) (The "IDEA was envisioned as a federal-state partnership in which Congress would
provide 40 percent of the cost and the states would pay 60 percent. Twice Congress has chastised
itself for its failure to keep its promise, once in a 1994 statute and once in a 1999 resolution, but it has
never increased funding to the 40 percent level.").
35. 34 C.F.R. § 300.306 (2006) (emphasis added).
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disabilities in programs assisted under this chapter." 36 However, there is no
case law under the IDEA investigation claims by athletic department
employees. Parenthetically, there is a provision pertaining to the IDEA
expressly abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity,37 albeit the Supreme
Court has not addressed whether this provision, along with a proper
Fourteenth Amendment nexus, would withstand such an attack by K-12 public
schools. 38
B. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act)
The Rehabilitation Act was enacted in 1973. 39 This statute prohibits
discrimination based upon disability and is applicable to educational programs
and activities if they are recipients of federal funds. It directs:
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United
States, as defined in section 705(20)40 of this title, shall, solely
by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance or under any program or activity conducted
by any Executive agency or by the United States Postal
Service. 41
As one court opined, "The purpose of the Rehabilitation Act 'is to prevent old-
fashioned and unfounded prejudices against disabled persons from interfering
with those individuals' rights to enjoy the same privileges and duties afforded
to all United States citizens."' 42
In order to establish a prima facie employment case under the
Rehabilitation Act, an individual must prove the following elements: (1) the
activity or program received federal funding; (2) the plaintiff is "disabled"
within the meaning of the statute; (3) the defendant discriminated against the
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1405 (Employment of Individuals with Disabilities) (emphasis added).
37. Id. § 1403 (2000).
38. See Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 11).
The IDEA is not applicable to post-secondary education as would be offered by colleges and
universities.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2000).
40. Id. § 705(20) (2000).
41. Id. § 794(a) (promulgation of rules and regulations) (emphasis added). The terms "program"
and "activity" are defined at 29 U.S.C. § 794(b).
42. Doe v. Eagle-Union Cmty. Sch. Corp., 101 F. Supp. 2d 707, 713 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (quoting
Mormson v. Comm'r of Special Serv., No. CV 94-5796 RJD, 1996 WL 684426, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
Nov. 18, 1996)).
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plaintiff in an employment decision based on the individual's disability; and
(4) the plaintiff is "otherwise qualified" to be employed or receive
employment benefits, or that the individual may be "otherwise qualified" via
"reasonable accommodations." 43
First, it is imperative to establish that the defendant is a recipient of
federal funds."a This statute is not restricted to just "educational" programs
and activities. The Rehabilitation Act can cover kindergarten through college
(K-graduate school) in both private and public schools, provided that the
educational institution program or activity is a recipient of federal funds,
45
which is examined on an individual basis.
Second, an individual must establish that he or she meets the statutory
definition of being disabled. The term "disabled" is now used in place of
"handicapped," although not all statutory language has been updated. The
Rehabilitation Act defines a "handicapped" individual,46 which is the same
definition utilized by the ADA.47 The word "disability," as applicable to
employees, is defined to mean "any individual who-(i) has a physical or
mental impairment which for such individual constitutes or results in a
substantial impediment to employment; and (ii) can benefit in terms of an
employment outcome from vocational rehabilitation services provided
pursuant to subchapter I, III, or VI of this chapter."48 This element requires
satisfaction of three prongs. Initially, a plaintiff must establish that he or she
has a physical or mental impairment. The statute expressly provides that
certain conditions, such as alcoholism, are not covered when employment is
involved. 49 Additionally, this law allows for the exclusion of employment of
43 See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 8 (citations of underlying cases
omitted) (revising the factors from the student or student-athlete viewpoint to the employee
viewpoint).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).
45. See Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 (1988 amendments), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (utilizing a
broad application and applying to the Rehabilitation Act).
46. The regulation states: "(1) Handicapped persons means any person who (i) has a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, (ii) has a record of
such an impairment, or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment." 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(i)
(2006) (emphasis added).
47. See infra text accompanying note 69.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(A).
49. See 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(C)(v), which states,
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title as such sections relate to
employment, the term, 'individual with a disability' does not include any individual
who is an alcoholic whose current use of alcohol prevents such individual from
performing the duties of the job in question or whose employment, by reason of
such current alcohol abuse, would constitute a direct threat to property or the safety
of others.
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individuals with certain diseases or infections, stating:
For purposes of sections 793 and 794 of this title, as such
sections relate to employment, such term, ['individual with a
disability'] does not include an individual who has a currently
contagious disease or infection and who, by reason of such
disease or infection, would constitute a direct threat to the health
or safety of other individuals or who, by reason of the currently
contagious disease or infection, is unable to perform the duties of
the job.50
Simply having a certain disability will not suffice; the individual must also
establish that the particular impairment interferes with a major life activity, 51
which has been defined explicitly to include "working." 52 And finally, the
individual must prove that prior to the adverse employment action taken by the
defendant employer or potential employer, the educational institution knew of
the individual's condition (essentially implicating that the defendant was
actively placed on notice) or the individual was regarded as having a disabling
condition (essentially attributing a constructive notice). 53  Vocational
rehabilitation services may also come into play for disabled individuals.
Third, the plaintiff must establish that an adverse action taken by the
educational institution against the disabled individual was due to that
individual's disability and not due to other legally-sanctioned, legitimate
business reasons. Finally, the plaintiff must then establish that he or she was
qualified for the position or would have been "otherwise qualified." A
qualified handicapped person means "(1) with respect to employment, a
handicapped person who, with reasonable accommodation, can perform the
Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. § 705(20)(D). An individual would not be deemed disabled or impaired due to the
following conditions: homosexuality, bisexuality, transvestitism, pedophilia, exhibitionism,
voyeurism, gender identity disorders not resulting from physical impairment, or other sexual behavior
disorders, compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, or psychoactive substance use disorders
resulting from the current illegal use of drugs. Id. § 705(20)(E)-(F).
51. "Major life activities" is defined to mean "functions such as caring for one's self, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2006). The list is not exclusive.
52. Id.
53. See generally Costello v. Univ. of N.C. at Greensboro, 394 F. Supp. 2d 752 (M.D.N.C. 2005)
(concerning intercollegiate male golfer), on further motion, 2006 WL 3694579 (M.D.N.C. Dec. 14,
2006) (finding the student-athlete was not disabled); Steams v. Bd. of Educ. for Warren Twp. High
Sch. Dist. No. 121, No. 99-C-5818, 1999 WL 1044832 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 1999) (concerning
interscholastic male basketball player).
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essential functions of the job in question." 54
Some critical procedural and jurisdictional aspects are discussed for the
various statutes. First, the Rehabilitation Act imposes no administrative filing
requirement for an aggrieved individual. Second, the Rehabilitation Act
contains no explicit statute of limitations. Generally, courts tend to borrow the
limitations period from the applicable state statute of limitations for personal
injury actions; however, for employment-related matters, reference to the
Americans with Disabilities Act would be required.55 Third, generally,
compensatory damages are permissible, presumably like Title IX. 56 However,
punitive damages are not allowed.57 Fourth, the jurisdictional reach over
governmental entities is explored. In Lane v. Pena (Pena),58 the Supreme
Court determined that the Rehabilitation Act infringed upon the federal
government's authority in dismissing a disabled cadet attending the Merchant
Marine Academy, which was overseen by the U.S. Department of
Transportation. 59 The opinion foreclosed the ability of the plaintiff to seek
monetary damages from the federal government pursuant to the Rehabilitation
Act.60 The Supreme Court has not ruled on whether the Eleventh Amendment
impinges upon the states' sovereign immunity. 61
54. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(i) (2006).
55. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000).
56. Both statutes are devoid of any explicit statutory language concerning allowing monetary
damages for aggrieved individuals. See Franklin v. Gwinmett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)
(allowing monetary damages in a Title IX action when intentional discrimination is proven); see also
K.M. ex rel. D.G. v. Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 343, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (ruling
that "[a] plaintiff may recover money damages under the ADA or Section 504 by showing a statutory
violation resulted from 'deliberate indifference' to those rights secured the disabled by those
statutes"); Ali v. City of Clearwater, 807 F. Supp. 701, 705 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (stating, "Furthermore,
the Franklin Court's reliance on Guardians and Darrone make it clear that Section 504 should be
interpreted similarly to Title IX; that is, in cases of intentional discrimination, damages are not limited
to those equitable in nature"); Tanberg v. Weld County Sheriff, 787 F. Supp. 970 (D. Colo. 1992)
(allowing for compensatory damages, citing Title IX and Franklin).
57. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000) (remedies and attorney's fees); see also Barnes v. Gorman, 536
U.S. 181 (2002) (disallowing punitive damages for both this statute and the ADA); Brown v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004) (disallowing punitive damages by an
employee against a school district, pursuant to the ADA), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d
1250 (D. Kan. 2005).
58. 518 U.S. 187 (1996).
59. Id. Lower courts had held federal prisons educational programs were not subject to Title IX
despite their obvious federal funding.
60. Id. at 199-200.
61. See Equalization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7(a)(l) (2000) (eff. Oct. 21, 1986) (explicitly
applicable to the Rehabilitation Act). For lower court cases addressing Eleventh Amendment
considerations, see Miller v. Texas Tech University Health Sciences Center, 421 F.3d 342 (5th Cir.
2005) (finding that state agencies were not insulated by the Eleventh Amendment, where state
agencies accepted federal funds and thus they could be subject to lawsuits in federal courts pursuant
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The first Supreme Court review of a Rehabilitation Act educational
employment case occurred during 1987, with the Court sanctioning the
statute's basic purpose. In School Board of Nassau County, Florida v.
Arline,6 2 a female teacher was dismissed from her elementary school teaching
position after suffering a third relapse from tuberculosis. First, the Court
examined whether an individual with tuberculosis, a contagious disease, was a
"handicapped individual" within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act, and
secondly, whether the individual was "otherwise qualified" to teach with such
condition. The Supreme Court found that she was a "handicapped individual"
within the meaning of the Act. The Court stated:
Arline's contagiousness and her physical impairment each
resulted from the same underlying condition, tuberculosis. It
would be unfair to allow an employer to seize upon the
distinction between the effects of a disease on others and the
effects of a disease on a patient and use that distinction to justify
discriminatory treatment. 63
Furthermore, the Court advanced, "Allowing discrimination based on the
contagious effects of a physical impairment would be inconsistent with the
basic purpose of [Section] 504, which is to ensure that handicapped
individuals are not denied jobs or other benefits because of the prejudiced
attitudes or the ignorance of others. ' 64 Finally, since the record demonstrated
insufficient evidence to determine if the plaintiff was "otherwise qualified,"
the case was remanded on this issue. This Court decision would provide the
backdrop for subsequent cases pertaining to all educational employees,
including athletic department employees.
Since passage of the ADA, 65 the Rehabilitation Act underscores
[t]he standards used to determine whether this section has been
violated in a complaint alleging employment discrimination
under this section shall be the standards applied under title 1 of
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and the provisions
of section 501 through 504, and 510, of the Americans with
to the Rehabilitation Act), cert. denied sub nom. Louisiana Department of Education v. Johnson, 546
U.S. 1170 (2006); Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason University, 411 F.3d 474,
490, 498 (4th Cir. 2005) (Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity waived concerning the
Rehabilitation Act). See Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17
(manuscript at 15).
62. 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
63. Id. at 282.
64. Id. at 284.
65. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) (2000).
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Disabilities Act of 1990, as such sections relate to
employment. 66
This accounts for the decrease in Rehabilitation Act cases for public
school and university athletic department employees, although it has not been
totally usurped for those employed in the sports field.67
C. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA)
President George H.W. Bush signed the ADA 68 into law on July 26, 1990,
although it was not effective until July 26, 1992. This statute is rather
remarkable, as unlike the Rehabilitation Act, where the educational program
or activity must receive federal funds, the ADA may involve private entities
and private individuals, including the private owners and operators of places
of public accommodations, as defined within the statute. The ADA and the
Rehabilitation Act focus on whether the defendant has provided a reasonable
accommodation to an individual on the basis of a known disability. The ADA,
like the Rehabilitation Act, defines "disability" as "(A) a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of
[an] individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as
having such an impairment. ' 69 The term "major life activities" is defined as:
66. See id. § 705(20)(A).
67. See infra text accompanying notes 159-69 (concerning Schultz v. YMCA of the United
States, 139 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1998), and community-related athletic employment); see also infra text
accompanying note 127 (regarding the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett finding the Eleventh
Amendment protected public universities deemed "arms of the state" from being sued for monetary
damages via Title I of the ADA).
68. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 12 (referring to Pub. L. 101-336, § 1,
104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213)); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 12117(a) (incorporating by reference Title VII procedures into ADA Title I actions. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)(1)). The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (2000), also pertains to this
civil rights statute.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). In Den Hartog v. Wasatch Academy, 129 F.3d 1076, 1082 (10th Cir.
1997), the Tenth Circuit Court stated:
Similarly, it would be illegal for an employer to discriminate against a qualified
employee because that employee had a family member or a friend who had a
disability, if the employer knew about the relationship or association, knew that the
friend or family member has a disability, and acted on that basis. Thus, if an
employee had a spouse with a disability, and the employer took an adverse action
against the employee based on the spouse's disability, this would then constitute
discrimination.
Id. at 1082. The court also noted "that the protection afforded to non-disabled employees who have
an association with a disabled person differs in one significant respect from that afforded to disabled
employees. This difference is the application of the ADA's 'reasonable accommodation'
requirements." Id. at 1083.
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"functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 70  The term
"substantially limits" means:
(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average
person in the general population can perform; or (ii)
[s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration
under which an individual can perform a particular major life
activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under
which the average person in the general population can perform
the same major life activity. 71
This comprehensive legislation, unlike other statutes, is divided into
different areas depending on either the nature of the activity or the entity
involved: Title I oversees employment relationships, Title II covers public
entities, and Title III addresses public accommodations. This cobbling
together of somewhat disparate areas into one statutory scheme provides for
lack of uniformity.
The ADA prohibits retaliation against individuals who raise the specter
that an employer may be engaging in this type of discrimination.7 2 On the
procedural front, an aggrieved individual seeking relief for employment
pursuant to Title I (employment) claims must first file an administrative
complaint and exhaust administrative remedies; 73 whereas, an individual
pursuing remedies under Title 1I (public entities) or Title III (those providing
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006); see also Hanig v. Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist., 384 F. Supp. 2d
710, 715 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that the EEOC found that a public high school guidance counselor
was not deemed disabled due to her dyslexia and dysgraphia, which the plaintiff indicated interfered
with her writing skills, an integral part of her having to send written letters of recommendation on
behalf of her students to colleges and universities).
71. Id. at § 1630.2(j)(1); see, e.g., Meling v. St. Francis Coll., 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(discussed within).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (applying when an individual has "opposed any act or practice made
unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing"). The Eighth Circuit Court in Amir v. St.
Louis University, 184 F.3d 1017, 1025 (8th Cir. 1999), stated, "In order to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation, a plaintiff must show (1) that he engaged in a statutorily protective activity, (2) that an
adverse action was taken against him, and (3) a causal connection between the adverse action and the
protected activity." See also Treglia v. Town of Manlius, 313 F.3d 713, 719 (2d Cir. 2002)
(identifying the prima facie elements, including another element that the employer was aware of the
employee's protected activity); Hanig v. Yorktown Cent. Sch. Dist., 384 F. Supp. 2d 710, 725
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (finding that a claim for ADA retaliation cannot succeed where the plaintiff was no
longer employed by the public school district).
73. See Smith v. Park County Sch. Dist. No. 6, No. 99-8023, 1999 WL 1136762, *1 (10th Cir.
Dec. 13, 1999) (concerning the failure of the plaintiff to exhaust the administrative remedies with
respect to his ADA claim, by not filing a charge within 300 days of the alleged violation).
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public accommodations) apparently may proceed straight to court, although
there is some case law requiring that the entity must be placed on notice prior
to filing a lawsuit pursuant to Title III. For Title I (employment-related), the
individual must file an administrative complaint with the EEOC within 180
days (as with Title VII actions), 74 since the ADA mandates compliance with
the administrative procedures of Title VII. For Title II (public entities), there
is no express statute of limitations, so federal courts borrow the comparable
state statute of limitations, generally based on the limitations period used for
personal injury actions. The Civil Rights Act of 1991, 75 applicable to Title
VII lawsuits, also covers Title I (employment) of the ADA, and allows the
awarding of compensatory damages, depending on the number of employees
within an establishment, with a maximum award of $300,000,76 as well as the
right to a jury trial. Punitive damages are not permitted for Title I cases. 77 For
a Title II (public entities) claim, the individual would need to prove intentional
discrimination to obtain monetary damages. However, in a case commenced
by a student-athlete, a Georgia district court ruled that monetary damages were
unavailable when involving public accommodations covered under Title 111,78
although injunctive relief is permitted. Since the new millennium, the
Supreme Court has ruled on ADA cases involving the Eleventh Amendment as
it concerns Title I (employment) and Title II (public entities), which are
discussed within.79 The specific titles will be reviewed in reverse order: Title
74. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring an individual to file an administrative complaint with
the EEOC, or if permissible by state law, allowing a dual filing with the state agency, which must be
done within 180 days of the offending action. The time limit may be extended to 300 days); see also
Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 11.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e).
76. See id. § 198 1a(b)(3)(D).
77. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Brown v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1250 (D.
Kan. 2005).
78. See Cole v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1060 (N.D. Ga. 2000)
(concerning a claim that the NCAA's academic eligibility rules violated the ADA; the court granted
the NCAA's motion to dismiss the action).
79. See 42 U.S.C. § 12202 (state immunity):
A State shall not be immune under the [E]leventh [A]mendment to the Constitution
of the United States from an action in Federal or State court of competent
jurisdiction for a violation of [the requirements of] this chapter .... [R]emedies
(including remedies both at law and in equity) are available for such a violation to
the same extent as such remedies are available for such a violation in an action
against any public or private entity other than a State.
See infra text accompanying note 127 concerning the decision in Garrett (where there was no
mention of this specific statutory provision in the opinion); see also Erickson v. Bd. of Governors
State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. Ill. Univs., 207 F.3d 945 (7th Cir. 2000) (ruling that Title I does not
abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Bd. of Govs. of
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1II, Title II, and then Title I.
i. Title III: Public Accommodations
1. Generally
Title III prohibits disability discrimination by private entities providing
public accommodations. 80 It does not apply to public entities. It mandates
that "[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation."81  The Title III component "defines a 'public
accommodation' as 'a private entity ... which affects commerce through the
operation of a concert hall, stadium, or other place of exhibition or
entertainment, a nursery, elementary, secondary, . . . school, or other place of
education, or a gymnasium . . . or other place of exercise or recreation."' 82
Thus, the statute expressly applies to an assortment of sporting venues.
The ADA instructs that reasonable modifications are required.
"Discrimination" has been defined to include:
a failure to make reasonable modifications in policies, practices,
or procedures, when such modifications are necessary to afford
such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would
fundamentally alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, or accommodations. 83
Thus, reasonable accommodations are required unless it can be
demonstrated that such modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of
the accommodations. 84  Additionally, entities may exclude disabled
State Coils. & Univs. for N.E. I1l. Univ., 531 U.S. 1190 (2001).
80. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (2000); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.101-.608 (2006) (implementing
regulations).
81. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (emphasis added).
82. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 13 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7))
(identifying twelve categories) (emphasis added).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006).
84. See Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 818 (9th Cir. 1999) (ruling that an
academic institution must make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability pursuant to both the
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individuals who pose a significant risk to the health or safety of other
individuals. It states, "Nothing in this subchapter shall require an entity to
permit an individual to participate in or benefit from the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages and accommodations of such entity where
such individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others."85 The
statute elaborates, "The term 'direct threat' means a significant risk to the
health or safety of others that can not be eliminated by a modification of
policies, practices, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or
services." 86  The next case addressing public accommodations received
national attention and showcased the David versus Goliath aspect of the
disabled athlete battling against the governing sports entity in a very visible
and accessible fact pattern.
2. PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin
During 2001, in PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin,87 for the first time the Supreme
Court examined a case pertaining to any disabled individual involved with
athletics under any of the federal disability statutes. Although the professional
golfer was an independent contractor rather than an employee of the PGA
Tour, the case holding may be pertinent for other ADA cases involving
athletic department employees. Casey Martin, "a golfer with a circulatory
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA; however, neither statute requires the school to make a fundamental
or substantial modification to its programs or standards).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3).
86. Id.
87. 532 U.S. 661 (2001) (finding that allowing a disabled professional golfer to use a golf cart
during professional tour events constituted a reasonable accommodation). Both the district court and
Ninth Circuit Court allowed Martin to use the golf cart. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242
(D. Or. 1998) (granting the golfer an injunction allowing him to use the golf cart, whereupon the PGA
Tour appealed the decision), affd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir. 2000), ajfd, 532 U.S. 661 (2001). See
generally Alison M. Barnes, The Americans with Disabilities Act and the Aging Athlete After Casey
Martin, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REv. 67 (2001). However, the Seventh Circuit Court, in another case,
rendered pre-Martin, prohibited a golfer with a hip condition from using a cart in other golf events.
See Olinger v. U.S. Golf Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 926 (N.D. Ind. 1999), aff'd, 205 F.3d 1001 (7th Cir.
2000), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 532 U.S. 1064 (2001), on remand, No. 99-2580, 2001 WL
1029125 (7th Cir. Sept. 4, 2001) (referring the case back to the district court in light of the Martin
decision); see also Leiken v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., No. Civ. S-93-505, 1994 WL 494298 (E.D.
Cal. 1994) (agreeing to consolidate an individual action with a class action, commenced pursuant to
Title III of the ADA, commenced by individuals challenging the ski resort policy forbidding persons
with wheelchairs from using cable cars). In Akiyama v. U.S. Judo Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1184
(W.D. Wash. 2002), in a case analyzing whether individuals that were required to bow to others
violated their freedom of religion, the Washington district court, commenting on the landmark
decision in Martin, stated, "The Supreme Court has also made clear that there is no 'rules of
competition' exception to the anti-discrimination laws; such rules are not immune from judicial
review and may be subjected to the appropriate tests for identifying 'discrimination."'
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problem that would clearly be exacerbated if forced to walk the course, sought
to use a golf cart during a Professional Golf Association (PGA) Tour event,
pursuant to the ADA." 88 The PGA claimed that walking was part of the game
and barred Martin's use of a golf cart during professional tour events.89 Both
the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) and the PGA Senior
Tour allowed the use of carts for its golfers. 90 There was no question that
Martin was disabled or that the Tour's action was predicated solely on the
disability of Martin. Simply put, with the use of a cart, Martin could
participate, and without it, he would be unable to participate.
The Magistrate judge found that the ability to plan and execute golf shots
was an inherent, essential part of the game of golf, as opposed to the ability to
walk distances, which the Magistrate found to be incidental to the game.91
When given his requested accommodation, Martin was able to perform his
chosen work, and thus, the Magistrate ordered the PGA to allow the golfer to
use a golf cart.92 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district
court's decision granting an injunction, directing that the PGA Tour could not
prevent Martin from using a cart during PGA tournament events. 93
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the two contested issues were whether
the PGA Tour, Inc., clearly a private entity, engaged in actions under the
ADA's definition of public accommodation, contained in Title III, and
secondly, whether allowing a disabled golfer to use a cart in professional
competitions constituted a reasonable accommodation. 94 In another divided
decision,95 the Supreme Court issued an affirmative response to the first
88. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 15 n.66.
89. Martin, 532 U.S. at 670-71.
90. Id. at 667-68.
91. Id. at 690.
92. Id.
93. Martin v. PGA Tour, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1242 (D. Or. 1998), aff'd, 204 F.3d 994 (9th Cir.
2000).
94. Martin, 532 U.S. at 664-65.
95. Id. at 661. Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, joined in by Justice Thomas, claiming that the
majority was wrong on both counts of whether the PGA came under the definition of a public
accommodation and secondly, whether allowing use of the cart did constitute a fundamental
alteration. The dissent opined,
The statute, of course, provides no basis for this individualized analysis that is the
Court's last step on a long and misguided journey. The statute seeks to assure that a
disabled person's disability will not deny him equal access to (among other things)
competitive sporting events-not that his disability will not deny him an equal
chance to win competitive sporting events.
Id. at 703 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Scalia, who also criticized the
opinion for opening the area to a floodgate of litigation, wrote, "The Court guarantees that future
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inquiry.96 The Tour held events at courses that were deemed public. 97 The
private golf courses were open to the public, who were allowed to attend and
be a part of the gallery. Additionally, the Q (qualification) school was open to
the public, provided the individual paid $3000 and submitted two letters of
reference. 98
The Court then tackled the second issue. As indicated, the ADA
regulations require a public entity to "make reasonable accommodations in
policies . . . when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on
the basis of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service." 99 Did
allowing Martin to use the cart constitute a reasonable accommodation or
would it result in a fundamental alteration to the game of golf? The Court
explored what were the essential versus incidental elements of this sport. It
stated:
The use of carts is not inconsistent with the fundamental
character of golf, the essence of which has always been shot-
making. The walking rule contained in [the PGA Tour's] hard
cards is neither an essential attribute of the game itself nor an
indispensable feature of tournament golf ... Further, the factual
basis of petitioner's argument-that the walking rule is
"outcome affecting" because fatigue may adversely affect
performance-is undermined by the District Court's finding that
the fatigue from walking during a tournament cannot be deemed
significant. 00
Thus, the Court concluded walking was not deemed fundamental to the
essence of this particular sport, but rather, it was an incidental aspect of the
game of golf.
Additionally, the Court required that the entity involved must conduct an
individualized inquiry. The Court stated, "Even if petitioner's factual
predicate is accepted, its legal position is fatally flawed because [the PGA
Tour's] refusal to consider Martin's personal circumstances in deciding
whether to accommodate his disability runs counter to the ADA's requirement
cases of this sort will have to be decided on the basis of individualized factual findings. Which means
that future cases of this sort will be numerous, and a rich source of lucrative litigation." Id. at 702.
This prognostication has not materialized.
96. Id. at 677.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 665.
99. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2006).
100. Martin, 532 U.S. at 663.
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that an individualized inquiry be conducted."' 10 1 Then, the Court concluded
the use of the cart by this disabled individual would not result in a
fundamental alteration. 10 2 Martin's use of the golf cart did not provide him
with any unfair advantage. 10 3 The Court upheld that herein it would be a
reasonable accommodation to allow a professional golfer with a disability to
use a golf cart. 104 The Court's expansive discourse on what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation should serve disabled athletic department
employees seeking relief under the ADA under both Title I and Title II.
ii. Title II: Public Entities
Title II is modeled on the Rehabilitation Act and governs public
entities.10 5 The array of public entities entails any department, agency, special
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a state or local government. 10 6
Thus, it is clear that all state colleges and universities and public schools
would be included. Title II imparts: "Subject to the provisions of this
subchapter, no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such
disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the
services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity."' 1 7 Title II defines a qualified individual
with a disability as "an individual, . . . who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices ... or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential.., requirements for the.., participation
in programs or activities provided by a public entity."' 0 8
On May 17, 2004, in Tennessee v. Lane (Lane),10 9 the Rehnquist Court, in
a divided opinion, determined that state entities would not be insulated by the
101. Id. (emphasis added); see Dennin v. Interscholastic Conn. Athletic Conf., Inc., 913 F. Supp.
663 (D. Conn.) (pre-Martin case, requiring an individualized analysis by the state athletic association,
concerning a disabled interscholastic swimmer with Downs Syndrome),judgment vacated, 94 F.3d 96
(2d Cir. 1996).
102. 532 U.S. at 690.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). Enforcement of Title 11 is predicated on the
Rehabilitation Act. Id. § 12133; see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.101-999 (2006).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1); see also Transp. Workers Union of Am. v. N.Y. City Transit Auth.,
342 F. Supp. 2d 160 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the plaintiffs could use Title II of the ADA to assert an
employment disability-based claim, thus the union could assert both Title I and Title II against the
municipal department).
107. 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
108. Id. § 12131(2) (emphasis added).
109. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
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Eleventh Amendment in a case concerning access by disabled individuals to
Tennessee state courthouses. 110 Disabled individuals, who used wheelchairs,
were not afforded accommodations, such as elevators, to reach the upper
floors of the Tennessee state court buildings and were left to literally crawl up
the steps if no one was available to carry them up the staircases. 11 It should
be stressed that this was not a unanimous decision with Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas filing a dissent. 112
Aside from the specific decision rendered for these plaintiffs, the issue arises
as to whether this holding should be narrowly confined only for access to state
courthouses or expansively applied to all state entities covered under Title II.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, recognized the underlying problem,
stating, "[N]othing in our case law requires us to consider Title II, with its
wide variety of applications as an undifferentiated whole."1 13 Thus, the Court
resisted giving a blanket approval to all Title II premised actions, which will
engender future litigation to flesh out the boundaries of the state sovereignty.
Although, the Court did recognize that Title II was enacted to address
pervasive discrimination "in such critical areas as... education."114
iii. Title I: Employment
Title I covers the area of employment 1 5 and requires the employment of
at least fifteen employees 116 for a business that involves interstate commerce.
The potential employee or employees must be able to "perform the essential
functions of the employment position" with or without a reasonable
accommodation.11 7 The statute requires that a reasonable accommodation be
made by the employer for the disabled employee, provided it does not
constitute an undue hardship. The term "reasonable accommodation" as
defined in the ADA
110. Id.
111. Id. at 513-14.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 528. However, it should be stressed that the Supreme Court recognized that Congress
documented "[a] pattern of unequal treatment in the administration of a wide range of public services,
programs and activities, including the penal system, public education, and voting." Id. at 524.
114. Constantine v. Rectors and Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 487 (5th Cir.
2005) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3)) (emphasis in original).
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117. Religious entities are provided an exemption. Id. § 12113(c);
see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.1-.16 (2006) (implementing regulations).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) ("The term 'employer' means a person engaged in an industry
affecting commerce who has 15 or more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more
calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year, and any agent of such person.").
117. Id. § 12111(8).
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may include (A) making existing facilities used by employees
readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities;
and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules,
reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of
equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of
examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of
qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar
accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 8
The term "undue hardship" takes into account financial considerations and
the level of difficulty in attempting to provide such accommodation. 119 As
indicated, the term "working" constitutes a major life activity. 120  The
regulations provide further amplification of the term "working," identifying:
The term substantially limits means significantly restricted in the
ability to perform either a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs
in various classes as compared to the average person having
comparable training, skills and abilities. The inability to perform
a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation
in the major life activity of working. 12 1
In order to establish a prima facie ADA Title I employment case, the
following must be established:
(1) [The plaintiff] is an individual with a disability according to
the statute; (2) [the plaintiff] is "otherwise qualified" to perform
the job requirements, with or without [a] reasonable
accommodation; (3) [the plaintiff has] suffered an adverse
employment decision; (4) [t]he employer knew or had reason to
know of [the plaintiff's] disability; and (5) [t]he position
remained open after the adverse employment decision or the
disabled individual was replaced. 122
118. Id. § 12111(9).
119. Id. § 12111(10) (noting four enumerated factors that may be considered when considering
whether the action would constitute an undue hardship); see also id. § 12111 (10)(b) (i)-(iv).
120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2006) (defined as "functions such as caring for oneself, performing
manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working"). The Tenth
Circuit Court held "communicating" was not a major life activity. Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d
1300, 1305 (10th Cir. 1999).
121. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
122. See Swanson v. Univ. of Cincinnati, 268 F.3d 307, 314 (6th Cir. 2001) (concerning a former
surgical resident); see also Macy v. Hopkins County Sch. Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 363 (6th Cir.
2007). Another court stated,
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Here, the job description and responsibilities would be a critical aspect,
especially in hiring and termination cases.
iv. Current Considerations
First, recent Supreme Court decisions have made it more difficult for
potential plaintiffs to qualify that they meet the disability criteria necessary to
proceed with their disability claims. The Supreme Court found that if
individuals with certain conditions were able to take certain medicine or use
certain devices or aides, then they would not in fact be deemed disabled. 123
This action has appreciably lessened the pool of individuals who have
disabling conditions but are not now deemed de jure "disabled" for ADA
application.
Second, while this statute broadened the categories of potential
defendants, and the ADA statutory scheme covers states and arms of the state,
the Supreme Court dramatically curtailed the applicability of the ADA to
certain educational employers as potential defendants. The Court ruled on a
Title I claim in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett,
which involved a consolidated case, including the university's termination of
the plaintiff, a registered female nurse, who had been undergoing treatment for
breast cancer.124  On February 21, 2001, the Supreme Court, in a split
a plaintiff must show that (1) his employer is subject to the ADA; (2) he has a
disability under the meaning of the ADA; (3) he could perform the essential
functions of his job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (4) his
disability was a factor that led to his termination .... Once the plaintiff alleges a
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of
discrimination by articulating a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the
termination adverse employment action.
Sanzo v. Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist., 381 F. Supp. 2d 113, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). The Sanzo
court also found that "incidents of misconduct and incompetence only further provide legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons for [a school employee's] termination." Id. at 118. The court also noted,
"Similarly, New York courts use the same McDonnell Douglas framework to analyze cases of
employment discrimination under the [New York Human Rights Law, found at N.Y. EXEC. LAW
§§ 290-301 (McKinney 2006)]." Id. at 118.
123. In recent years the Supreme Court issued a number of decisions that narrowed the potential
class of disabled employees. See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999); Murphy
v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999); Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S.
795 (1999) (discussed in Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 12 n.52). The Court, in
this collection of cases, determined that if a corrective device or medication ameliorated or regulated
the medical condition then the employee would no longer be deemed disabled pursuant to the ADA.
See also Daniel Egan, Comment, The Dwindling Class of "Disabled Individuals ": An Exemplification
of the Americans with Disabilities Act's Inadequacies in D'Angelo v. Conagra Foods Inc., 81 ST.
JoHN'S L. REv. 491 (2007).
124. 531 U.S. 356 (2001), on remand, 344 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2003), on remand, 354 F. Supp.
2d 1244 (N.D. Ala. 2005), opinion after remand, 359 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (N.D. Ala. 2005).
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decision, concluded that the Eleventh Amendment would preclude application
of Title I of the ADA to arms of the state, which would by extension include
this public state university, as it impugns the sovereignty of states, when
claimants were seeking monetary relief for such disability discrimination in
employment. 125 Here, the ADA has a specific provision abrogating Eleventh
Amendment immunity toward the state.126 Nevertheless, the Court, in a 5-4
decision authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, ruled that the ADA exceeded
Congress's § 5 authority of the Fourteenth Amendment (since the Fourteenth
Amendment was enacted subsequent to the passage of the Eleventh
Amendment).127 Essentially, to pass judicial muster, a federal statute allowing
a citizen to sue a state or arm of a state must have a proper Fourteenth
Amendment § 5 nexus. In reviewing the three-tier analysis the Court uses for
equal protection purposes pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, disability is
not placed either within the first strict scrutiny analysis reserved for
fundamental rights or suspect classes (race, national origin, or alienage), or
even second intermediate test analysis (sex and birth legitimacy), but
according to the Court is relegated to the third rational relationship test. 128
Thus, the Court stated that the Constitution bars only "irrational"
discrimination and that it would be "entirely rational and therefore
constitutional for a state employer to conserve scarce financial resources by
hiring employees who are able to use existing facilities."' 129
While Garrett involved a state university, whether other state universities
and local public school districts also come under the umbrella of "arms of the
state" now becomes a critical element.130 The Garrett decision has effectively
negated Title I's application for employees working or seeking to work at state
entities. Query, whether this decision would also apply to Title II and Title III
of the ADA when it involves state entities, such as public schools, other state
institutions, and public state parks. Three years later, in Tennessee v. Lane,
the Court found that individuals could sue states that did not provide access to
125. 531 U.S. at 360.
126. See supra note 79.
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, which states in principal part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 356 (pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment).
128. See Heckman, One Nation Under God, supra note 3, at 540 n.10.
129. Linda Greenhouse, The High Court's Target: Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2001, § 4, at
3 (quoting Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist).
130. See Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 4.
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the state judicial systems pursuant to Title 11 of the ADA. 13 1 Disabled
employees are now utilizing Title II to sue state entities in order to circumvent
the judicial roadblock caused by the Garrett decision. Whether this legal
strategy will prove successful remains to be seen. Surprisingly, only a handful
of cases have been commenced involving athletic department employees since
the ADA's effective date.
D. Athletic Employment
i. Physical Education Teachers or Professors
Due to confidentiality factors, 132 it is unknown how many disabled
individuals are hired as physical education teachers or interscholastic and
intercollegiate coaches. While individuals who subsequently become disabled
may be protected by the federal statutes, it is remarkable that more cases have
not been instituted within the last forty years by disabled individuals
confronted with the inability to obtain employment or being subjected to an
adverse action during their employment concerning athletic endeavors at
schools. Two cases are profiled involving educational institutions: the first
case concerns a disabled individual seeking to become a physical education
teacher who sought relief under a state statute, and the second case involves a
physical education professor who was terminated after she became disabled
and who asserted a violation of the ADA. A third case regarding a disabled
individual, who worked for a private employer and sought relief under the
Rehabilitation Act, is also profiled due to its instruction in this area.
The next case exemplifies the problems faced by disabled individuals
seeking employment in the athletics field. In Zimmerman v. Minot Public
School District, No. 1,133 the North Dakota Supreme Court found no violation
of a state human rights law, 134 which prohibited discrimination based on
disability, when a local school district did not hire a hearing-impaired
applicant for the opening as a middle school physical education teacher. 13 5
Zimmerman annually filed applications with the school district regardless of
131. 541 U.S. 509 (2004); see also supra text accompanying note 99.
132. See supra note 25 (concerning HIPAA medical privacy law); see also Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232 (2000) (providing confidentiality as to certain school
records, including medical records).
133. 574 N.W.2d 797 (N.D. 1998).
134. N.D. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4 (2007).
135. 574 N.W.2d at 798.
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whether any vacancies existed. 136 When an opening occurred, the school
district interviewed nine applicants. 137  The plaintiff had been providing
physical education instruction for a number of years at a school for the deaf
and had graduated with an education major and a physical education minor
and a lower grade-point-average (2.50) than the applicant chosen. 138 The
plaintiff expressed interest in coaching two sports not available at this
particular school, while the individual hired indicated an interest in coaching
the four sports offered. 139 The applicant who was hired had no teaching
experience, but had student-taught at the middle school with excellent
recommendations; he graduated with a major in physical education and a
higher grade-point-average (3.70) than the plaintiff.140  The trial court
concluded the school district had advanced legitimate non-discriminatory
reasons for its decision. 141 The appellate court affirmed the lower court's
determination, finding the trial court had not committed any error therein, and
thus sanctioned the school district's hiring action. 142
In Meling v. St. Francis College,143 a terminated professor of physical
education sued alleging her termination from this small New York Catholic
college violated the ADA. 144 In 1993, Meling had been injured in an
automobile accident. 145 As a result, she received a medical leave of absence
for the fall 1993 and spring 1994 semesters. 146 The professor applied for
disability for the following fall 1994 semester, whereupon the private college
informed the professor that she could only receive a one-year medical leave. 147
Her physician informed the college that she could return to work for "light
duty only."'148  She sought to resume teaching, but wanted certain
modifications and assistance-essentially, she was seeking a "reasonable
accommodation."' 149 During this period, the professor had also filed for






141. Id. at 799.
142. Id. at 800.
143. 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y. 1998).
144. Id. at 267.
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whether he or she was partially or completely disabled, as benefits were
contingent upon such classification after proving eligibility. 150  Meling
apparently had indicated that she was totally disabled. The college
subsequently discharged Meling from her position.'51
At the conclusion of the trial, a New York federal jury awarded Meling
$225,000 in compensatory damages and $150,000 in punitive damages, and it
ordered her reinstatement to the faculty.' 52 The defendant-college moved to
prevent entry of the favorable award as a final judgment while the plaintiff
cross-moved, seeking her reinstatement with tenure. 153 First, the Eastern
District Court of New York aligned itself with the jury determination that the
plaintiff was disabled pursuant to the ADA, based on the limitation of her
abilities of walking, standing, sitting, reaching, and lifting.154 Second, the trial
judge, in this pre-Barnes case, would not set aside the jury's punitive damages
award that may be issued in an ADA action when malice or reckless
indifference is presented. 155  At trial, apparently the college's counsel
attempted to establish that Meling was totally disabled-based on her
submission of an application seeking government benefits-and thus could not
do her job even with any reasonable accommodation; this position could result
in the jurors concluding that the school terminated the professor for the reason
she was so disabled as to be unable to do the essential functions of her job. 156
The court noted:
The vast majority of Meling's courses required no physical
activity on her part, and even the courses that required
demonstrations could be taught by using students to perform the
required skills, a method that is preferred [in] some academic
circles even where the instructor has no physical limitations.
Indeed, without changing Meling's schedule at all for the Fall
1994 semester, Meling could readily have performed her job...
150. Id. at 273.
151. Id. at272.
152. Id. at 270.
153. Id. at 276-77.
154. The regulations amplify that "major life activities" are "basic activities that the average
person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. 1630.2(i) (2006).
The following items would be included: "sitting, standing, lifting, reaching ... caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing speaking, breathing, learning and working." 3 F.
Supp. 2d at 273 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i)).
155. See 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002); Brown v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 500, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 2004), on further consideration, 368 F. Supp. 2d 1250
(D. Kan. 2005).
156. Meling, 3 F. Supp. 2d at 274.
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had the college permitted her to teach with the assistance of a
student demonstrator. 157
Thus, the court found that instituting reasonable accommodations via the
use of a student demonstrator would comport with the statute, which the
college failed to offer or provide the professor. No college representative ever
contacted the professor about any possible accommodations. Third, the
professor's receipt of disability benefits (through the Teachers Insurance
Annuity Association (TIAA)) did not establish as a matter of law that she was
unable to work 58 (which may have countenanced the employer's action).
Finally, the court declined to order her reinstatement with tenure. The parties
pursued no appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals-not even a
challenge by the college due to the punitive damages awarded against it. With
the generous compensatory damages, and more significantly the awarding of
punitive damages, which would no longer be sanctioned, the case captures the
spirit of the federal laws designed to rebut disability discrimination.
Parenthetically, in Schultz v. YMCA of the United States,159 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a deaf lifeguard who failed to meet the
qualifications for certification would not be entitled to damages for emotional
injuries he claimed pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act. 160 David Schultz was
an accomplished swimmer, swim instructor, and lifeguard with certification by
the American Red Cross. 16 1 Schultz then sought certification by the YMCA,
which was not required for his current position at a Massachusetts YMCA
facility. 162 The YMCA, a private religious organization, required that its
lifeguards be able to hear noises and distress signals. 163 The plaintiff took the
required certification course. 164 With the use of a hearing aid, an audiologist
reported that Schultz could hear normal sounds. Based on the applicant's
wearing a hearing aid, the instructor recommended the certification, which the
157. Id
158. The lower court identified, "On February 12, 1997, the EEOC issued an Enforcement
Guideline holding that an individual's statement for the purpose of obtaining disability benefits, that
she is 'totally disabled' or 'unable to work' does not bar a claim under the ADA." Meling v. St.
Francis Coll, No. 95-CV-3739 JG, 1997 WL 1068681, *5 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1997). The court found
that "[t]he SSA do[es] not make any allowance for an individual's ability to work with reasonable
accommodations." Id.
159. 139 F.3d 286 (1st Cir. 1998).
160. Id. at 290.
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YMCA granted the plaintiff. 165 Subsequent to this, the course instructor
noticed Schultz did not always wear his hearing aid, and so she asked that her
name be removed from the plaintiffs certification, which led the YMCA to
revoke the certification. 66 However, prior to the revocation, the plaintiff had
resigned from his position as aquatics director and accepted a lower paid
position at the facility, which he then resigned.' 67 The plaintiff offered
evidence that the ability to hear "contributes little, if anything, to the
performance of life guarding functions."' 68 The First Circuit concluded the
YMCA's action was not prompted by malice or hostility such as to warrant the
grant of damages for emotional distress to this individual. 169
The concept of reasonable accommodations is predicated on the ability of
the disabled individual to perform the requisite essential duties the position
requires. While the college professor in Meling was qualified, but required a
reasonable accommodation, the Schultz case exemplifies that the individual,
regardless of any disability, must still exhibit the minimum mandatory
requirements for the specific position. It is especially critical in the education
field for K-12 teachers and sometimes coaches to be appropriately licensed
and certified in the states in which they seek to teach or coach. Coaches are
increasingly charged with being able to prove, at a minimum, that they have
cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) certification. And with automated
external defibrillators (AEDs) becoming more common in the athletic arena, a
review should be made to ascertain if coaches are certified to use the AEDs. 170
It is when the individual meets such requirements (with or without a
reasonable accommodation) but still is not hired that the inquiry will be
made-based on a specific factual determination-as to the reason the school
hired an individual without any discernible disabilities over the disabled
candidate, when both were equally qualified. The hiring situation poses a
catch-22 problem where the employer is seeking an individual with
165. Id.
166. Id. at 288.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 289. One expert's report advanced "that drowning victims are almost never in a
position to call for help." Id. It was not indicated whether being in the company of someone who
could alert others, albeit that individual was not in a position to help the distressed swimmer, was
significant-which could easily arise in a pool-based situation.
169. Id. at 290-91.
170. Recently, New York passed a statute, N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 917 (McKinney 2006) (on-site
cardiac automated external defibrillator), which is also known as the "Louis Law," based on the
student-athlete who died as a result of a ball hitting his chest during a boys' lacrosse game at a Long
Island public high school. It requires the availability of AEDs at all extracurricular athletic events,
regardless if the event takes place on or off public school property, along with a properly trained
individual to operate the device.
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experience, leaving the disabled individual at a possible disadvantage. Even
though the teacher in Zimmerman had experience over the recent graduate, it
still did not render his claim successful where he repeatedly sought a position
at the local public school because the school could show legitimate, objective
reasons for hiring the non-disabled individual.
ii. Coaches
The issue in Maddox v. University of Tennessee17 1 concerned whether the
conduct of an athletic employee or his alleged disability was the overriding
factor resulting in his termination.1 72 The men's assistant football coach
alleged the university violated the ADA and Rehabilitation Act due to his
alcoholism condition. 173 During February 1992, the plaintiff was offered a
contract, terminable at will in accordance with a university manual.' 74 In an
employment application, Maddox did not indicate he had any health problems
that would interfere with performing his job. 175 The application also inquired
as to whether the applicant had ever been arrested, to which this individual
responded he had not, which was not accurate, as there had been three prior
arrests (two incidents involved driving while under the influence of
alcohol). 176 On May 26, 1992, he was arrested for allegedly driving while
intoxicated (DWI), reportedly at a high rate of speed.177 The arrest resulted in
negative publicity for the university. 78 After the arrest, Maddox then entered
an alcohol rehabilitation program. 179 The university officially terminated the
coach during June 1992 for his alleged criminal conduct and the bad publicity
engendered. 180
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the opposing stances:
171. 62 F.3d 843 (6th Cir. 1995). In Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342
(D. Ariz. 1992), the district court granted an injunction "allowing a Little League baseball first-base
coach, who used a wheelchair, to coach on the field at an All-Star game, despite an association rule to
the contrary." Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64. The Little League had
indicated that the presence of the wheelchair constituted a threat to the safety of the participants. See
42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3). However, Anderson had coached for his team for approximately three years
without incident. Anderson, 794 F. Supp. at 345.
172. Maddox v. Univ. of Tenn., 62 F.3d 843, 844 (6th Cir. 1995).
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"The [university] says it fired him because of his conduct (drunk driving),
rather than his disability (alcoholism). The plaintiff replies his conduct is
caused by his disability, so a dismissal for the former is a dismissal for the
latter."' 181 The court emphasized the difference
[b]etween discharging someone for unacceptable misconduct and
discharging someone because of the disability. As the district
court noted, to hold otherwise, an employer would be forced to
accommodate all behavior of an alcoholic which could in any
way be related to the alcoholic's use of intoxicating beverages;
behavior that would be intolerable if engaged in by a sober
employee or, for that matter, an intoxicated but non-alcoholic
employee. 1
82
The coach's responsibilities at the NCAA Division I university included:
on-field coaching;
[r]ecruitment of high school football players; . . . serving as a
positive role model for athletes on the university's football team,
... counseling players on various issues, including the use and
abuse of alcohol and drugs, and ... promoting a positive image
as a representative of not only the football program but the
university as well. 183
The Sixth Circuit Court found the university's reasons for terminating the
plaintiff did not constitute a pretext, but rather constituted a legitimate
reason. 184 It also found that the plaintiff was not "otherwise qualified"'185 due
to the fallout engendered to the university, reasoning, "The school falls out of
favor with the public, and the reputation of the football program suffers.
Likewise, to argue that football coaches today, with all the emphasis on the
misuse of drugs and alcohol by athletes, are not 'role models' and 'mentors'
simply ignores reality."'186 The Sixth Circuit court concluded, "Employers
subject to the Rehabilitation Act and ADA must be permitted to take
appropriate action with respect to an employee on account of egregious or
criminal conduct, regardless of whether the employee is disabled."'187
181. Id. at 846.
182. Id. at 847 (presented in Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64).
183. Id. at 845 n. 1.
184. Id. at 848-49.
185. Id. at 848.
186. Id. at 848-49.
187. Id. at 848.
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This case captures two principles involved with the area. First, the
individual must be deemed "disabled." Obviously certain disabilities will be
ascertainable to the onlooker; whereas, other medical conditions will not.
Then, the inquiry is whether the employer-school knew or should have known
of the employee's disability before the underlying action took place that led to
the employer's adverse action against this person. If the educational
institution could not detect or did not know of the athletic department
employee's disability, then an essential element needed to satisfy a prima facie
case will be lacking. Second, even assuming the employee can satisfy that he
or she was appropriately "disabled," this will not automatically condone
purported bad behavior under the label that the individual is disabled. This
goes back to the definition of disability, whereby certain conditions are not
legally sufficient to be deemed statutorily "disabled."' 188 The Maddox case
also showcases the importance of any underlying contract or employment
agreement between the parties.
While certain conditions that are action-based-such as alcoholism or
drug addition-are included in the definition of disability, nevertheless, as this
case exemplifies, it does not provide a blanket tolerance of any activities
undertaken by those individuals. This would require a fact-specific inquiry.
For example, could a school legally fire a physical education teacher with
Tourette Syndrome for voicing obscenities in the gymnasium? An episode of
the Oprah television show featured a primary school teacher with this
condition. He simply explained to his students that he had the condition and
that as a result he may engage in this involuntary action. Therein, the teacher
made known his medical condition.
iii. Officials
In the area of athletics, there is an expectation that those participating will
be the fittest of the fit. The next two cases explore what happens when the
officials do not visibly meet this criteria.
In Jones v. Southeast Alabama Baseball Umpires Ass'n,189 an umpire,
"[w]ho [used] a prosthesis due [to] a leg amputation, alleged a violation of the
ADA against the Assocation in not assigning him to umpire solely high school
varsity baseball games."' 190 Jones had notified the Association that he no
longer wished to umpire at the junior varsity games and wanted to umpire
188. See supra notes 49-50.
189. 864 F. Supp. 1135 (M.D. Ala. 1994).
190. See Heckman, Athletic Associations, supra note 27, at 14 n.64.
20071
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
solely at varsity baseball games. 191 During 1992, the association rejected the
request and informed Jones that based on the use of a "[p]rosthetic device, he
did not have the mobility to umpire effectively on a regular basis at the more
competitive varsity level."' 192 The Alabama district court recognized that the
ADA covers both an employer and employment agency. 193 While the
association conceded it had twenty-five employees, exceeding the required
fifteen employees, it argued that these employees did not exceed the minimum
hiring length of at least twenty weeks as the high school baseball season lasts
approximately thirteen to fourteen weeks. 194  Jones countered that the
association also assigned the umpires to officiate at summer league baseball
games, which run from April to August (approximately a five-month
period). 195 The state trial court did not engage in the merits of the case and
simply denied the association's motion for summary judgment, stating, "It is
unclear from the record whether the umpires procured by the Association for
schools are employees of the Association or are procured to be employees of
the schools; the Association would be an employment agency only if the latter
is true."' 196
Merely because an individual uses a prosthesis device does not
automatically equate with lack of mobility. Moreover, there is relatively
minimal running around by officials in baseball games compared to other
sports like football, basketball, soccer, lacrosse, and field hockey. Obviously,
this case dealt with officiating interscholastic baseball games. Periodically,
there is attention focused on the girth of Major League Baseball (MLB)
umpires, purportedly for health reasons, who are presently required to have
"reasonable body weight."' 197
The next case examines such a situation involving a college football
191. Jones, 864 F. Supp. at 1136.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 1137-38.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1138.
197 See How to Become MLB Umpires, http://www.mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official-info/umpires/
how-to-become.jsp (last visited Nov. 16, 2007); see also Dan Gelston, Former Umpire Eric Gregg
Dies After Stroke, USA TODAY, June 5, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/baseball/2--6-06-05; Tom Haudncourt, HGH Ignites New Fears; Grimsley Saga Sure to Fuel
Criticism, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, June 11, 2006, at 7C, available at
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/ mi-4196/is-200606 11/ai-u 16476533; Bob Nightengale,
Thumbs up on Ejections Is a Message from Umps, SPORTING NEWS, Mar. 17, 1997, at 32, available
at http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/lg 1-1922063 (concerning MLB umpire Eric Gregg, "who took
time off last season to enter a weight-loss clinic after the death of fellow National League umpire
John McSherry").
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referee. In Clemons v. Big Ten Conference, a college football referee for the
NCAA Division I conference unsuccessfully claimed discrimination due to his
obesity in violation of the ADA.198 The Big Ten Conference, one of the most
powerful NCAA Division I football conferences, revised the rating system for
its football referees, modeling it on the National Football League's policy. 199
Referees received one-year contracts.200  The conference considered five
criteria for their referees: "(1) appearance and physical condition; (2) position,
coverage and movement; (3) consistency, common sense and judgment; (4)
poise, decisiveness and game control; and (5) relationship with the coaches,
players and others."201  Between 1990 and 1992, the plaintiffs ratings
increasingly plummeted as his weight increased to 270 pounds, at which time
he received notices from the conference about his weight.202 The following
year, he was again assigned a poor rating, with his weight up to 280 pounds.20 3
He was then placed on probation. 204 During April 1994, the conference
renewed his contract for the 1994-1995 season.20 5 When Clemons reported
for work in August, his weight reached an apex of 285 pounds.206 Two days
later, the conference canceled his contract. 20 7  Clemons argued that the
conference manual had no reference to weight, although it did require referees
to be in good physical condition.20 8
The Illinois district court noted, "Simply because the Big Ten did not
employ height-weight charts does not make the physical condition requirement
invalid. 20 9 Additionally, the ADA regulations indicate that "except in rare
circumstances, obesity is not considered a disabling impairment. '210 The
court ultimately found that the plaintiff was not disabled as his ability to do
other jobs was not impacted, and the ADA was not meant to cover exclusion
from a single position of employment. 211 The court found that










208. Id. at *4.
209. Id.
210. Id. at *5 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i)).
211. Id.
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Plaintiff has not provided any evidence that an official that
cannot keep up with the athletes can nonetheless perform
adequately. Plaintiffs evaluations demonstrate that he failed to
keep himself in a physical condition that enabled him to keep up
with the athletes and place himself in the proper position to make
accurate calls.212
The court seemed content that the plaintiff was not disabled; however, the
court did not expound on whether it would have countenanced the factor
contained in the first condition pertaining to "appearance." Clemons also
claimed his termination was due to racial discrimination, which will be
discussed in Part IV.
III. AGE DISCRIMINATION
A. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA)
The ADEA 21 3 is a federal statute that prohibits employment discrimination
on the basis of age, and includes individuals over the age of forty,214 where the
employer has at least twenty employees 21 5 and there is an interstate commerce
basis. The statute's purpose is "to promote employment of older persons
based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination
in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems
arising from the impact of age on employment., 21 6 The ADEA mandates:
It shall be unlawful for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's age;
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
212. Id. at *4.
213. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000). For new implementing regulations, see 72 Fed. Reg. 36,873
(eff. July 6, 2007).
214. 29 U.S.C. § 63 1(a) ("The prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are
at least forty years of age.").
215. Id. This is due to the ADEA's inclusion as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
216. Id. § 621(b).
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status as an employee, because of such individual's age; or
(3) to reduce the wage rate of any employee in order to comply
with this chapter.217
Lawful practices may include "a bona fide occupational qualification
reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business; or
where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age" or the
laws of a foreign country, or where age is used in a valid seniority system or
employee benefit plan, or where the discharge or discipline was for good
cause.218 On February 24, 2004, in General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline,219 the Supreme Court held that there would be no ADEA violation
where an employer favored an older employee over a younger employee, even
though both were in the protected class of being forty years of age or older.220
In establishing a prima facie case, an individual can assert age
discrimination based on direct evidence. 221 Another avenue used to establish
civil rights violations, such as Title VII, is through use of a disparate impact
claim, which alludes to situations where neutral or favorable policies
nonetheless have a negative effect on the protected group. 222 However, it is
217. Id. § 623(a) (employer practices). See generally Jankovitz v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 421 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2005) (challenging the school district's employee retirement incentive
plan). The Eighth Circuit stated, "Arbitrary age discrimination occurs when an employer denies or
reduces benefits based solely on an employee's age." Id. at 654; see also Bowman v. Orleans Parish
Sch. Bd., 141 Fed. Appx. 291 (5th Cir. 2005) (unpublished opinion) (concerning the unsuccessful
claim of a female who challenged the School Board's failure to promote her to the position as school
principal based on her age); Abrahamson v. Bd. of Educ., 374 F.3d 66 (2d Cir. 2004) (ruling the
collective bargaining agreement applicable to teachers over age fifty-five violated the ADEA), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 984 (2004).
218. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (lawful practices).
219. 540 U.S. 581 (2004); see also Meling v. St. Francis Coll., 3 F. Supp. 2d 267 (E.D.N.Y.
1998) (discussed within).
220. Cline, 540 U.S. at 584.
221. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 613 (1993) (noting "[d]isparate
treatment... captures the essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA").
222. In general, Title VII cases may be established through reliance on a discriminatory intent or
a discnminatory impact. The former is demonstrated through disparate treatment. Disparate
treatment can be proven either through direct or indirect evidence. See infra note 314 (concerning
Title VII). In most cases, there is not direct evidence of the employer voicing its intent to purposely
discriminate against an older individual. Instead, the plaintiff will rely on the indirect method.
Indirect evidence is established through use of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method. Tex.
Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). This requires three major steps: (1) the plaintiff must prove that he or she is a
member of the protected class, was qualified for the position, and an adverse action was taken by the
employer toward the individual; (2) then the defendant must prove there was a legitimate business
reason for not hiring the plaintiff or taking the unfavorable employment action toward this individual;
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
not clear whether the ADEA, a statute enacted three years after passage of
Title VII, allowed for cases predicated upon disparate impact. During 2005,
the Supreme Court ruled that while an employee could predicate an ADEA
case on a disparate impact theory, it would be narrowly limited. The Court
distinguished the statutory language found in Title VII, which allows for full
use of a disparate impact theory,223 as opposed to the ADEA. The Court
required that the plaintiff "'isolat[e] and identify[] the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities.' "224
The ADEA contains an anti-retaliation provision whereby an employer
may not discriminate when "such individual, member or applicant for
membership has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or
because such individual, member or applicant for membership has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or litigation under this chapter." 225  There is a pre-filing
requirement. 226  The individual would follow the Title VII provisions
concerning statute of limitations aspects. The ADEA provides for both legal
and (3) finally, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the alleged reason was
pretextual. Id. at 802-04. "Under the McDonnell Douglas scheme, the plaintiff bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case." Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 613-14 (7th Cir.
2005) (investigating whether an adverse employment was undertaken by an educational employer and
noting that in this circuit, the "denial of a raise qualifies as an adverse employment action ... but that
the denial of a bonus does not") (internal citations omitted). In Farrell, the Seventh Circuit found that
a "permanent increase in base salary strongly suggests that the award is a raise, not a bonus." Id.
The latter legal basis is demonstrated through establishment of a disparate impact theory. 42
U.S.C. § 2000-e-2(k)(l)(A)-(C) (2000) (amending the original statute to allow for use of the disparate
theory); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). "Under a disparate impact theory,
an employer is held liable when a facially neutral employment practice disproportionately impacts
members of a legally protected group." Farrell, 421 F.3d at 616. The Seventh Circuit continued:
In order to advance a disparate impact claim, the plaintiff must first establish a
prima facie case by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employment policy or practice had an adverse disparate impact on women on the
basis of their gender. The plaintiff must first 'isolate and identify 'the specific
employment practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical
disparities," and second demonstrate causation by offering 'statistical evidence of a
kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice in question has caused the
exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotion because of their membership in [the]
protected group.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
223. See Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 9-10.
224. Smith v. Jackson, Miss., 544 U.S. 228, 241 (2005) (emphasis added) (quoting Watson v. Ft.
Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994 (1988)).
225. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2000) (opposition to unlawful practices; participation in investigations,
proceedings, or litigation).
226. Id. § 626(d).
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and equitable relief, which may include back pay, front pay, and liquidated
damages in cases of willful violation of the statute. 227 The law directs:
In any action brought to enforce [the ADEA] the court shall have
jurisdiction to grant such legal or equitable relief as may be
appropriate to effectuate the purposes [of the statute], including
without limitation judgments compelling employment,
reinstatement, or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to be unpaid minimum wages or unpaid
overtime compensation under this section.228
During 2002, in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Supreme Court
rendered its first post-Seminole Tribe decision addressing the application of an
Eleventh Amendment defense in a case involving a major federal civil rights
law.229 The plaintiffs included associate professors, faculty, and librarians at
state universities. 230
While the Court recognized that the statutory language of the ADEA
"does contain a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate the States'
immunity, ... that abrogation exceeded Congress' authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. '231 The Court emphasized that Congress could not
use the Commerce Clause to shore up the ability of citizens to sue states or
arms of the state based on this federal statute.232 The Court noted that the
Fourteenth Amendment could be used to surmount the earlier enacted
227. Id. § 626(b) ("[L]iquidated damages shall be payable only in cases of willful violations...
.'1).
228. Id.
229. 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (finding that the ADEA does not allow lawsuits by state employee to be
brought in the federal courts, despite the express language in the statute providing for such causes of
action. The Court found such language violated Congress' authority pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Kovacevich v. Kent State Univ., 224 F.3d 806 (6th Cir. 2000)
(female professor alleged sex and age discrimination against the university. The appellate court held
that the Eleventh Amendment insulated this state university against her ADEA claim); Peterson v.
Davidson County Cmty. Coll., 367 F. Supp. 2d 890, 893 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (finding Eleventh
Amendment prevented an employee from bringing an ADEA claim against a North Carolina
community college. The North Carolina district court stated, "Here, there is no state statute or
constitutional provision demonstrating the state of North Carolina's waiver of its immunity regarding
the ADEA.").
230. Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 9-10)
(discussing this case in detail) (referring to this consolidated case with employees from the University
of Montevallo, Florida State University, and the Florida Department of Corrections).
231. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67; see also Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 17 (manuscript at 9-10).
232. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 80 ("Today we adhere to our holding in Seminole Tribe: Congress'
powers under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject States to suit at the
hands of private individuals.").
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Eleventh Amendment;233 however, strings were attached. There are three tests
the Court has utilized in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases. Cases
predicated on age discrimination would be assigned to the "rational
relationship" test. The Court concluded that the ADEA failed the
proportionality and congruence test 234 imposed by the Court in an earlier
opinion, City of Boerne v. Flores.23 5 In examining purported discrimination
assigned to "older persons," the Court noted that they "have not been
subjected to 'a history of purposeful unequal treatment."' 236 Thus, the Court
found the ADEA exceeded the constitutional constraints.
B. Intercollegiate Athletic Departments
i. Coaches or Athletic Directors
This is another area with a surprisingly low incidence of case law
involving individuals engaged in athletic-related employment at schools. In
Moore v. University of Notre Dame,237 the Indiana district court found that the
defendant-private university violated the ADEA in terminating a sixty-four-
year-old male assistant football coach from the storied football program.
238
The court determined that the coach's reinstatement was not an appropriate
remedy, and it ordered the university to pay the former offensive lineman
coach, who was fired in 1996, compensatory damages in the amount of
$75,577 and attorneys' fees totaling $394,865.239
In Jacobs v. College of William and Mary,240 the plaintiff, who had turned
forty years of age when announcements were made for certain full-time
appointments in the physical education department, claimed that the college
failed to employ her in the new position of full-time varsity basketball coach
due to her age.241 She had been the former women's basketball coach. 242 The
233. Id. ("Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, however, does grant Congress the authority
to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity.").
234. Id. at 82-83.
235. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
236. Heckman, The Impact of the Eleventh Amendment, supra note 17 (manuscript at 10)
(quoting Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83).
237. 22 F. Supp. 2d 896 (N.D. Ind. 1998); Moore v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 968 F. Supp. 1330
(N.D. Ind. 1997).
238. 22 F. Supp. 2d at 904.
239. Id. at 915.
240. 517 F. Supp. 791 (E.D. Va. 1980), affd without opinion, 661 F.2d 922 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1033 (1981).
241. 517 F. Supp. at 798.
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court found no violation of the ADEA as the college listed a Masters in
Physical Education as a requirement, which the plaintiff did not have, although
she had at the time finished all the course work, but was waiting to complete
her oral component of the program. 243 In a certain irony, the female head of
the search committee denied the allegation that she had asked the current
captain of the women's basketball team the following question: "Wouldn't
you all like a younger coach, someone like Mary Ann Stanley?"
244
Nevertheless, the district court asserted that "[the] plaintiff has the burden to
prove, not that age was a factor, but that 'age was the determining factor,'...
and 'proof that it was a determining factor is ... essential to recovery under
the ADEA."'' 24 5 The court stated, "A mere reference to age is not sufficient to
establish a right to recovery. It must have been a determining factor, and
plaintiff must establish 'but for' the age, she would have been selected. '246
The court concluded, "The evidence falls far short of meeting this standard.
There is no dispute of any substantial fact and therefore no support for a
verdict showing 'but for' age plaintiff would have been selected. '24 7 This is
reminiscent of the disability statute requirements that the plaintiff must meet
the minimum requirements in order to go forward. It again demonstrates the
significance of the job description and requirements for athletic employment
positions.
Due to the unfavorable Court ruling in Kimel, educational athletic
employees are turning to state laws for redress. In Brady v. Curators of
University of Missouri,24 8 the head baseball coach at the University of
Missouri-St. Louis contended a violation of the Missouri Human Rights Act 2
4 9
based on age discrimination and retaliation, where his full-time position with
benefits was reduced to a part-time position without benefits. 250 This was
after the coach had previously been reinstated as part of a settlement
242. Id.
243. Id. at 799-800.
244. Id. at 800. Marianne Stanley, an extremely successful women's basketball coach, would
later become embroiled in her own sex discrimination claim concerning her termination as the head
coach at the University of Southern California. See Stanley v. Univ. of S. Cal., 13 F.3d 1313 (9th Cir.
1994); Stanley, No. CV93-4708-JGD (C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1995) (granting defendants' motion for
summary judgment in its entirety), aff'd, 178 F.3d 1069, (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1022
(1999); see also Heckman, Sex Discrimination in the Gym, supra note 1, at 600-04 (discussing the
Stanley case); Heckman, The Glass Sneaker, supra note 1, at 599-600 (same).
245. Jacobs, 517 F. Supp. at 800 (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 606 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979)).
246. Id. at 801.
247. Id.
248. 213 S.W.3d 101 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
249. Miss. HUMAN RIGHTS ACT § 213.111 (2000).
250. 213 S.W.3d at 101.
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agreement with the university after filing a claim with the EEOC. 251 James
Brady had been the head coach since 1985, with a winning record every year
and with eighty percent of his players graduating. 252 In May 2002, the
university engaged in the somewhat common practice of placing certain sports
in tiers, with baseball, softball, and-volleyball placed in the less favorable tier
two sports, while basketball and soccer were deemed tier one sports.
253
During this period, the plaintiff argued that the university allowed the baseball
field to deteriorate, such that the coach contended the school had to decline the
NCAA's offer to conduct championship games there, despite the baseball team
being the best team in Division II at that juncture, and that the school never
moved the coach back to his original favorable office. 254
The coach proffered that three younger athletic department employees had
been treated better than him.255 The university had hired a male assistant
men's basketball coach, who was younger, and only had half a year student
coaching experience at a salary appreciably higher than coach Brady's reduced
salary. 256 Another younger athletic department employee, the compliance
officer, was allowed to work less than full-time hours to care for his children
while still classified as a full-time employee.257 The jury brought back a
verdict in excess of $1 million in favor of the coach, with $225,000 for actual
damages, $750,000 for punitive damages against the university, $200,000
punitive damages individually against the Chancellor for Administrative
Affairs, and $100,000 punitive damages individually against the female
Athletic Director. 258 The defendants challenged the issuance of punitive
damages. First, the Missouri appellate court ruled that the state statute
allowed for punitive damages,259 affirming the trial court's action. Second,
the court affirmed that the sufficiency of evidence warranted the punitive
damages. 260
ii. Other Athletic Department Employees
The first two cases concern women doing administrative work in the
251. Id. at 105.
252. Id. at 104.






259. Id. at 108.
260. Id. at 109-10.
[Vol. 18:1
2007] ATHLETIC EMPLOYMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS 143
athletic departments employed by the University of Oklahoma. In Beery v.
University of Oklahoma Board of Regents,26 1 a forty-eight-year-old female
administrative assistant to the athletic director alleged age discrimination when
she was terminated.26 2 Beery's duties included secretarial and administrative
duties.263 She had worked for the former athletic director for over fifteen
years, then for the interim athletic director for a few months and the new
athletic director for about six months until her termination on March 19,
1997.264 During 1996, the new athletic director had hired a forty-year-old man
to be his special assistant. 265 The special assistant was being groomed to be an
associate athletic director. 266 He received a significantly higher salary than the
plaintiff.267 The special assistant began assuming some of the plaintiffs
higher-level duties, such as "supervising the clerical staff, assisting the
Athletic Director in preparing the budget, and returning sensitive phone calls
and letters." 268 The athletic department then announced a reorganization,
which resulted in the plaintiffs termination, and the subsequent hiring of the
former basketball office assistant, a forty-eight-year-old female, to a new
Secretary II position.
26 9
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in this unpublished opinion, affirmed
the lower court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the age
discrimination claim.270 The court rejected the plaintiffs use of comparison
with the new special assistant; rather, the court found that the plaintiffs
responsibilities and duties were more comparable to the new Secretary II
position, which was filled by another woman over forty years of age. 27 1 The
court identified that the special assistant's higher salary was related to his
budgetary and supervisory roles, finding that there was "no evidence that
plaintiff ever held the position for which [the special assistant] was hired, or
that she was qualified to do so." 272
In McEwen v. University of Oklahoma Board of Regents ex rel State of
261. No. 98-6459, 2000 WL 27692 (10th Cir. Jan. 14, 2000).









271. Id. at *3.
272. Id.
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Oklahoma,273 the Tenth Circuit again affirmed the lower court's issuance of
summary judgment in favor of the state university concerning another age
discrimination lawsuit commenced by a fifty-three-year-old woman, who had
worked twenty-two years in the university's athletic department and refused a
transfer to the physical plant. 274 She was terminated due to a reduction-in-
force in the athletic department. The lower court had found that the
university's reason for the adverse employment decision was credible.
In Austin v. Cornell University, two male employees, who held seasonal
positions at the private university's golf course, alleged age discrimination. 275
This New York district court found that the lawsuit could proceed against two
named university employees as defendants, respectively, the head golf
professional at the Robert Trent Jones Golf Course in Ithaca, New York, and
the Associate Director of Athletics for Operations and Facilities.276 One of the
plaintiffs, Austin, worked in the pro shop for a number of seasons and as a
paid ranger for one season; McPeak worked as a volunteer ranger for a number
of seasons and a paid ranger for the golf course for two seasons-as the golf
course was not open during the winter months. 277 Prior to the 1993 season,
both Austin and McPeak were not rehired.278 At that time, Austin was
seventy-three-years-old, and McPeak was sixty-seven-years-old. 279  They
were told the university's decision was predicated on a reorganization to use a
"double wave" system, which involved golfers crossing over after respectively
playing the first nine holes or the tenth through eighteenth holes, and a
downsizing from twenty to about sixteen or seventeen positions. 280 The
opinion omitted any discussion as to why an exact count was not provided for
the trial court's consideration. If the plaintiffs accounted for two of the
positions, then who was the third, and if applicable, fourth individual who did
not make the final cut? The defendants indicated that they had received
complaints regarding the plaintiffs' job performances, but decided not to
communicate this to the plaintiffs, purportedly to spare their feelings. 28'
Cornell advertised for the position and hired four individuals: three were under
273. No. 99-6214, 2000 WL 783418 (10th Cir. June 20, 2000).
274. Id. at*l.
275. 891 F. Supp. 740 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying the defendants' motion for summary judgment
to dismiss the lawsuit).




280. Id. at 743-44.
281. Id. at 744.
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forty years of age and one man was in his fifties. 282
First, the New York district court identified that "[u]nlawful termination
cannot occur where a party is not an employee at the time of the alleged
discrimination," 283 and thus granted the university's motion to dismiss. 284
However, as to unlawful failure to rehire, the court noted that "the 'fresh help'
and 'timid' comments reasonably can relate to age-based stereotypes regarding
plaintiffs. '285 Additionally, since the plaintiffs were replaced with workers
having no ranger experience, the court found this established a permissible
inference of discrimination. 286 The court underscored the university's failure
to criticize the plaintiffs' performance during the prior season, which could
"lead to the rational inference that their performance was satisfactory and that
defendants' current claim to the contrary is pretextual. '' 287 Merely providing a
list of ranger duties to the plaintiffs was not satisfactory to place the plaintiffs
on notice that their work performance was unsatisfactory. 288 Finally, this
district court would allow individuals, as opposed to the employer, to be held
liable under the ADEA where the discriminatory acts were performed while
exercising supervisory control over a plaintiffs employment. 289
This case points out that if the educational institution is going to engage in
employee evaluations, then it behooves the school to communicate the
outcome of such activity to the employee. With the subsequent Court decision
in Cline, it would appear that substituting older employees with younger
employees, who are also over forty-years of age, will be tolerated. Obviously,
this raises the question as to whether the ADEA statute should be amended to
provide jurisdiction not only for those over forty-years-old, but also those who
fall into that category where they are replaced by anyone who is ten years
younger than the current employee.
C. Interscholastic Athletic Departments
The following cases involve high school football coaches. In Eggleston v.
South Bend Community School Corp.,290 a male high school teacher had
earlier alleged age discrimination by the school district in being denied a
282. Id. at 744-45.
283. Id. at 746.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 748.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 748-49.
289. Id. at 750.
290. 858 F. Supp. 841 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
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teaching position. 29' The parties entered into a settlement agreement, which
contained a clause related to the teaching position, as well as to his position as
an assistant football coach.292 The athletic department provided the coach
with a favorable written evaluation, indicating that "[d]iscipline was excellent.
Covered all phases of coaching responsibilities. Outstanding scouting report
for each week. Very pleased with his work. 2 9 3 However, the head football
coach was not so enamored with this assistant coach.294 The plaintiff would
successfully file three grievances. 295 Then the plaintiff instituted this lawsuit
alleging retaliation based on his removal as the assistant football coach. The
court, in this pre-Kimel case, emphasized:
For more than twenty years, the federal courts have held that
harassment violates the statutory prohibition against
discrimination in the terms and conditions of employment. The
[Equal Employment Opportunity] Commission has held and
continues to hold that an employer has a duty to maintain a
working environment free of harassment based on race, color,
religion, sex, national origin, age, or disability, and that the duty
requires positive action where necessary to eliminate such
practices or remedy their effects.296
The Indiana district court indicated the ADEA allows for compensatory
damages, 297 but not punitive damages. 298 It also found that the ADEA allows
for a claim based on a hostile environment. 299
On March 30, 2001, in Puchalski v. School District of Springfield,300 a
Pennsylvania district court denied a motion for summary judgment filed by the
plaintiff, a terminated male football coach, who contended that his termination
was based on a violation of the ADEA and that he was defamed. 30 1 The
291. Id. at 843.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 848.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 848-49.
296. Id. at 848 (emphasis in original).
297. Id. at 855.
298. Id. at 856.
299. Id. at 846-47. This generally is found in Title VII sexual harassment hostile environment
cases.
300. 161 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2001); see also Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL
351193 (N.D. Ill., June 23, 1997) (examining a coach's lawsuit predicated on discrimination based on
age and race) (discussed within).
301. See also Henderson v. Anne Arundel County Bd. of Educ., 54 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Md.
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plaintiff had been the head coach for ten years.302 It was alleged that he
directed a racial epithet at a football player during a game at another school.
A school employee allegedly made the statement that they were looking for a
"young coach who works in the [school] district., 3 0 3 The district did not
renew the plaintiffs contract. 30 4 The decision was purportedly based on a
number of reasons, including the alleged failure by the coach to allow players
to practice without first obtaining required physical examination forms.
30 5
Clearly, making certain that all athletes are physically able and medically
cleared to participate is an aspect that all coaches must follow. Ultimately, the
school district hired one of the plaintiffs assistant coaches, who was then
twenty-five-years-old. 30 6 The court ruled the plaintiff failed to establish an
unlawful pretext for the adverse employment action. 30 7 The coach also
alleged racial discrimination. The Pennsylvania district court rejected the
coach's claim that the athletic director made a racist remark concerning him





There are a number of provisions that may prohibit discrimination based
upon an individual's race. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution
1999) (discussed within) (finding no ADEA violation in not hiring the former high school head
football coach back to his former position. The court ruled that the school board articulated non-
pretextural reasons for selecting another younger Caucasian man).
302. Puchalski, 161 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 403.
305. See, e.g., 8 N.Y. COMP. CODES R & REGS. tit. 8, § 135.4 (c)(7)(i)(i) (2006) (directing public
schools "(i) to provide adequate health examination before participation in strenuous activity and
periodically throughout the season as necessary, and to permit no pupil to participate in such activity
without the approval of the school medical officer"). See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 901 (medical
inspection to be provided) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 903 (pupils to furnish health
certificates) (McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 904 (examinations by medical inspection)
(McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 905 (record of examinations: eye, ear, and scoliosis tests)
(McKinney 2005); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 906 (existence of contagious diseases, return after illness)
(McKinney 2006); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 912-a (urine analysis; drug detection) (McKinney 2006).
306. 161 F. Supp. 2d at 403.
307. Id. at 412.
308 Id. at 402.
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW [Vol. 18:1
ensures equal protection by states pursuant to the Equal Protection Clause. 309
For fundamental rights or laws predicated on race, national origin, or alienage,
the laws must pass the highest test, the strict scrutiny test. As the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated:
In order to preserve these principles, the Supreme Court recently
has required that any governmental action that expressly
distinguishes between persons on the basis of race be held to the
most exacting scrutiny ... Furthermore, there is now absolutely
no doubt that courts are to employ strict scrutiny when
evaluating all racial classifications, including those characterized
by their proponents as "benign" or "remedial."
3 10
Lawsuits may be brought as §1983 actions, 311 a procedural mechanism
that allows the plaintiff to assert violations of constitutional protections and
certain statutes in federal courts.
3 12
309. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The 2000 U.S. Census form contained the following definitions:
"The term Black or African American refers to people having origins in any of the Black racial
groups of Africa. It includes people who indicate their race as Black, African Am., or Negro, or
provide written entries such as African American, Afro American, Kenyan, Jamaican, Caribbean-
American, Nigerian, or Haitian;" and "[t]he term White refers to people having origins in any of the
original peoples of Europe, the Middle East, or North Africa. It includes people who indicate their
race as 'White' or report entries such as Irish, German, Italian, British, Iraqi, Near Easterner, Arab, or
Polish." Race, http://www.answers.com/topic/race-united-states-census (last visited Oct. 14, 2007).
310. See Hopwood v. Tex., 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996), on remand, 999 F. Supp. 872
(W.D. Tex. 1998), aff'd in part, rev 'd in part, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000), reh 'g and reh 'd en banc
denied, 248 F.3d 1141 (table), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 929 (2001); Heckman, Women & Athletics,
supra note 1, at 7 n.23 (identifying Supreme Court decisions designating the aforementioned as
suspect classes subject to a strict scrutiny standard).
311. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2005).
312. For cases brought by student-athletes concerning the NCAA's academic requirements
alleging discrimination on the basis of race pursuant to the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution or the various federal statutes, see Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n, 198
F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 1999), on remand, No. Civ. A. 97-131, 2000 WL 388722 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 14, 2000),
reconsideration denied, No. Civ. A. 97-131, 2000 WL 623233 (E.D. Pa. May 15, 2000), aff'd, 252
F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (examining whether NCAA's use of standardized tests (SAT scores) to
determine academic eligibility constituted discrimination, on the basis of race pursuant to a Title VI
disparate Impact theory, against incoming freshmen African-American students); Pryor v. National
Collegiate Athletic Ass "n, 153 F. Supp. 2d 710 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding the NCAA was a recipient of
federal funds in this Title VI action that also contested the NCAA's initial eligibility standards); Hall
v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 985 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. I1. 1997) (another Title VI action
concerning NCAA's core course requirements imposed to satisfy a student-athlete's academic
eligibility); see also Diane Heckman, Tracking Challenges to NCAA's Academic Eligibility Rules
Based on Race and Disability, 222 EDUC. L. REP. 1, Oct. 4, 2007 (discussing the Cureton and Pryor
cases); Kenneth L. Shropshire, Colorblind Propositions: Race, the SAT, and the National Collegiate
Athletic Association, 8 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 141 (1997).
For other matters involving student-athletes or schools, see Colorado Seminary v. National
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ii. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)
There are also a number of federal statutes that prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race. First, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based
on race, 3 13 provided there are at least fifteen employees and the business has
an interstate commerce connection. The pivotal language of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer -
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (NCAA's placement of the member school
on probation for failure to declare certain intercollegiate hockey players ineligible was not
unconstitutional); Butts v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass 'n, 751 F.2d 609 (3d Cir. 1984) (college
basketball player brought action seeking preliminary injunction against enforcement of NCAA rule
providing that athlete's participation in organized sport after twenty years of age and prior to college
would count as one year of varsity competition in sport for purposes of four-year college eligibility
limitation. The Third Circuit upheld the lower court's denial of the player's request seeking an
injunction, even if the rule might have a racially disparate impact); Louisiana High School Athletic
Ass'n v. St. Augustine High School, 396 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1968) (finding state high school athletic
association which prevented schools with black student-athletes from being members violated the
Constitution); Davis v. Kent State University, 928 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (dismissing
complaint filed by male African-American, who claimed loss of his athletic scholarship on the
gymnastics team was motivated by his race in this Section 1983 action predicated on violation of the
First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments); Kelley v. Metropolitan County Board of Nashville
and Davidson County, Tennessee, 293 F. Supp. 485 (M.D. Tenn. 1968) (concerning suspension of an
"all Negro high school" for a year). See generally, Timothy Davis, The Myth of the Superspade: The
Persistence of Racism in College Athletics, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 615 (1995) (examining "the role
of race in denying equality of opportunity to black participants involved in college sports"); Timothy
Davis, Racism in Athletics: Subtle Yet Persistent, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 881 (1999)
(follow-up article); Alfred Dennis Mathewson, Emphasizing Torts in Claims of Discrimination
Against Black Female Athletes, 38 WASHBURN L.J. 817 (1999).
313. See also Cox v. Nat'l Football League, 29 F. Supp. 2d 463 (N.D. III. 1998) (unsuccessful
Title VII retaliation claim brought by NFL player); Scholz v. RDV Sports, Inc., 710 So. 2d 618 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that a terminated white assistant coach for the Orlando Magic, an
NBA team, established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Title VII concerning his
allegation of wrongful discharge), review denied, 718 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 1998). The court noted, "Title
VII extends protection against intentional racial discrimination to both minority and nonminonty
employees." Id. at 623. The court further articulated, "[lI]t was not necessary for [the plaintiff] to
prove that race was the sole reason for his termination .... Rather, he was only required to submit
evidence indicating that race was a motivating factor in making the decision." Id. at 625. See
generally Sean D. Johnson, Wage Discrimination in the National Basketball Association: Is There
Discrimination Based on Race?, 6 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 27 (1999); Earl Smith, Race Matters in
the National Basketball Association, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 239 (1999); Michael Corey Dawson,
Comment, A Change Must Come: All Racial Barriers Precluding Minority Representation in
Managerial Positions on Professional Sports Teams Must Be Eliminated, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
551 (1999).
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sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants
for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 314
In order to establish a prima facie racial discrimination case, the following
elements must be proven: "(1) membership in a protected class; (2)
satisfactory job performance [where the individual is already employed]; (3)
an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action
occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination." 315
A plaintiff may establish either a disparate treatment or disparate impact case.
A disparate treatment case may be proven by either a direct or indirect
method. Under the direct method, the individual must prove that the
defendant was motivated by discriminatory animus, through either direct or
circumstantial evidence. 316 Presently, there has been no Supreme Court ruling
finding that this statute, upon which the ADEA was modeled, infringes on
state sovereignty as found in the Eleventh Amendment. While this statute is
activity based, the next one is based on a federal funding predicate.
iii. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VI)
Title V1317 prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. It states, "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
314. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(2)(a) (2000) (employer practices).
315. Zhao v. State Univ. of N.Y., 472 F. Supp. 2d 289, 307 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (citing Cruz v.
Coach Stores, Inc., 202 F.3d 560, 567 (2d Cir. 2000)). This court also noted,
Nor does it matter that the stereotyping involved positive attributes that could have
initially favored a plaintiff at the time of hiring. If an employer has crossed the line
into making employment decisions based on ethnic stereotyping rather than on the
merits, one could easily see how a stereotype that may benefit an employee on one
day could result in an adverse employment action on another day.
Id. at 310.
316. Sun v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 473 F.3d 799, 812 (7th Cir. 2007) (indicating that
circumstantial evidence of intentional discrimination features "(1) suspicious timing, ambiguous oral
or written statements, or behavior toward or comments directed at other employees in the protected
group; (2) evidence, whether or not rigorously statistical, that similarly situated employees outside the
protected class received systematically better treatment; and (3) evidence that the employee was
qualified for the job in question but was passed over in favor of a person outside the protected class
and the employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2941 (2007). The
indirect method utilizes the McDonnell Douglas method. Id. at 814.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (effective July 2, 1964).
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color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance." 318 Thus, in order to trigger application
of this statute, a prospective plaintiff must establish that the program or
activity received federal funds. It would be applicable to any educational
program or activity that is a recipient of federal funds. Unlike with Title VII,
in Alexander v. Sandoval,319 the Supreme Court determined that an individual
could not enforce the disparate-impact Title VI regulations in a private action;
individuals must establish intentional discrimination in order to obtain relief
pursuant to Title VI. The Equalization Act also applies to Title VI. 320 The
Court has not entertained a case challenging the Eleventh Amendment
entwinement over this statute's application to potential public schools.
iv. Section 1981 Action
Another federal statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, is restricted to prohibiting racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of employment contracts, which
also utilizes the burden-shifting analysis. The law provides the following:
(a) Statement of equal rights[:] All persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is
enjoyed by white citizens .... (b) 'Make and enforce contracts'
defined[:] For purposes of this section, the term 'make and
enforce contracts' includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship. (c) Protection against impairment[:] The rights
protected by this section are protected against impairment by
nongovernmental discrimination and impairment under color of
State law. 321
The court in Goins v. Hitchcock Independent School District32 2 stated:
318. Id.
319. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (5-4 decision) (rejecting the plaintiff's claim that Alabama violated
Title VI by offering tests to obtain driver's licenses only in the English language).
320. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7.
321. Id. § 1981 (1991).
322. 191 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. Tex. 2002), affd, 65 Fed. Appx. 508 (5th Cir. 2003)
(unpublished opinion).
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In order to sustain a claim under § 1981 against Individual
Defendants, Plaintiff must show that (1) she belongs to a racial
minority; (2) the Individual Defendants intended to discriminate
against her on the basis of race; and (3) such discrimination
involved an activity enumerated in the statute (i.e., the making
and enforcing of a contract). 323
Title VI, Title VII, and § 1981 actions require intentional discrimination.
B. Coaches
The period since the passage of Title VII also reflects the changing of all-
white or predominantly Caucasian athletic teams and corresponding coaching
squads,324 especially in the interscholastic and intercollegiate sports of football
and men's basketball. A number of coaches, especially football coaches, have
commenced lawsuits. The cases generally fall into two categories: (1) those
commenced by African-American coaches alleging failure to be hired or
retained,325 and (2) reverse discrimination suits, involving the termination of
white coaches who were replaced by African-American coaches. 326 Long-
time coaches may also assert age discrimination claims. The issue of whether
school districts could hire coaches of one race to match the race of the team's
student-athletes would underlie a number of cases. The general scenario
would feature the termination of the long-time white male coach, leaving open
two possible legal grounds: an age discrimination claim, as well as a race
discrimination claim. Female coaches have not asserted race-based
challenges, where little progress has been made in their coaching men's
football or men's basketball teams, regardless of their race.
Throughout these cases, attention should be paid to the identity (category)
of the school employee making the offensive remarks and to how the courts
323. Id. at 869-70 (covering only race and alienage and not gender-based discrimination); id. at
870 n.9; see also Auguster v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 249 F.3d 400, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2001)
(detailing the elements required to support a prima facie case as had been articulated by the district
court).
324. See, e.g., the history of the men's basketball team at the University of Kentucky. Richard
Lapchick, A Reason to Celebrate Sports: Buck O'Neil, ESPN.COM, Oct. 14, 2006, http://
sports.espn.go.com/espn/columns/story?columnist-lapchickrichard&id=2621475.
325. See, e.g., Wallace v. Tex. Tech Univ., 80 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1996); Harris v. Birmingham
Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); Cross v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway Ark. Sch. Dist.,
395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
326. See, e.g., Cameli v. O'Neal, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 862988 (N.D. I11. June 23, 1997);
Covington v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 738 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Tex. 1990); Frye v. Anne
Arundel County Bd. of Educ., No. C-2000-67307-OC, 2002 WL 31995810 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21,
2002).
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handled the discourse. The following case illustrates biases that may still
impact individuals, even though the administrator's comment did not establish
race discrimination. In Auguster v. Vermilion Parish School Board,327 the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found no § 1981 claim for racial discrimination
concerning an African-American male teacher in a Louisiana school whose
teaching contract was not renewed, where his position was filled by a white
woman.328 A school administrator had reportedly told the plaintiff that he had
a negative experience with past hiring of African-American coaches, "and if
there was another problem, no matter what it was, that he would do his best to
get rid of me, from day one." 329  After being hired, this teacher was
reprimanded for inappropriate use of corporal punishment and for showing an
R-rated movie to his students.330 The court found: "Given the overwhelming
evidence supporting the school board's legitimate justification, however, [the
administrator's] comments can be viewed as no more than stray remarks,
which are insufficient to survive summary judgment."'331
The cases are divided into two sections, dealing with hiring or termination
concerns. The cases are chronologically presented; they all concern
interscholastic or intercollegiate coaches with the exception of the Clemons
case, which involved an official.
i. Hiring-Related Cases
While the 2007 National Football League Super Bowl game was historic
for featuring for the first time two African-American coaches (Lovie Smith,
coach of the Chicago Bears, and Tony Dungy, coach of the winning
Indianapolis Colts), 332 the hiring of minority individuals to coach NCAA
Division I teams has not made great progress despite forty years of civil rights
legislation. A 2007 New York Times article reported that merely seven out of
327. No. 00-30736, 2001 WL 392261 (5th Cir. May 3, 2001).
328. Id. at *2.
329. Id. at *5.
330. Id. at *2.
331. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated,
The fact that [an administrator] had told [the plaintiff] that 'if there was another
problem, no matter what it was, that he would do his best to get rid of [him]' is
insignificant in comparison to the evidence of the [plaintiffs] unfitness as a teacher
and thus is insufficient, on its own, to establish discrimination.
Id. at *6 (analyzing the elements pertaining to stray remarks).
332. See John Branch, One Man's Journey: From the Flats to the Pinnacle, Savoring the Ride,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, § 8, at 1; Karen Crouse, One Man 's Lesson: A Gentle Touch Develops into
a Winning One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28, 2007, § 8, at 1.
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119 NCAA Division I-A programs were led by minority coaches, one less than
in 1998. 333 The article also informed that only two out of twenty head-
coaching vacancies for the past season were filled by minority coaches. 334
In Harris v. Birmingham Board of Education,335 the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals examined whether racial discrimination occurred in a case
commenced by three African-American male coaches employed by an
Alabama board of education. The plaintiffs alleged they were only assigned to
coach football or basketball at historically all African-American schools in the
area and were never promoted to the head coaching position at other
schools. 336  This Alabama school board operated under a desegregation
order.337 The plaintiffs produced statistical evidence that "[o]nly once in a
ten-year period (1970-1980), was a white head football coach replaced by an
[African-American] head football coach and that occurred at a school which
eventually became predominantly [African-American]. 338  There was an
informal system used for assigning head coaches, with no fixed criteria for the
head coaching positions.339 The Eleventh Circuit found that as to one of the
plaintiffs, "[t]he statistical evidence, the showing of only subjective hiring
standards and the history of past racial discrimination was enough to compel a
finding of employment discrimination." 340 The appellate court highlighted:
Title VII, Supreme Court precedent, and our holdings would be
rendered a farce if a public employer, without notification of job
opportunity procedures, without uniform criteria for determining
qualifications, and with a totally subjective system of selection
could rebut a prima facie case by a prospective employee of the
protected class by showing that the employee never had the
opportunity to learn of and apply for the job.34 1
333. Selena Roberts, College Booster Bias Is Delaying Minority Hiring, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2007, § 8, at 1, 6.
334. Id.
335. 712 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1983); see also Cross v. Bd. of Educ. of Dollarway Ark. Sch.
Dist., 395 F. Supp. 531 (E.D. Ark. 1975) (concerning another black high school football coach, who
was demoted to a junior high school football coach, when the all-black high school became the junior
high school and the older black students where placed in a predominantly white high school. He was
passed over for consideration as the high school football coach, which the court found violated Title
VII).
336. Harris, 712 F.2d at 1379.
337. Id. at 1381.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1383.
341. Id. at 1384.
[Vol. 18:1
A THLE TIC EMPLOYMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
The court thus remanded the case back to the district court for further
proceedings in light of its determination as to one of the coaches. 34
2
Another teacher, with one Mexican and one African-American parent,
unsuccessfully asserted a Title VII violation in Lujan v. Franklin County
Board of Education, where a white applicant was chosen as the head high
school football coach at a Tennessee school.343 Previously, Lujan had been
the head football and boys' basketball coach at an all-black high school that
closed. 344 Then, the plaintiff was assigned to be the assistant football coach at
his new school. 345 The Tennessee district court found there were "plausible
non-discriminatory reasons" for the school board's action.346  The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the decision. 347
In Covington v. Beaumont Independent School District,348 two football
coaches, a male Caucasian and male Hispanic, at a Texas high school alleged
racial discrimination in being reassigned from the varsity football team to the
sophomore team. 349 The school had assigned two male African-American
coaches to coach the varsity football team based on the rationale that the
majority of the team were African-American players. 350 In this § 1983 action,
the Texas district court held this violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 351  In 1990, the court noted the school district's
actions were not part of an affirmative action plan, nor was the reassignment
undertaken to remedy identified past discrimination against black coaches.
352
The court rejected the school district's rationale that its reason was to further
racial integration among its coaching staff in light of an old case charging the
system was not integrated. 353 The Texas district court ruled the coaches were
entitled to $1 each for the constitutional violation and $5000 each for mental
distress and anguish. 354
On June 14, 1999, in Henderson v. Anne Arundel County Board of
342. Id.
343. 584 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
344. Id. at 280.
345. Id. at 280-81.
346. Id. at 282.
347. Lujan v. Franklin County Bd. of Educ., 766 F.2d 917 (6th Cir. 1985).
348. 738 F. Supp. 1041 (E.D. Tex. 1990) (the coaches were still being paid according to the
contracts to coach the varsity team).
349. Id. at 1042.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 1042-43.
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Education,355 the Maryland district court granted a board of education's
motion for summary judgment dismissing the claims of race and age
discrimination brought pursuant to Title VII, § 1981, and the ADEA by an
African-American male who was not selected as the head varsity football
coach at one of the high schools. 356 The plaintiff had been the head coach at
the high school for three years, compiling the following win-loss record: 1-9,
5-5, and 2-8.357 His contract was not renewed. 358 A new coach who had a
winning record came in for a few years. 359 When he left, the plaintiff applied
for the position, which went to a younger male Caucasian.360 The plaintiff
apparently had a poor interview, which combined with his poor performance
when he last had the position, were deemed legitimate reasons for hiring the
other individual.3 61 The court rejected the plaintiff's "spoliation" argument
that members on the interview panel had destroyed their personal notes after
the interviews occurred. 362 The plaintiff pointed out that the interview by the
selection committee was conducted by Caucasians and based on subjective
criteria. 363 The court commented:
Although the Court recognizes that the vagaries of high school
sports make it difficult for any coach to maintain a consistent
winning record-given the shifting talent pool of players from
year to year-nonetheless, Mr. Henderson's losing record when
he had the head coach job, combined with his poor interview
performance, certainly constituted a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for his non-selection .... 364
As to the argument that subjective elements were included, the court noted
that "the selection of a football coach comes close to a tenure decision, in that
subjective evaluations are highly important. 365
355. 54 F. Supp. 2d 482 (D. Md. 1999).






362. Id. at 485. The court found, "These were minor records, personal to the interviewers, and it
is certainly understandable that teachers serving on a panel to interview a football coach would see no
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In Frye v. Anne Arundel County Board of Education,366 the plaintiff
alleged reverse race discrimination in not being selected as the head football
coach at a Maryland high school, where the coach had held the position for
two prior years when the school board announced it would solicit applications
for the 1999-2000 academic year.36 7 Three candidates applied, including
Frye, a Caucasian male. 368 The position went to one of his assistant coaches,
an African-American male.369 A five-person panel did the interviewing for
the position. 370 However, the school principal made the ultimate hiring
decision, indicating that she did not hire the plaintiff due to his prior job
performance allegedly consisting of profanity and negative remarks made by
him to his players, along with lack of control of the team and his lack of self-
control. 3 7 1 The coach had two winning seasons as head coach. 372  The
Maryland state appellate court dismissed the assertion that one or more of the
panel members thought it would be "nice" to have a black coach, and that
there may have been discrepancies between the actual tallies of the selection
committee members and what was transferred to the principal, since the
selection panel did not make the ultimate decision. 373 The plaintiff also
alleged the new hiring was a sham, as it was announced in a newspaper article
before the principal officially took over that position. 374 The appellate court
noted, "The Supreme Court has held that Title VII protects whites as well as
minorities." 37 5 However, the court found the plaintiff did not establish his
burden of essentially proving that the principal's action was due to
discriminatory racial animus, stating, "Even if [the principal] was wrong in her
assessment, there is no evidence that she was dishonest or that she was
motivated by racial reasons, nor does being wrong establish unlawful
[discriminatory] conduct. '376 Thus, the Maryland appellate court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment.
The analysis addressed the role of the panel; however, it was not fully
investigated, since the court relied on the principal making the ultimate
366. No. C-2000-67307 OC, 2002 WL 31995810 (Md. Cir. Ct. Nov. 21, 2002).




371. Id. at *2.
372. Id.
373. Id. at *3.
374. Id.
375. Id. at *1 (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1975)).
376. Id. at *4.
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decision. This case poses four potential tracts of inquiry, especially for high
schools hiring coaches. First, the criteria for selecting the coach should be
identified at the commencement of the process, such as the following: (a)
educational background (including minimum requirements: high school
graduate, college graduate, other); (b) sports background (high school
participation, collegiate, Olympic, professional, other); (c) coaching
background (high school, college, Olympic, professional, other); (d) win-loss
record; (e) coaching philosophy; (f) identification of the school's philosophy
concerning the role of athletics; (g) graduation rates; (h) coach's control of
past teams; (i) coach's record for technical fouls, etc.; (j) student-athlete
violations; (k) health and safety concerns (number of athletes injured and
severity of injuries); (1) temperament, which is one of those subjective aspects;
and (in) other miscellaneous aspects. Second, educational institutions should
make it clear who has the ultimate hiring decision and what the role of any
panel or search committee is before the selection process begins: thus, is it
merely to screen potential candidates with a final interview of the top two or
three individuals by the actual school administrator who makes the ultimate
decision, or does the panel have final authority? Why bother having a panel,
purportedly comprised of school representatives conversant with the area, if
the panel's recommendation is not followed? Third, the lax manner in which
the panel reached its decision was glossed over-if tally sheets are utilized,
then the chair of the selection committee should be charged with collecting,
tallying, and storing them if making the ultimate decision or before their
transmittal to the ultimate decision-maker. Fourth, the ultimate decision-
maker's basis for making the selection should comport with the original
criteria.
In Seagrave v. Dean,377 a Louisiana trial court awarded the white male
former track coach at the Louisiana State University and Agricultural and
Mechanical College (LSU) damages for lost wages and emotional distress for
breach of a state law. 378 Originally, the state university hired Seagrave as an
assistant men's and women's track coach. 379 Then the university promoted
him to be the head coach for the women's team.380 When an opening occurred
with the men's team during 1987, Seagrave applied for the position, which
went to another male who had experience being the head coach of the men's
program. 381 LSU told Seagrave that he did not have the proper experience.3 82
377. 908 So. 2d 41 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
378. Id. at 42.
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During a 1989 out-of-state spring training program, the plaintiff informed
the current men's track coach that he had engaged in an all-night counseling
session with one of his female athletes at the residence where he was living
during this interim period.383 Upon Seagrave's return, a meeting was held
whereupon the administration asked the coach to resign; he refused. 3 84 The
university held a grievance hearing, even though the coach was deemed an at-
will employee. 385 LSU did not change the termination decision.
386
In 1990, Seagrave commenced his lawsuit alleging a number of grounds,
including that his termination was predicated upon racial discrimination,
pursuant to a Louisiana state statute, based on his marriage to an African-
American woman. 387 In analyzing the requisite prima facie elements, the
Louisiana appellate court reversed the favorable trial court decision. 38 8 First,
the appellate court determined the protected class was not African-Americans,
"but rather is someone engaged in an interracial relationship." 3 89 Seagrave
was replaced as the women's track coach with an African-American woman,
who was not engaged in an interracial relationship. 390 Thus, the "jury could
reasonably conclude that Seagrave established that he was replaced by
someone outside of his protected class." 39 1 However, the inquiry did not end
there.
Apparently, there was a comment by the athletic director that Seagrave
would not be considered for the men's head coaching position "because he
only had experience coaching women and because he was going to marry a
black woman." 392 The Louisiana state appellate court stated:
In order for comments in the workplace to provide sufficient
evidence of discrimination, they must be (1) related to the
protected class of persons of which the plaintiff is a member; (2)
proximate in time to the termination; (3) made by an individual






387. Id. at 43-44.
388. Id. at 42.
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the employment decision at issue.393
The court found the plaintiff failed to establish all the criteria as the
comment was allegedly made in 1987, approximately two years before the
coach's ultimate termination. 394 Thus, the appeals court found that the jury
erred. 395
During 2006, in Banks v. Pocatello School District No. 25,396 the Idaho
district court refused to grant summary judgment to the school district based
on a male African-American's Title VII claim that he was not hired as a head
football coach based on racial discrimination and retaliation for filing an
administrative grievance with the EEOC.
ii. Termination Cases
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected claims asserted by a black,
male assistant men's basketball coach based on violation of his First
Amendment freedom of speech and association protections and § 1981 racial
discrimination in Wallace v. Texas Tech University.397  The university
reportedly warned the coach not to get too close to his players. 398 It then
refused to renew the coach's contract for allegedly advising some of his
players that they were entitled to financial assistance during their fifth year of
NCAA eligibility. 399 The appellate court affirmed the grant of summary
judgment.400 It noted that an allegation of a racial slur did not establish a
violation of § 1981, nor did the evidence support the plaintiff's claim that racist
remarks had been made by the head coach or other individuals. 40 1 The Fifth
Circuit also rejected the assertion of discrimination based on a difference in
pay accorded the two assistant coaches, as the other coach had greater
experience-thus providing an objective reason for the difference in
compensation afforded him.402
The next case is instructive, where educational institutions can premise
employment decisions based on the win-loss record of a coach, as it is a
393. Id.
394. Id. at 46-47.
395. Id. at 47.
396. No. CV-04-125-E-BLW, 2006 WL 1128214 (D. Idaho Apr. 25, 2006).
397. 80 F.3d 1042 (5th Cir. 1996).
398. Id. at 1046.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 1042.
401. Id. at 1048.
402. See Heckman, Freedom of Speech, supra note 3, at 39-40 (expounding on this case).
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legitimate barometer to use in making employment decisions where written
coaching contracts are non-existent or negligible, especially on the
interscholastic level. In Cameli v. 0 'Neal,40 3 a Caucasian long-time Illinois
high school varsity basketball coach unsuccessfully alleged race and age
discrimination. 40 4 The case reflects, depending on the parties' viewpoint, the
interaction or interference by the administration into the fundamental role of a
coach: (1) to make his own staffing decisions, provided they do not abridge
any applicable laws, and (2) to make his own team-composition decisions in a
sport where tryouts were held to ascertain the talent and ability of potential
team members. 40 5
A chronological timeline is featured. Initially, the head boys' basketball
coach refused to hire a "Black" assistant coach to sit on the bench.406 The
racial composition of the school or even the team members was not provided.
The administration informed Cameli that he must have an African-American
assistant "to increase the diversity of the coaching staff. '407 The coach then
indicated his displeasure with the African-American man hired to coach the
sophomore team.40 8  The assistant principal then recommended that the
plaintiff not be rehired as the varsity coach; however, the superintendent did
not implement the recommendation.40 9
During the beginning of the 1992-1993 school year, a new principal came
on board who indicated he would be a hands-on administrator. 410 At the end
of the 1992-1993 school year, the coach indicated his intent to retire from
teaching at the end of the following academic year (June 19 9 4 ).4 11 The
plaintiff was born during 1934 and thus would presumably be approximately
sixty-years-old upon his retirement. 412 Cameli met with the new principal,
who informed him that he did not favor retired teachers continuing to
403. No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 351193 (N.D. Ill. June 23, 1997); see also Jett v. Dallas Indep.
Sch. Dist., 798 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1986) (concerning the involuntary transfer of a Caucasian football
coach due to his alleged comments in a local newspaper, predicated on a First Amendment free
speech violation), affd in part, rev'd in part, 491 U.S. 701 (1989), on remand, 7 F.3d 1241 (5th Cir.
1993).
404. Cameli, No. 95-C-1369, 1997 WL 351193, at * 12.
405. See id. at *2-4, *15. This differs from where student-athletes can be members of the team
provided that they show up for the team.
406. See generally id.




411. Id. at *2.
412. Id. at*1.
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coach. 413 The court did not identify any Illinois statutes or regulations that
formally embodied this stance, nor did it indicate whether the school district
had policies that directed this stance-as opposed to a single administrator's
viewpoint. The principal informed the coach that he thought the sophomore
coach could take over the plaintiffs position.414
At the end of the 1993 varsity basketball tryouts, the plaintiff wanted to
cut two seniors from the team, based on other superior talent exhibited.415
However, the principal instructed the coach that while the two seniors did not
have to play, they were to be kept on the team.416 During November 1993,
one of these students then accused the coach of calling him a "bastard" during
a practice, which was contested. 417 During December, the coach dismissed
three students from the team.418 The principal again intervened and overruled
this determination.419 The plaintiff claimed that his supervisors "told him
repeatedly that he would be the last white coach" at the high school.420 The
principal informed the coach of his displeasure with the coach being called for
a technical foul during an away game against the school's rival team. 421 The
principal was not satisfied with the team's performance that year. 422 The team
lost in the final playoff game to a team that included "a 1996 Heisman Trophy
finalist, two players who eventually went on to play NCAA Division I
basketball, and Antoine Walker, who now plays professionally for the Boston
Celtics." 423 The team finished with a win-loss record of 16-9, although it was
14-3 for the second half of the season.424
The plaintiff also claimed that the superintendent asked him, "Don't you
think you're getting too old for this game?" and "Don't you think you ought to
surprise everyone by resigning? 425 During March 1994, the principal sent the
plaintiff a letter indicating he would not be rehired as the coach, and the school
hired the thirty-eight-year-old African-American boys' sophomore basketball









422. Id. at *4.
423. Id. at *4 n.6.
424. Id. at *4.
425. Id.
[Vol. 18:1
A THLE TIC EMPLOYMENT AND CIVIL RIGHTS
coach for the position.4 26 The court did not indicate if the public high school
did any advertising to solicit applications for the coaching position.
As to the ADEA claim, the Illinois district court stated, "A statement by
an employer or its agents that reveals hostility to older workers may constitute
direct evidence of discrimination." 427 However, the court then highlighted,
"The mere utterance of derogatory age-related comments, which are
unconnected to the allegedly wrongful employment decision at issue, cannot
give rise to an inference of age discrimination." 428 Thus, the Illinois district
court found no ADEA violation predicated upon its determination that the
superintendent was not the individual who made the employment decision not
to rehire the plaintiff, which was done by the principal, even though the
superintendent reviewed or approved this decision-and the plaintiff proffered
evidence that age-related comments were made by this individual. 429 When
the assistant principal advanced his decision to terminate the coach, the
superintendent had authority to override that determination. 43° The court also
rejected the plaintiffs claim that the reasons for his discharge were
pretextual. 431  Previously, when the former acting principal wanted to
terminate the coach, it was the superintendent who did not implement the
decision. 432 The power that each of these administrators held, which may not
have been unilateral, as the court apparently relied upon, constituted dual
power held by both the superintendent and the principal to affect employment
decisions. 433 The plaintiff pursued no appeal.
Second, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that a hostile environment
was created pursuant to Title VII based on race.434 The court found the
evidence presented did not constitute an objectively hostile environment. 435
The court also rejected a further motion by the school district to limit the
amount of front pay potentially available to the plaintiff to compensate him for
the amount of his coaching stipend for any years he could prove that he would
have continued to coach.436
426. Id.
427. Id. at *5.
428 Id. at *6.
429. Id. at*ll1-12.
430. Id.
431. Id. at *9-11.
432. Id. at *8.
433. Id. at*12.
434. Id. at*13-14.
435. Id. at *13.
436. Id.
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Thus, the court ruled that the school district would essentially be
responsible for a breach of contract claim to pay the coach for any time that
remained on the coach's contract with the school district. However, on the
two big-ticket items, the court rejected the coach's ADEA and Title VII
discrimination claims. The court sanctioned the school district's premature
termination of the coach, where the court did not categorically conclude that
the school district's actions were predicated on just cause.
During 1997, this same Illinois district court also rejected the ADEA and
Title VII claims advanced in the next case involving an African-American
man. In Clemons v. Big Ten Conference, this collegiate football referee
claimed ADA disability discrimination due to obesity, previously discussed, as
well as racial discrimination against the Big Ten Conference, a conference in
the NCAA.4 37 There were no allegations of any race-related statements made
by conference members to this plaintiff. The Illinois district court held that
"[a] plaintiff may establish racial discrimination under Title VII or Section
1981 either by presenting direct evidence of discrimination or by following the
burden-shifting method set out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green."4
38
Ultimately, the court issued summary judgment to the conference on both
discrimination claims advanced. 439
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the existence of a number of strong civil rights statutes aimed at
prohibiting discrimination, aside from the issue of sex discrimination, there
exists a paucity of cases involving athletic department employees at
educational institutions predicated on age, disability, and race. The
surprisingly minimal case law accounts for the lack of clear trends to
extrapolate from the material. It does capture the restricted ability by these
employees to avail themselves of these laws, with the Supreme Court's
erecting Eleventh Amendment barriers to suing certain public educational
institutions or narrowing whether plaintiffs can meet the jurisdictional criteria
that they belong in the class subject to purported discrimination.
In the area of disability discrimination involving employment, despite the
presence of three federal statutes, reliance is posited principally on the ADA.
Any possible use of the fundamentals of the Martin decision to the issue of
disability discrimination concerning athletic employment remains to be seen,
437. No. 96-C-0124, 1997 WL 89227 (N.D. Il. Feb. 4, 1997).
438. Id. at *3; see also Heckman, Forty Years of Sex Discrimination, supra note 13, at 5
(elaborating on the burden-shifting method).
439. Clemons, No. 96-C-0124, 1997 WL 89227, at *6.
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especially as concerns the pivotal area of providing a reasonable
accommodation. The Supreme Court's broad reading of what constitutes a
reasonable accommodation is a favorable result-and represents the only case
that the Court has substantively addressed involving individuals involved with
athletics pursuant to the federal civil rights laws examined herein.
Additionally, the Meling lower court decision showcases the peril for
educational institutions that do not consider ascertaining what the reasonable
accommodation consists of in a particular situation, as evidenced by the
appreciable punitive damages awarded in a pre-Barnes case.
On the converse side, the Supreme Court has substantially limited those
deemed "disabled" and extricated state entities from being subject to the
ADA's coverage for Title I employment-based cases based on the Eleventh
Amendment. Whether public school athletic department employees can safely
use Title II for adverse employment actions at public entities remains to be
seen, as the Martin case dealt with an independent contractor who sought
relief under Title III and the Lane case dealt specifically with access to the
courts, pursuant to Title II, and not educational facilities. The Court in Barnes
also took away the ability of disabled individuals to receive punitive damages.
The bottom line is that the Rehnquist Court took the broad congressional
mandate embodied within the ADA and has appreciably lessened it due to the
result of the Garrett decision.
It is not known if the prevalence of older (male) coaches, especially on the
professional level, including the National Basketball Association, the National
Football League, and Major League Baseball, has had any impact on making it
not out-of-the-ordinary to employ older coaches. As exemplified by the
presence of Coach Joe Patemo at Penn State University (collegiate football)
and Coach Bobby Knight at Texas Tech University (collegiate basketball), the
pattern continues. During 2006, Coach John Cheney announced his retirement
from Temple University (collegiate basketball). Numerous other male
collegiate coaches could have been identified. Perhaps this societal
acceptance accounts for the scarcity of cases by educational athletic
department employees asserting age discrimination. On the judicial side, the
Supreme Court's decision in Kimel restricting the ability of individuals to
commence ADEA actions against state actors is also complicit with providing
a barrier to athletic department employees at certain educational institutions
from going forward with claims for monetary damages in federal courts. With
race discrimination, this area was dominated by interscholastic football
coaches challenging coaching decisions. It revealed not only the traditional
cases, but a number of reverse discrimination claims. The bellwether issue in
the area of federal discrimination laws remains the outcome of Eleventh
Amendment challenges and any congressional response.
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Many courts have dismissed the "stray" offensive comments uttered by
school employees in the discrimination cases as not being indicative of a
discriminatory intent when the coach is dismissed from coaching the
interscholastic or intercollegiate team. A number of these cases are predicated
on the coach's poor win-loss record in that sport, which is put forth to be an
objective barometer when making athletic department employment decisions.
However, as every longtime coach knows, there will be times when the team
will be victorious and other times when it will not be. 440 Having an athlete of
the caliber of Mia Hamm, Michael Jordan, or Joe Montana will significantly
ensure the prospect of a winning season-but after the athlete's graduation,
unless there is another individual possessed with superior athletic talent, the
previously great coach will look merely average at best. The overall caliber of
the team pool is not put into the equation when win-loss records are examined.
This is taking into account the ability to recruit such athletes, which is not
present in public school interscholastic programs. Moreover, on the
interscholastic level, the emphasis should be on the non-profit aspect of the
endeavor and its educational-related purpose. The same argument could be
advanced with intercollegiate athletic programs. The selection process,
especially when it encompasses selection committees, should be reviewed for
the employment of athletic department employees. Coaches should
understand the parameters of their employment, not only where a written
contract is entered into between the parties, but also where the relationship is
based on a handshake. Educational administrators must be cognizant of these
civil rights laws when making employment decisions and continue to keep
track of the developing law.
440. See Brady v. Curators of Univ. of Mo., 213 S.W.3d 101, 105 (Mo. App. E.D. 2006).
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II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREATEST WORLD HEAVYWEIGHT
CHAMPION
A. Ali's Fight with Sonny Liston Marks the Advent of His Boxing-
Related Lawsuits
B. Ali Commences His Legal Fight for Conscientious Objector
Classification
i. "I ain't got no quarrel with the Viet Cong": Ali's Anti-
Vietnam Position Draws Public Ire
ii. Ali Spars with Federal and Administrative Tribunals over His
Classification
C. Ali Continues His Assault on Boxing Heavyweight Contenders
D. Ali Fights Conscription on Grounds of Under-representation
E. Ali Sentenced for Refusing Induction
F. Ali Becomes Involved in Leading Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Case
G. Ali Battles New York State Boxing Athletic Commission over
Boxing License
H. Physical Education Teachers or Professors
L Ali Prevails in the U.S. Supreme Court as a Conscientious Objector
III. THE RETURN AND RETIREMENT OF THE WORLD HEAVYWEIGHT
CHAMPION
Attorney, Quintana Law Group, APC; J.D., University of California at Berkeley (Boalt Hall),
1997; B.A. University of California at Berkeley, 1993. The views expressed in this article are those
of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of the Quintana Law Group, APC.
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
A. The Legal Fallout from the "Rumble"
B. Ali's Post-fight Jeers Prompt Lawsuit
C. Ali Champions the Right of Publicity Protection
D. Ali's Fight with Leon Spinks Incites Antitrust Lawsuit
E. The End of a Legendary Career
IV. CONCLUSION
Every knee must bend, every head must bow,
every tongue must testify, thou art The Greatest
of all time. I
I. INTRODUCTION
Muhammad Ali is considered one of sport's most popular, if not
controversial, icons of the twentieth century. 2 In the sports world, perhaps
only soccer's fabled Pele or basketball's renowned Michael Jordan can
legitimately challenge Ali's indissoluble recognition and universal appeal. 3
Known simply by the self-proclaimed moniker "The Greatest" 4 to boxing
aficionados and fans worldwide, Ali was a charismatic and exuberant
champion with an intoxicating and flamboyant personality. Ali's
extraordinary boxing skills are irrefutable. As an amateur, Ali had a
phenomenal boxing record of 100 victories in 108 bouts by the age of eighteen
and had won six Kentucky Golden Gloves titles, two National Amateur
Athletic Union championships, two National Golden Glove crowns, and an
1. THE QUOTABLE ESPN 228 (Shelly Youngblut, ed. 1998) (quoting boxing promoter Don King
in reference to Muhammad Ali).
2. See America's Greatest: Four Athletes Wo Transcend Sports in the 20th Century, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB., Jan. 14, 1999, at D7 (naming Muhammad Ali, Jackie Robinson, Babe Ruth, and
Michael Jordan); Vicki Michaelis, Top 10 Sports Heroes of the Past 100 Years, DENVER POST, Jan.
17, 1999, at CI 0 (ranking Muhammad Ali number one).
3. See Stephen Brunt, Jordan Joins Ali, Pele as Men Who Rose Above Their Sports, GLOBE &
MAIL (Toronto), Jan. 14, 1999, at S2 (naming Muhammad Ali, Michael Jordan, and Pele as the three
athletes in the twentieth century "who have become part of the worldwide mass consciousness");
Hubert B. Herring, A Benchmark for Generation X Golf, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 1999, at 2 (naming
Muhammad Ali along with Babe Ruth, Billie Jean King, and Pele as "sports figures who don't just
define their sports, they change their sports").
4. MUHAMMAD ALl WITH RICHARD DURHAM, THE GREATEST: MY OWN STORY 415 (1975) ("1
already told them. And I already told you. Didn't you hear me? I said I was The Greatest.").
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Olympic gold medal in the light heavyweight division. 5 His remarkable
amateur success carried over to a much acclaimed and well-documented
professional boxing career. At his prime, Ali showcased all the indispensable
attributes of a superlative pugilist: quick hands, remarkable reflexes, nimble
footwork, a potent jab,6 and an uncanny ability to withstand his opponents'
punches. By the time Ali retired from boxing in 1981, he had captured the
professional heavyweight championship an unprecedented three times and
compiled an impressive 56-5 career record with thirty-seven knock-outs and
nineteen successful title defenses. 7 Deservingly, Ali was inducted into the
International Boxing and United States Olympic Halls of Fame and is
recognized by pundits and the general public alike as one of the greatest
heavyweight champions of all time. 8 In 1994, Ali was honored as "Athlete of
the Century" by Sports Illustrated magazine. 9
Ali's path to immortality, however, was rocky. At the commencement of
his professional boxing career, Ali was more maligned than he was adored.10
He had developed a vivid, profane gift for hectoring and mentally browbeating
his opponents before fights with a myriad of antics and tactics in and out of the
boxing ring." 1 As a formidable, poetry-spouting bully, Ali escalated taunting
and smack-talking to unprecedented heights to strategically keep his
opponents psychologically off balance. His aphorisms, rhymes, and pre-fight
jeers at some of the sport's best known boxers-Joe Frazier, George Foreman,
5. "Fighters in the [light heavyweight] category must weigh between 165 [pounds] and 178
[pounds] if amateurs, and between 160 [pounds] and 178 [pounds] if professional." THE
DICTIONARY OF SPORTS: THE COMPLETE GUIDE FOR TV VIEWERS, SPECTATORS AND PLAYERS 187
(Gerry Cox ed., 1999).
6. In boxing parlance, a "jab" is a "short sharp punch," used frequently to divert an opponent's
attention before another, presumably more potent punch is thrown. THE MAMMOTH BOOK OF
WORLD SPORTS 92 (Noam Friedlander ed., Carroll & Graf Publishers 1999)(1975); see THE
DICTIONARY OF SPORTS: THE COMPLETE GUIDE FOR TV VIEWERS, SPECTATORS AND PLAYERS,
supra note 5, at 187. Other types of punches include "the hook" (a heavy blow, usually to the head)
and "the uppercut" (which is delivered from below and aimed at the lower part of the face or at the
body). THE MAMMOTH BOOK OF WORLD SPORTS at 92.
7. Cyber Boxing Zone, Muhammad Ali, http://www.cyberboxingzone.com/boxing/aIhrec.htm
(last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
8. Ali was inducted into the International Boxing Hall of Fame in 1990. International Boxing
Hall of Fame, Enshrinees: Muhammad Ali, http://www.ibhof.com/ali.htm (last visited Sept. 27,
2007). Ali was inducted into the Olympic Boxing Hall of Fame in 1983. U.S. Olympic Hall of Fame,
http://www.hickoksports.com/history/olymphof.shtml (last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
9. Barry Dick, The Greatest - Muhammad Ali, COURIER-MAIL (Brisbane, Austl.), Nov. 26, 2005,
at 64, available at http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,17365233-10389,00. html.
10. See Stephen Brunt, For Shining Moment, World Stands Still for All, GLOBE & MAIL
(Toronto), July 20, 1996, at E2.
11. BERT BLEWETT, THE A-Z OF WORLD BOxING: AN AUTHORITATIVE AND ENTERTAINING
COMPENDIUM OF THE FIGHT GAME FROM ITS ORIGINS TO THE PRESENT DAY 13 (1996).
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW
Charles "Sonny" Liston, Floyd Patterson-are considered classics.
Consequently, the media and much of the general public considered the young,
upstart Ali an arrogant, unapologetic braggart who irritated many with his
orotund talk. Indeed, Ali's braggadocio alone motivated the general public to
flock to his bouts expecting, if not yearning for, his opponent to slam his
mouth shut with a fistful of knuckles. 12 As Ali recounted: "Every time I
stepped into the ring, at least half the audience was so anxious to see me
slaughtered, they would cheer and scream and stomp for every punch an
opponent hit me with. So much so that they became hysterical when I
frustrated those dreams and hopes."' 13
Whether marveled or not, Ali was the embodiment of the consummate
entertainer, the marquee protagonist in a night of riveting theater. Ali aptly
self-promoted and knew how to enlist the news media as an integral part of his
competitive strategy.
Ali's achievements extend beyond his well-known boxing prowess and
records. He literally transcended the sport of boxing and dominated other
public landscapes: political activism, civil rights, religious freedom, and
humanitarian projects. 14 Although dozens of books have been written and
various movies produced about Ali, Ali's significant contribution to American
law either as a party litigant or through the legal action stemming from his
many fights has not been systematically discussed.
In order to shed additional light on Ali's remarkable life, this article
briefly recounts Ali's many feats both in the boxing ring and the courts. Part
II of this article chronicles the rise of the upstart and mouthy Ali and his
heavyweight championship fight debut against the ferocious Sonny Liston in
the bout that "shocked the world."' 15 The fight's legal fallout marked the
advent of Ali's many boxing-related lawsuits throughout his career. Part I
will also focus on Ali's conversion to Islam, his refusal to be inducted into the
armed forces, and consequently, the revocation of his boxing license. The
article then navigates through Ali's protracted legal fight in the various federal
and administrative tribunals over his conscientious objector status and
12. AUDREY EDWARDS, MUHAMMAD ALI, THE PEOPLE'S CHAMP 12, 17 (1977) ("His boasting
alone drew records to his fights."); Patrick Smith, Down for the Count, But Still the Greatest, THE
AGE (Melbourne, Austl.), July 22, 1996, at 2. "He became a performer, hustling people with a
calculated sales pitch designed to shock his public yet still make them turn out for the fights."
EDWARDS, supra at 12.
13. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 133.
14. See Michael Oriard, College Athletics as a Vehicle for Social Reform, 22 J.C. & U.L. 77, 84
(1995). Ali has further lent his name to a number of causes including the Muhammad Ali Parkinson's
Research Center and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act of 1998, S. 2238, 105th Cong. (1998).
15. International Boxing Hall of Fame, supra note 8.
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involvement in a leading foreign surveillance intelligence case. Along this
difficult path, Ali's legal battle resulted in several published and important
cases, culminating in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Clay v.
United States.16 Part II of the article also analyzes Ali's legal struggle with the
state boxing commissions to renew his boxing license.
Fresh from his victories before the Supreme Court and state boxing
commission, Part III of the article focuses on the highly anticipated return of
the heavyweight champion to the familiar boxing ring. The article recounts
his epic fights with the sport's best known boxers-Joe Frazier in "The Fight
of the Century" and the "Thrilla in Manila," and George Forman in the "The
Rumble in the Jungle"-as well as the legal aftermath stemming from these
bouts. Part III also analyzes Ali's legal championing of the common law right
of publicity protection in the well-known Playgirl Magazine case17 and his
collateral impact in the fields of copyright and antitrust law. Finally, Part III
reflects upon Ali's final bouts and the twilight of his legendary career.
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE GREATEST WORLD HEAVYWEIGHT
CHAMPION
Muhammad Ali was born Cassius Marcellus Clay, Jr., named after a
prominent nineteenth century abolitionist, on January 17, 1942, in Louisville,
Kentucky. 18 Ali began his boxing career as a skinny, 112-pound twelve-year-
old under the tutelage of Joe Elsby Martin, a white Louisville policeman. 19
Surprisingly, Ali did not naturally gravitate towards boxing, but instead
serendipitously discovered the sport that would ultimately define him.20 The
tale of Ali's unexpected convergence with boxing is so often retold as to be a
fundamental part of his legend.21 In October 1954, at age twelve, Ali and a
friend rode their bicycles to a local recreational auditorium, which was hosting
a bazaar.22 When the two boys left to return home, Ali discovered that his
bicycle had vanished. 23 In his frantic search for a policeman who could help
recover his bicycle, Ali wandered into the auditorium's basement gym where
Martin ran a boxing training program.24 Immediately, Ali was hooked.25 As
16. Clay v. United States (Clay II), 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
17. Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
18. JOHN COTTRELL, MUHAMMAD ALl, WHO ONCE WAS CASSIUS CLAY 9 (1967).
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he recollected:
[T]he sights and sounds and the smell of the boxing gym excited
me so much that I almost forgot about the bike.
There were about ten boxers in the gym, some hitting the
speed bag, some in the ring, sparring, some jumping rope. I
stood there, smelling the sweat and rubbing alcohol, and a
feeling of awe came over me.26
Six weeks later the young Ali won a three-minute, three-round split
decision in his debut match.2 7 The rest, as the saying goes, is history.
Ali first came to public attention after he won the gold medal in the light
heavyweight division in the 1960 Summer Olympic Games in Rome, Italy.28
Ali's decisive Olympic victory--considered the apex of the amateur boxing
world-enabled him to garner the invaluable notoriety he needed to launch his
meteoric ascent towards the professional heavyweight title.29 On the heels of
the Olympic Games, Ali made his professional debut on October 29, 1960, by
defeating Tunney Hunsaker.30 The fight was significant because, as Ali
stated, of "all the publicity and all the shouting I'd done, the sports world
would be watching every blow I threw." 31  Between 1960 and 1963, Ali
defeated nineteen consecutive opponents, including several contenders. 32 The
1963 bout against Brit Henry Cooper, the one-time British, European, and
Commonwealth heavyweight champion, was particularly noteworthy because
Cooper had knocked Ali down in the fourth round with his trademark left
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. "To all intents and purposes, Cassius was born at the age of 12, the day he entered the gym
and started fighting." ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 46.
28. The championship bout was fought on September 5, 1960. RUMMEL, supra note 18, at 31-
32. Ali's opponent was Zbigniew Pietrzyskowski of Poland, the European champion and gold medal
favorite. Id. at 31. Judges awarded Ali a unanimous decision. Id. at 32.
29. Ali v. Connally, 266 F. Supp. 345, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1967) (Ali's "subsequent entry into the
ranks of professional pugilism was followed by immediate, continuous and remarkable success").
30. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
31. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 80.
32. The nineteen fighters defeated by Muhammad Ali were, in chronological order: Herb Slier
(December 27, 1960); Tony Esperti (January 17, 1961); Jim Robinson (February 7, 1961); Donnie
Fleeman (February 21, 1961); Lamar Clark (April 19, 1961); Duke Sabedong (June 26, 1961);
Alonzo Johnson (July 22, 1961); Alex Miteff (October 7, 1961); Willi Besmanoff (November 29,
1961); Sonny Banks (February 19, 1962); Don Warner (March 28, 1962); George Logan (April 23,
1962); Billy Daniels (May 19, 1962); Alejandro Lavorante (July 20, 1962); Archie Moore (November
15, 1962); Charlie Powell (January 24, 1963); Doug Jones (March 13, 1963); and Henry Cooper (June
18, 1963). Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
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hook, "Enry's 'Ammer." 33 The bell rang before Cooper could complete a
knockout, and, according to the legend, Ali was so dazed that his trainer,
Angelo Dundee, cut his glove. 34 Another glove had to be fetched, giving Ali
time to recover from the knockdown and ultimately prevail over Cooper.35
Outside the ring at this time, America was in the midst of the turbulent
1960s, an era of significant political, cultural, and social cataclysm driven by a
motley of lively and controversial causes and characters. It was then that Ali
the professional boxer would become, perhaps unexpectedly, Ali the lightning
rod for a society struggling to deal with a myriad of social, political, and
cultural issues. Ali, then still Cassius, began to develop a budding interest in
the Nation of Islam, an organization the general public at the time considered
to be subversive and militant.36
A. Ali's Fight with Sonny Liston Marks the Advent of His Boxing Related
Lawsuits
Ali's professional and personal life would be suddenly and permanently
transformed in 1964. In that year, Charles "Sonny" Liston was the fearsome
world heavyweight boxing champion.37 Ali did the unthinkable and daringly
challenged the seemingly invincible and ferocious Liston for the world
heavyweight boxing title. Even though Ali was not the primary heavyweight
title contender, his continuous taunts at Liston induced the heavyweight
champion to choose Ali as an opponent.38 "Ain't I pretty?," Ali would cry.
"Ain't that big old bear Liston ugly?" 39 Like many of Ali's historical bouts to
come, the Ali-Liston fight was promoted with a catchy nickname: "The
Greatest Grudge Fight in History." 40  On February 25, 1964, a significant
underdog, Ali indeed "Shocked the World" by defeating Liston after six
rounds. 4 1 Liston surrendered the title when he refused to answer the bell for
round seven, opting instead to retire on his stool, having lost round six under a
33. Henry Cooper, http://www.answers.com/topic/henry-cooper-boxer (last visited Sept. 26,
2007).
34. James Slater, Clay v. Cooper: The Final Word on the Torn Glove Story,
EASTSIDEBOXING.COM, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.eastsideboxing.com/news.php?p=6346&more = 1.
35. Henry Cooper, supra note 33.
36. EDWARDS, supra note 12, at 62.
37. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
38. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 112.
39. JOHN D. MCCALLUM, THE WORLD HEAVYWEIGHT BOXING CHAMPIONSHIP: A HISTORY 322
(1974).
40. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 113.
41. http://www.answers.com/topic/henry-cooper-boxer Boxing Hall of Fame, supra note 8.
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flurry of Ali's hefty punches, and claiming an injured shoulder.42
Despite Ali's excessive pre-fight ballyhooing and self-promotion, the bout
itself was indifferently covered by the news media and poorly attended.
Perhaps this was because the fight was perceived as a considerable
mismatch. 43  Indeed, the case of Inter-Continental Promotions, Inc. v.
MacDonald stemmed from the fight's lackluster attendance. 44  Inter-
Continental Promotions, which "owned both fighters," sued the fight's
promoter, William MacDonald, and his surety for breach of contract.4 5 Under
the express terms of their contract, MacDonald agreed to pay Inter-
Continental, "upon completion of the boxing contest," $625,000 for the live
gate receipts.46 Since only "a small crowd" attended the fight, the gate
receipts amounted to a mere $225,000.47 MacDonald paid Inter-Continental
that amount and the latter sued for the outstanding balance.48 In federal
district court, MacDonald averred that his contract with Inter-Continental was
illegal on its face since Florida law made promoting a prizefight illegal.49
Specifically, MacDonald relied upon a Florida statute that made it a felony "to
voluntarily engage in" or "to render aid" in "any pugilistic exhibition, fight or
encounter ... [for] which any admission fee is charged, 50 except "boxing
exhibitions held by and under the auspices of' a designated or specifically
approved organization. 51 The district court agreed with MacDonald, and
Inter-Continental appealed; the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
reversed. 52 After consideration of the Florida statute and legislative history,
42. According to Muhammad Ali's account of the fight's final rounds:
In the sixth, I went out and Liston was a changed man. He'd thrown his best stuff and
he hadn't been able to do his damage. I felt his breathing. He was tired and I was
still strong, and he knew he had no protection against my lefts or rights. When the
bell rang for the start of the seventh round, he stayed in his comer. He sat limp on the
stool, staring blankly across at us. Angelo and Bundini were screaming at me: "You
The Champion! You The Champion!" I leaped into their arms. The long campaign
was over. I had come into my own. I had fulfilled my prediction.
ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 119.
43. Liston was an 8-1 betting favorite over Ali. Dave Kindred, It Was 25 Years Ago: No Small
Feat of Clay, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 26, 1989, at E4.
44. 367 F.2d 293, 294 (5th Cir. 1966).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 295.
47. Id. at 294.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 295 (citing to FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 548.01-.02 (West 1971)(repealed 1984)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 303.
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the Fifth Circuit held that a "prizefight" came within the scope of the generic
terms "pugilistic exhibition" and "boxing exhibition." 53 Moreover, the court
noted that while the statute requires only that the bout "be held by and under
the auspices" of one of the designated or approved organizations, it does not
require that the group be a signatory to every contract that relates to the
fight.54 The absence of any mention of a designated or approved group in the
contract between Inter-Continental and MacDonald was not inconsistent with
the allegation that an approved group ultimately sponsored the bout.55 The
court found that because Inter-Continental completely performed its part of the
bargain, the "potential injustice is far greater than if neither side had
performed and one of the parties were seeking to compel the other to do so." 56
B. Ali Commences His Legal Fight for Conscientious Objector Classification
The day after the Liston fight, Ali again "shocked the world" when he
appeared at a press conference and formally announced that he accepted the
teachings of Islam and changed his name to Cassius X.57 A couple weeks later
he changed his name to Muhammad Ali. Ali's announcement purportedly
prompted then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to inquire about the champ's
draft status. 58 Furthermore, Ali's religious conversion to the Nation of Islam
struck a disconcerting chord with the general public and made him anathema
to white Christian America. 59
Ali would not return to the boxing ring for almost sixteen months. On
May 25, 1965, Ali defeated Liston again in a lackluster rematch bout.60 This
time Ali needed less than one round to dispose of Liston with the now alleged
and infamous "phantom punch."'61 "I'm the king of the world," Ali vigorously
53. Id. at 292.
54. Id. at 302.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 303.
57. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 178. When asked the significance of the letter "X," Ali
replied that as members of the Nation of Islam, "we rejected the names handed to us by our former
slave masters and X took the place of our real but unknown black names." Id. at 128.
58. HOWARD BINGHAM & MAX WALLACE, MUHAMMAD ALI'S GREATEST FIGHT: CASSIUS
CLAY VS. THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 96 (2000).
59. Brunt, supra note 3 (stating Ali's religious conversion "turned a man whom the press had
characterized as harmless and clown-like into an apparently dangerous character").
60. See Robert Fachet, Sports Fanfare: Boxing, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 1995, at E2; Shirley
Povich, Joe Walcott: Many Names, Endurance Most ofA 1l, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1994, at D3.
61. Fachet, supra note 60; Povich, supra note 60; see also Earl Gustkey, 19 Years Later Liston
Death Remains Mystery to His Friends, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1989, at I (opining that Ali's first round
knock-out punch "didn't look strong enough to break an egg").
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proclaimed after the fight, now with added validity. 62 Ali went on to defeat
Floyd Patterson on November 22, 1965.63
i. "I ain't got no quarrel with the Viet Cong" 64: Ali's Anti-Vietnam Position
Draws Public Ire
Synonymous with the tumult of the 1960s was America's controversial
involvement in the Vietnam War. The outspoken Ali opposed conscription
and became entangled in a protracted legal brawl that would culminate in the
landmark U.S. Supreme Court conscientious objector case of Clay v. United
States.65 That decision is considered one of the most important legal events of
that era. 66 Ali's legal fight would "highlight a fundamental question in the
Supreme Court-whether a citizen has a constitutional right by liberty of
conscience to refuse to serve in a particular war as opposed to war in the
abstract. ' 67 This fight began on February 17, 1966, when Ali was classified 1-
A68 by a selective service board in Louisville, Kentucky. 69 When journalists
asked Ali about his reaction to his classification, Ali uttered his infamous
poem about the Vietnam War. As Ali recalled later:
Of all the poems I wrote, all the words I spoke, all the slogans I
shouted ... of all the controversies that aroused people against
me or for me, none would have the effect on my life or change
the climate around me like the "poem" I read on a TV hookup
one warm February afternoon in Miami, 1966.70
Keep asking me, no matter how long,
On the war in Viet Nam, I sing this song
I ain't got no quarrel with the Viet Cong...71
62. Muhammad Ali Quote, http://www.saidwhat.co.uk/quote650.html (last visited Sept. 26,
2007).
63. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
64. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 124.
65. Clay v. United States (Clay 111), 403 U.S. 698 (1971).
66. See Mark Conrad, Major Legal Events of the Century: 1961-1972, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 13, 1999,
at 5.
67. JOHN COTTRELL, MUHAMMAD ALl, WHO ONCE WAS CASSIUS CLAY 339 (1967).
68. A "I-A" classification signified the eligibility for unrestricted military service. Clay III, 403
U.S. at 699.
69. Clay v. United States (Clay 1), 397 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1968).
70. ALI WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 123.
71. Id. at 124.
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A reporter was asking me if I would accept the draft. The
children were looking at my face and I was looking at theirs. I
shook my head and repeated the remark I had already made to
them. Some of the reporters rushed off to file their reports. They
had enough. Others kept asking, "How does it feel about to be
drafted?" 72
Ali's public remarks caused a national uproar and evoked death threats
against him.73 Numerous legal and administrative proceedings ensued. On
February 28, 1966, Ali applied for draft exemption as a conscientious objector
because of his religious convictions, informing the local selective service
board that as a minister in the Nation of Islam, "to bear arms or kill is against
my religion. And I conscientiously object to any combat military service that
involves the participation in any war in which the lives of human beings are
being taken." 74
The local selective service board denied Ali's conscientious objector claim
and he appealed to the Kentucky Appeal Board.75
ii. Ali Spars with Federal and Administrative Tribunals over His
Classification
On May 6, 1966, the Kentucky Selective Service Appeal Board reviewed
Ali's file de novo and concluded that he was not entitled to conscientious
objector classification. 76 Ali's file was subsequently referred to the U.S.
Department of Justice for an advisory recommendation as permitted by then-
applicable Selective Service regulations. 77 In turn, the Justice Department
subsequently requested an investigation by the FBI and a special hearing "on
the character and good faith" of Ali's conscientious objections. 78
As Ali's investigation proceeded, he continued to box and defended his
world heavyweight title against various foreign, but highly ranked, opponents.
These bouts took place on his opponents' home turfs and outside the United
States. On March 29, 1966, Ali won a unanimous decision over tough George
72. Id. at 138.
73. Tom Callahan, Direct From the Stands, the Bad Seed, WASH. POST, May 2, 1993, at D3; Bob
St. John, Ali's Long Shadow Extends from First Meeting to Today, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, July 29,
1997, at 13A (reporting that Ali's refusal to be inducted made him "a national outlaw").
74. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, 160.
75. Clay v. United States (Clayl), 397 F.2d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 1968).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 918.
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Chuvalo, the then-reigning Canadian Heavyweight Champion, in Toronto,
Canada. 79 A .few months later Ali went to England and knocked out Henry
Cooper (who had knocked him down in their initial 1963 match) for a second
time.80 Ali then knocked out "British Bulldog" Brian London, also in
England, on August 6, 1966.81
Back home, Ali continued his sparring match with the Kentucky Selective
Service Appeals Board. On August 23, 1966, Ali petitioned the Selective
Service for an exemption from conscription as a minister of the Lost Found
Nation of Islam. 82 That same day, a special hearing was held in Louisville,
Kentucky, before former federal circuit judge Lawrence Grauman.83 On the
basis of the record, the hearing officer concluded to the Justice Department
that Ali stated his views "in a convincing manner, answered all questions
forthrightly," and was "sincere in his objection on religious grounds to
participation in war in any form." 84 The hearing officer recommended that
Ali's conscientious objector claim be sustained. 85
Notwithstanding this recommendation, the Justice Department advised the
Kentucky Appeal Board that Ali's request for conscientious objector
classification should be denied.86 The Justice Department concluded that Ali's
objections to participation in war insofar as they were based upon the
teachings of the Nation of Islam "rest on grounds which are primarily political
and racial. These constitute objections to only certain types of war in certain
circumstances, rather than a general scruple against participation in war in any
form." 87 The Justice Department asserted that "only a general scruple against
participation in war in any form can support a claim for conscientious
objector" classification. 88 The Justice Department also noted that Ali "had not
consistently manifested his conscientious objector claim and had not shown
overt manifestations sufficient to establish his subjective belief where his
claim was not asserted until [conscription] became imminent. '89 On January
10, 1967, without a statement of reasons, the Kentucky Appeal Board denied
79. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 906.
83. Clay v. United States (Clay ll), 403 U.S. 698, 699-700, 699 n.2 (1971); Clay 1, 397 F.2d at
918; MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 324.
84. Clay 1, 397 F.2d at 918.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 918-19; MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 324.
87. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 919; MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 324.
88. Clay 1, 397 F.2dat919.
89. Id.
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Ali's conscientious objector claim. 90
C. Ali Continues His Assault on Boxing Heavyweight Contenders
Meanwhile, in the boxing ring, Ali continued his assault on heavyweight
contenders, conquering two more challengers: German Karl Mildenberger and
Cleveland Williams. 91 Ali was next scheduled to fight Ernie Terrell.92 The
Ali-Terrell bout gained controversy and was publicized as a vicious "grudge
fight" when, during the pre-fight hoopla, Terrell refused to acknowledge Ali
by his Muslim name and repeatedly referred to Ali by his "slave name,"
Cassius Clay.93 This rebuff so incensed Ali that the champ pledged to punish
Terrell in the ring for this perceived impudence. 94 "I'm going to whip him and
talk to him and insult him and humiliate him," Ali promised. 95 On February 6,
1967, Ali's prognostication came to fruition. For fifteen rounds, Ali
continually bombarded the overmatched Terrell with combinations of
devastating punches. 96 According to ringside spectators, Ali kept taunting
Terrell throughout the fight shouting, "What's my name? What's my
name?" 97 As John Cottrell described the infamous eighth round in 1967:
At this point the champion started to shout. He told [Terrell] to
stand up and fight; then he landed a thundering right to the jaw.
"What's my name?" he asked. No answer. He slashed the
silent Terrell with a left-right combination and asked again,
"What's my name?" Still no reply. Between rounds, cornermen
have been known to slap dazed boxers and ask that question to
test their awareness. [Ali] used the same method to taunt his
opponent, punctuating each tongue-lashing with a tattoo of
punishing punches. With one eye almost shut, the other starting
to close, Terrell was being subjected to ruthless, calculated
torture. 9
8
Even though the fight went the distance, Ali delivered a horrible beating
90. Clay v. United States (Clay II1), 403 U.S. 698, 700 (1971).
91. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
92. Id.
93. CoTrRELL, supra note 67, at 307-09.
94. Id. at 309.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 313-17.
97. Id. at 314.
98. Id. at 314-15.
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on Terrell and won thirteen of fifteen rounds.99
On February 24, 1967, the National Directory of Selective Service
appealed Ali's I-A classification to the National Selective Service Appeal
Board.100 Ali's appeal was again denied. 1 1 Back in the ring, Ali fought Zora
Folley in New York City's Madison Square Garden on March 22, 1967.102
The match was Ali's seventh heavyweight title defense in less than one
calendar year and his ninth since dethroning Liston. 10 3 After pounding Folley
for the first six rounds, Ali knocked him out the seventh round to retain his
heavyweight boxing title. 1°4 Most significantly, the fight would mark Ali's
last night in a ring for three and a half years, while numerous federal district
and appellate courts and boxing commissions became embroiled with Ali's
pending induction and his controversial recalcitrance.
D. Ali Fights Conscription on Grounds of Under-representation
Two days after the Folley fight, on March 24, 1967, Ali requested a
transfer of induction location from Louisville, Kentucky, to Houston, Texas,
which was granted. 10 5 Ali then challenged induction on the ground that
pervasive under-representation of African-Americans in the composition of
local selective service draft boards was forbidden race discrimination and thus
deprived local boards of lawful authority to induct any African-American
registrant. 10 6 On March 29, 1967, the U.S. District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky considered Ali's motion for declaratory judgment with
respect to the constitutionality of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act provision pertaining to selective service boards. 10 7  Specifically, Ali
argued the provision was unconstitutional on its face and as applied because of
"systematic exclusion" of African-Americans from membership on local
boards and appeal boards in Kentucky. 108 The Court concluded that the issues
99. Id. at 316-17.
100. Clay v. United States (Clay 1), 397 F.2d 901, 906 (5th Cir. 1968); Ali v. Breathitt, 268 F.
Supp. 63, 65 (W.D. Ky. 1967), stay denied, sub nom., Ali v. Gordon, 386 U.S. 1002 (1967). The
National Selective Service Appeal Board is comprised of three civilian members who are appointed
by the President of the United States. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 909. The Universal Military Training and
Service Act vests the board with the duties and functions of the President. Id.
101. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 906.
102. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 906; Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. at 65.
106. Clay I, 397 F.2d at 906; Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. at 64.
107. Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. at 64-65.
108. Id. at 64.
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raised in Ali's complaint did not present a "substantial constitutional question"
appropriate for judicial review "unless and until [Ali] presents himself at an
Induction Station and either submits to induction or refuses to submit to
induction."'10 9 Ali filed a similar complaint in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, asserting substantially the same legal contentions
as those presented in his Kentucky suit.1 10
On April 28, 1967, Ali reported for but declined to submit to induction
into the United States Armed Forces. I I The champ's refusal instantly made
him a politically significant figure at a time when American opinion against
the Vietnam War and compulsory system of military service was ever-
increasing. 112  On May 1, 1967, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas denied Ali's petition for injunctive relief.113 Judge Allen
Hannay held that a registrant who has not received and acted on an order of
induction cannot get injunctive relief because he cannot show "irreparable
injury."'"14 Thus, Ali's legal remedy could only arise after the final step
toward military induction, and should Ali refuse this final step, his remedy
would lie in whatever defense he claims in the criminal prosecution.115 Judge
Hannay also said that a second remedy available to Ali was that of habeas
corpus in the event Ali took the final step toward military induction while
claiming that his induction was illegal, unconstitutional, and void.1 16
The state boxing commissions that licensed professional boxers, however,
did not wait for the legal process to take its course. Before Ali had been
arrested or charged, let alone convicted, the New York State Athletic
Commission suspended his boxing license and withdrew its recognition of him
as the World Heavyweight Champion. 117  Soon thereafter, all other
jurisdictions in the United States followed in New York's footsteps. 118 Ali's
refusal to accept conscription was clear, and he knew the consequences: "I'm
109. Id. at 65.
110. Clay !, 397 F.2d at 908.
111. Id.; Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. at 65.
112. COTrRELL, supra note 67, at 339.
113. Clayl, 397 F.2d at 908.
114. Breathitt, 268 F. Supp. at 65.
115. Ali v. Connally, 266 F. Supp. 345, 347 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
116. Id.
117. THOMAS HAUSER, MUHAMMAD ALl: His LIFE AND TIMES 172 (1991). "One hour after Ali
refused induction-before he'd been charged with any crime, let alone convicted-the New York
State Athletic Commission suspended his boxing license and withdrew recognition of him as
champion." Id.; see also ALI WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 175; COTrRELL, supra note 67, at 339.
118. More than thirty state boxing commissions reportedly had refused to grant Ali a license to
fight. See HAUSER, supra note 117, at 172.
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giving up my title, my wealth, maybe my future. Many great men have been
tested for their religious belief. If I pass this test, I'll come out stronger than
ever." 119
E. Ali Sentenced for Refusing Induction
After refusing induction, Ali filed another complaint in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Texas, on April 29, 1967, seeking similar
injunctive relief.120 This complaint was likewise denied on May 1, 1967, for
the same reasons enunciated previously by Judge Hannay. 121 The district
court also held that Ali's "subsequent refusal of induction did not suffice to
create a remedy for injunctive relief."'122 Seven days later a federal grand jury
indicted Ali for draft evasion under 50 U.S.C. App. § 462.123 Ali's petition to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to restrain the impending trial
was denied on May 15, 1967.124 On June 20, 1967, at the height of Ali's
professional boxing career, a jury in the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas returned a verdict of guilty against Ali on the charge of
violating the Universal Military Training and Service Act because of his
refusal to be inducted. 125 Judge Joe Ingraham sentenced Ali to a term of five
years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.126 The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit affirmed Ali's conviction and Ali petitioned the U.S. Supreme
Court for certiorari.127
F. Ali Becomes Involved in Leading Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Case
As an additional weave to these already entangled administrative and court
proceedings, Ali's conviction also set the scene for another important legal
development taking shape at that time: the judicial review of the
reasonableness of warrantless foreign intelligence surveillances. While Ali's
petition to the U.S. Supreme Court was pending, the United States government
119. COTTRELL, supra note 67, at 336.
120. Clay v. United States (Clay 1), 397 F.2d 901, 908 (5th Cir. 1968).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 906.
124. Id. at 908.
125. Id. at 906-07.
126. Id. at 907.
127. Id. Similar arguments were rejected by the Fifth Circuit in other cases. See, e.g., Giordano
v. United States, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Sellers v. McNamara, 398 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied sub nom., Sellers v. Laird, 395 U.S. 950 (1969) (Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Marshall, dissenting).
[Vol. 18:1
MUHAMMAD ALL THE GREATEST IN COURT
revealed that five telephone conversations involving Ali had been
electronically "'overheard' on FBI wiretaps targeted against persons other than
Ali."1 28 Around this time, an exception to the warrant clause for foreign
intelligence gathering was being judicially developed. 129 While the U.S.
Supreme Court had never directly considered such an exception, several lower
federal courts had addressed this issue. 130 Ali was involved in one of the first
appellate decisions on this point. 13 1
Prompted by the United States government's disclosure and Ali's further
submissions, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the conviction on March 24,
1969, and remanded the case for a determination of whether Ali's conviction
had been tainted by the information obtained as a result of the unlawful
electronic surveillance.132 On July 14, 1969, Judge Ingraham conducted an in
camera review of the FBI's surveillance logs and ordered disclosure to Ali of
the records relating to four of the intercepted conversations. 133 The district
court did not require disclosure of the fifth conversation, however, holding it
to be the product of "a lawful surveillance by the FBI pursuant to the Attorney
General's authorization of a wiretap for the purpose of gathering foreign
intelligence."' 134 The district court held that the wiretaps did not indicate that
the information obtained by the FBI agents had tainted the government's
evidence against Ali. 135 Accordingly, the court reimposed Ali's five-year
prison sentence and fine. 136
Ali again appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
challenging the government's withholding of certain electronic
surveillances. 137  According to the United States, the surveillances were
conducted "for the purpose of gathering foreign intelligence" and had no
128. William F. Brown & Americo R. Cinquegrana, Warrantless Physical Searches for Foreign




131. See United States v. Clay (Clay I1), 430 F.2d 165, 166 (5th Cir. 1970); Brown &
Cinquegrana, supra note 128, at 109; David Hardin, Note, The Fuss Over Two Small Words: The
Unconstitutionality of the USA Patriot Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 291, 297 (2003).
132. Giordano, 394 U.S. 310 (per curiam), vacating and remanding United States v. Clay (Clay
1), 397 F.2d 901 (5th Cir. 1968).
133. Clay II, 430 F.2d at 166.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 166-67.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 170.
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bearing on the criminal prosecution at hand. 138 Relying on the inherent
powers of the President as Commander-in-Chief to justify the constitutionality
of the wiretap, the Fifth Circuit recognized the overriding need to obtain
foreign intelligence information to protect national security.139 The court
relied on the government's claim that the wiretap was installed "for the
purpose of gathering foreign intelligence information," stating that "[it] would
be 'intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held
secret.' ' 140 Despite the court's assertion that it balanced the rights of the
defendant with the national interest, the court omitted any discussion of the
Fourth Amendment. 14 1  The court determined that Ali's rights were
sufficiently protected by the in camera examination of the surveillance and,
thus, any further judicial inquiry was improper. 142 The court's opinion left
unscathed the President's unrestricted power in conducting warrantless
surveillances on the grounds of national security. 143 Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit once again upheld Ali's conviction. 144 Ali again petitioned the U.S.
Supreme Court for certiorari.
G. Ali Battles New York State Boxing Athletic Commission over Boxing
License
While federal courts continued to weigh-in on Ali's conviction and draft
status, Ali applied for renewal of his license to box in New York on September
22, 1969.145 The New York State Athletic Commission (Commission)
unanimously denied his application on October 14, 1969, due to his "refusal to
enter the service and [his felony] conviction in violation of Federal law [being]
regarded by [the] Commission to be detrimental to the best interests of boxing,
or to the public interest, convenience or necessity."' 146 Ali filed a complaint in
138. Id. at 171; Hardin, supra note 131, at 298.
139. Clay II, 430 F.2d at 171; Hardin, supra note 131, at 297-98.
140. Clay I, 430 F.2d at 171 (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S.
103, 111 (1948)); see also Hardin, supra note 131, at 298.
141. Clayll, 430 F.2d at 171; Hardin, supra note 131, at 298.
142. See Clay I, 430 F.2d at 171; Hardin, supra note 131, at 298.
143. In United States v. Enten, 388 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1971), the court relied on the holding of
Clay to determine the issue of "[w]hether the Attorney General's authorization of a wiretap for the
purpose of gathenng foreign intelligence information violates the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 98.
The court did "not believe the judiciary should question the decision of the executive department that
such surveillances are reasonable and necessary to the protection of the national interest." Id.
144. Clayll, 430 F.2d at 168-72.
145. Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Comm'n of N.Y., 308 F. Supp. 11, 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
146. Id.
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the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York charging that the
Commission's action in denying him a boxing license because of his
conviction for refusal to serve in the U.S. Armed Forces violated his First and
Fourteenth Amendments rights and constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eight Amendment. 147 Judge Frankel dismissed Ali's
complaint on December 24, 1969, explaining that the Commission possessed a
statutory right to deny, suspend, or revoke a boxing license because of an
applicant's prior felony conviction. 148 The court also held that Ali's claims
based on freedom of religion and cruel and unusual punishment were
meritless. 149 In footnote three of his decision, Judge Frankel noted that Ali
broadly claimed arbitrary discrimination in violation of his rights under the
Equal Protection Clause without asserting "some semblance of content for the
conclusory allegations."' 150 "Out of what may [have been] excessive caution,"
however, Judge Frankel granted leave "to replead the broad allegation so that
[Ali] may attempt, if he responsibly deems it possible, to supply some
concrete and specific content for his charge."' 51
On January 27, 1970, Ali amended his complaint to charge the
Commission with "arbitrarily, capriciously and invidiously" refusing to renew
Ali's boxing license in violation of his right to equal protection of the laws
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 152  Judge Mansfield, now
presiding, concurred with Judge Frankel's opinion that the Commission had
discretion to deny a boxing license to an applicant because of his conviction of
a felony or military offense. 153 The question before the district court was
whether the Commission could exercise its broad powers to regulate boxing in
such a way as to deny to an applicant the equal protection of the state's laws,
which is guaranteed to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. 154 Ali was able to
demonstrate at least 244 instances in recent years where the Commission
granted, renewed, or reinstated boxing licenses to applicants who had been
convicted of one or more felonies, misdemeanors, or military offenses
147. Id. at 15, 18-19.
148. Id. at 17.
149. Id. at 18 ("The argument that [the Commission's] refusal of a license for [Ali] to fight
impedes on [Ali's] freedom of religion is not interesting or intelligible enough for long discussion...
. Plaintiff [Ali] also invokes the Eight Amendment, arguing that the license denial inflicts 'cruel and
unusual punishment.' Again, a short answer seems enough.").
150. Id. at 15 n.3.
151. Id.
152. Ali v. Div. of State Athletic Comm'n of N.Y., 316 F. Supp. 1246,1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
153. Id. at 1249.
154. Id.
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involving moral turpitude. 155 "Some 94 felons thus licensed include persons
convicted for such anti-social activities as second degree murder, burglary,
armed robbery, extortion, grand larceny, rape, sodomy, aggravated assault and
battery, embezzlement, arson, and receiving stolen property.' 156 Under these
circumstances, Judge Mansfield concluded that the "deliberate and arbitrary
discrimination or inequality in the exercise of [the Commission's] regulatory
power, not based upon differences that are reasonably related to the lawful
purposes of such regulation," constituted a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.157 The Commission did not appeal the
ruling. Ali had finally won his bout with the Commission.
By summer 1970, American public opinion was turning increasingly
against the Vietnam War. The largest-ever anti-war demonstration had taken
place in Washington, D.C., and polls showed for the first time that a majority
of Americans disapproved of the United States' participation in the Vietnam
War. 158 Amid this mounting criticism, Ali's stand seemed less controversial
and treasonous. 159 For others, Ali's position remained largely divisive. 160
Consequently, Ali "faced the fact that not a promoter in America could get a
fight for [him] legally."'161
H. Ali's Dramatic Return to Boxing Ring
Having won his legal bout against the Commission, and with his
conviction still on appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court, Ali announced on
September 11, 1970, that he had signed to fight Jerry Quarry. 162 Quarry was
155. For instance, Sonny Liston. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1250. "In short, the exercise of state power by a state agency in the issuance or refusal
of licenses to engage in a regulated activity should not represent the exercise of mere personal whim,
caprice or prejudice on the part of such agency. It should, and constitutionally must, have some
rational basis." Id. (internal citations omitted). "Defendants have offered no evidence tending to
refute or rebut the overwhelming and undisputed proof of arbitrary, capricious, and unfounded
discrimination furnished by plaintiff." Id. at 1252.
158. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 213.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 250.
162. During his suspension, Ali spoke at various college campuses and articulated his beliefs on
the Vietnam War:
I'm expected to go overseas to help free people in South Vietnam, and at the same
time my people here are being brutalized and mistreated, and this is really the same
thing that's happening over in Vietnam. So I'm going to fight it legally, and if I
lose, I'm just going to jail. Whatever the punishment, whatever the persecution is
for standing up for my [Muslim] beliefs, even if it means facing machine-gun fire
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the "perennial mainstay in the heavyweight division throughout the '60's and
'70's" and considered the dominant "White Hope" of the era. 163 The fight
would take place on October 26, 1970, in Atlanta, Georgia, which had no state
boxing commission. 164 However, due to Ali's continued unpopularity in
many parts of the country, the Ali-Quarry match proved very difficult to
organize in that state. 165 Georgia state Senator LeRoy Johnson, the first
African-American to be elected to a political office in the southeast and the
first African-American elected to Georgia's Senate since Reconstruction, had
been instrumental in bringing the Ali-Quarry fight to Georgia. 166 Governor
Lester Maddox, a segregationist and staunch conservative, opposed the fight
proclaiming, "We shouldn't let him fight for money if he didn't fight for his
country."' 67  Maddox urged the public to boycott the fight. 168  Indeed,
Maddox had asked then Attorney General Arthur Bolton to search for legal
grounds to stop the fight.169 Bolton had found none, so, on fight day, Maddox
called for "A Day of Mourning."' 70 Over 600 members of the news media
attended the fight, and an estimated 100 million viewers worldwide reportedly
watched on closed-circuit television.171
The fight was significant for two reasons. First, it signaled Ali's much
anticipated return to the boxing ring after three and a half years of forced exile.
As Ali summarized the importance of the fight:
People are coming from Pakistan and China. . . . From
Philadelphia, from Detroit, from Watts. Satellites are flying
around the sky just to take this fight to Africa and Asia and
Russia. Millions and millions of people, watching and waiting-
that day, I'll face it before denouncing . . . the religion of Islam.
Hauser, supra note 117, at 187.
163. Jim Amato, Jerry Quarry, http://www.saddoboxing.com/boxing-article/Jerry-Quarry.html
(last visited Sept. 27, 2007).
164. Roy McHugh, Roy McHugh Remembers Ali, PIT. POST-GAZETTE, June 2, 1998, at E2.
165. Ali reportedly canceled an appearance on the popular Tonight Show with host Johnny
Carson because the fight promoters feared national attention might provoke a backlash against the
fight. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 286.
166. MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 334; Gary Pomerantz, The One-Ring Circus Atlanta Can't
Forget, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Oct. 21, 1990, at Fl; Black History Month Historical African-American
Portraits: Capitol Collection, http://www.sos.state.ga.us/black-history/Portraits.htm (last visited
Sept. 27, 2007).
167. Pomerantz, supra note 166.
168. ALl WITH DURHAM, supra note 4, at 310.
169. Id. at 310.
170. Pomerantz, supra note 166.
171. Id.
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just to see me jump around a ring.... I'd better win.., because
as much hell as I catch when I'm winning, I hate to think of what
would happen if I lost.172
The fight was also significant because the manner in which Ali beat
Quarry showed the world that he was again a major force in boxing. 173 For
three rounds, Ali was in complete command, peppering Quarry with stinging
left jabs and jolting him with left hooks and right combinations. 174 As Ali left
the ring, he spotted broadcast journalist Howard Cosell of ABC at the
television microphone and said, "Do you still think I'm all washed up?' 75
Ali went on to defeat Oscar "Ringo" Bonavena on December 7, 1970,
setting up the classic confrontation between Ali and Joe "Smokin' Joe"
Frazier. 176 Ali was back in the ring, but with his prolonged inactivity between
March 1967 and October 1970, Frazier was essentially made heavyweight
champion. 177 According to Ali: "They say Frazier is the technical champ, but
technical stuff doesn't mean much in the country any more. People are
rebelling, fighting, demanding what's right. No old man on a boxing
commission can tell them Frazier's the champ now. But I'm ready to get on
with fighting him." 178
On March 8, 1971, Ali and Frazier fought for the boxing heavyweight title
in what is still called "The Fight of the Century." "The Fight" is considered
one of the most famous, widely discussed, eagerly anticipated, and
comprehensively covered bouts of all time since it featured two skilled,
undefeated fighters, both of whom had reasonable claims to the heavyweight
boxing crown. 179 Setting the scene, Ali offered one of his classic poems:
Joe's gonna come out smokin'
But I ain't gonna be jokin'
I'll be pickin' and pokin'
Pouring water on his smokin'
This might shock and amaze ya
172. MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 337.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 338.
176. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
177. MCCALLUM, supra note 39, at 339.
178. Id.
179. The Fight of the Century, http://www.ibhof.com/ibhfhvyl.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2007).
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But I'm gonna destroy Joe Frazier 180
The fight lived up to the hype, and Frazier floored Ali with a hard left
hook in the fifteenth and final round and won a unanimous decision. 18 1 This
marked Ali's first professional defeat. 182 After the fight, both men went to the
hospital, and Frazier spent the next three weeks there recovering from Ali's
blows. 183
I. Ali Prevails in the U.S. Supreme Court as a Conscientious Objector
Back in the legal arena, on June 21, 1971, three months after his defeat by
Frazier, Ali's sentence was overturned by the U.S. Supreme Court in Clay v.
United States.184 Clay compendiously set forth the standards that a draft
registrant must satisfy in order to qualify for conscientious objector
classification. 185 According to Clay, registrants must establish that: (a) they
are conscientiously opposed to war in any form; 186 (b) their objection is based
on religious, moral, or ethical beliefs; 187 and (c) their objection is sincere. 188
In Clay, the federal government conceded, and the U.S. Supreme Court
agreed, that the Justice Department's conclusion that Ali's beliefs were neither
based upon "religious training and belief" nor sincerely held were erroneous as
a matter of law. 189 The government argued, however, that a "basis in fact"
existed for finding that Ali was "not opposed to 'war in any form' but [was]
only selectively opposed to certain wars."1 90 Indeed, Ali asserted that he was
180. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 233.
181. See Chris Gay, Trouble in the Ring: A Noble Sport Is Bloodied by Scandal and Farce; Can
It Fight Back?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 12, 1999, at W17.
182. The case of Barrett v. Coullet, 263 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1972), involved the Ali-Frazier match.
There, the complainant Barrett purchased a ticket to a closed circuit telecast of a boxing match
between Ali and Frazier and sought to maintain a class action for himself and others similarly
situated. Id. at 764. Barrett's chancery suit was for breach of contract and breach of implied
warranty based upon a charge that part of the program was not shown and other parts were of poor
quality. Id. at 764-65. On appeal, the class action was not allowed even though each claim involved
grew out of one factual situation common to each member of the potential class. Id. at 765. There,
each claim related to one occurrence (a telecast), which transpired on a single date. Id. at 764-65.
183. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 234.
184. 403 U.S. 698 (1971); Unites States v. Clay (Clay IV), 446 F.2d 1406 (5th Cir. 1971).
185. Clay 111, 403 U.S. at 700.
186. Id. (citing Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
187. Id. (citing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S.
333 (1970)).
188. Id. (citing Witmer v. United States, 348 U.S. 375 (1955)).
189. Id. at 702.
190. Id. at 701.
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morally opposed to engaging in a war prosecuted by "non believers" based on
his allegiance to the Holy Qur'an. 19 1
The Clay Court determined that, even if the government's position was
correct, Ali's conviction required reversal for other reasons. There existed
three possible reasons for denying Ali's conscientious objection claim, two of
which were concededly invalid; since neither the local selective service board
nor the Kentucky Appeal Board identified a sound basis for denying Ali's
conscientious objection claim, the Court said it was impossible to determine
upon which of the three grounds the boards relied. 192  Under such
circumstances, where the administrative determination might have been the
product of a factual finding that was legally insufficient to support the
classification, the entire proceedings must be invalidated. 193 In other words,
Clay signified that draft boards must state, albeit briefly, the reasons for an
adverse decision in every case in which a conscientious objector claim is
presented. 194 Clay addressed the more fundamental legal question of how the
courts must respond when confronted with positive evidence that board action
was tainted by misapplication of the law.195 In such a context of likely official
misfeasance, the Clay Court deemed analysis of the sufficiency of a prima
facie showing was unnecessary and inappropriate. 196
After the Court's decision was released, a swarm of reporters anxiously
waited for Ali's reaction to the news. 197 One reporter asked Ali "whether he
would take legal action to recover damages" from those who had pushed him
out of boxing during the previous three years. 198 Ali responded, "No. They
only did what they thought was right at the time. I did what I thought was
right. That was all. I can't condemn them for doing what they think was
191. The notion of the "jihad," or holy war, was discussed by Justice Douglas in his concurring
opinion. See id. 705-10 (Douglas, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 703.
193. Id. at 704.
194. United States v. Reese, 331 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
195. See BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME
COURT 137-38 (1979).
196. According to Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong's book, The Brethren: Inside the
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court originally voted five to three against Ali. Id. at 137.
Thurgood Marshall had been Solicitor General earlier in the case and recused himself Id. Justice
Harlan, a member of the majority, sequestered himself with background materials about the Muslims
and after studying them, changed his vote. Id He now thought that the government had mislead the
Selective Service and the courts by insisting that Ali's religious beliefs were not authentically anti-
war. Id. at 137-38.
197. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 248.
198. Id.
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right."' 199
111. THE RETURN AND RETIREMENT OF THE WORLD HEAVYWEIGHT
CHAMPION
For Ali, 1974 was a remarkable year in the boxing ring. First, Ali erased
the memory of his defeat by Frazier when the two fought again on January 28,
1974. 200 Although Frazier was no longer the heavyweight champion at the
time, the fight is still considered a classic. This time Ali defeated Frazier in
the twelfth round.20 1 On October 30, 1974, Ali regained the heavyweight
crown much the way he initially captured the title against Liston, by knocking
out another apparently menacing and indomitable prizefighter, the previously
unbeaten heavyweight champion George Foreman. 20 2 Forman was a large,
brooding, hard-hitting, young, ex-Olympic heavyweight champion who
previously demolished Frazier, knocking him out in the second round of their
championship fight.20 3  According to the pundits, Foreman was
indestructible. 20 4 Ali and Foreman would share equally a $10 million
purse. 20 5 By all accounts, "Ali was being tempted to suffer the humiliating
blows from Foreman which would blast him out of boxing forever." 20 6 Ali,
however, never thought about losing the fight and poetically dubbed the
legendary20 7 fight held in Kinsasha, Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of
the Congo), as "The Rumble in the Jungle." 20 8 With the boisterous crowd
chanting "Ali - boom-aye-yay" ("Ali will kill him"), Ali employed the now
famous "Rope-A-Dope" strategy to tire Foreman out before knocking him out
199. Id. at 249.
200. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
201. Id.
202. Id.; HARRY CARPENTER, BOXING, A PICTORIAL HISTORY 153 (1975); Will Joyner, "Kings"
Had a Long Walk to the Throne, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 8, 1997, at 5C; James Verniere,
Movies: Ali's Royalty Transcends His Sport, BOSTON HERALD, Feb. 28, 1997, at S3.
203. CARPENTER, supra note 202, at 153.
204. Id.; Joyner, supra note 202.
205. CARPENTER, supra note 202, at 153.
206. Id.
207. See Joyner, supra note 202 ("legendary 1974 'Rumble in the Jungle' bout); Rochelle Riley,
Ali Promotes Both "Healing" and Healing on Book Tour, COURIER J. (Louisville, Kent.), Feb. 27,
1997 ("legendary 1974 'Rumble in the Jungle' fight"); James Verniere, supra note 202 ("legendary
'Rumble in the Jungle"').
208. See Anthony Violanti, A Tale of Two Boxers, BUFFALO NEWS, Apr. 10, 1997, at Cl
(referring to the fight as "a battle for freedom, racial equality and honor by America's foremost black
athlete"). When We Were Kings is an award winning documentary that chronicles the famous
"Rumble in the Jungle" fight.
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in the eighth round.209 According to the strategy, Ali would cover and lean
against the ropes, allowing Foreman to connect with a steady rain of body
punches for the first seven rounds (all the while Ali would verbally taunt
Foreman that he had no power).2t 0 After Foreman punched himself out, both
mentally and physically, he became a sitting duck for Ali. In the eighth round,
Ali finally came off the ropes and landed a quick succession of punches,
including a stiff right that sent Foreman to the canvas where he was counted
out seconds before the end of the round. Ali had regained more than just
another boxing title; he had won the affinity of the general public. Even then-
President Gerald Ford invited the redeemed champion to the White House in
what was considered a sign of reconciliation after the Vietnam War ordeal.211
A. The Legal Fallout from the "Rumble"
From a legal prospective, the Ali-Foreman "Rumble" generated a number
of legal actions, most notably Monster Communications, Inc. v. Turner
Broadcasting Systems Inc.212 Monster Communications involved a copyright
dispute over documentary film footage of the "Rumble." 213  There, the
plaintiff produced an award-winning, eighty-four-minute film, When We Were
Kings (Kings) for theatrical release, which essentially recants the story of the
"Rumble. 214 The defendant, Turner Network Television, produced a ninety-
four-minute documentary film entitled Ali-The Whole Story (Story) for
television about Ali's life.215 The defendant incorporated between forty-one
seconds and two minutes (nine to fourteen film clips) of the same Zaire fight
footage. 216 Plaintiff brought a copyright infringement action against the
defendant on the ground that Story contained some of the same historic film
clips that were previously incorporated in Kings.217 The defendant argued that
this was fair use and the district court agreed.218 First, the court indicated that
fair uses of images captured from historically significant events may be far
209. Mike Littwin, Gast Goes the Distance with Ali Documentary, BALT. SUN, Mar. 11, 1997, at
ID (refemng to the "famous 1974 Rumble in the Jungle" as Muhammad Ali's "gloriously
incongruous rope-a-dope victory over George Foreman").
210. Joyner, supra note 202; Littwin, supra note 209.
211. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 252.
212. 935 F. Supp. 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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broader than uses of other types of visual images. 219 Moreover, analyzing the
footage quantitatively, the court stated that the infringing film clips constituted
no more than two percent of the film.220 The court also found that the
allegedly infringing film clips are not the focus of the defendant's film. 221
The two films are quite different: one focuses on the fight in Zaire; the other is
the story of Ali's whole life.222 Finally, the court found that disallowing the
use of such film clips might make it impossible for subsequent biographers to
tell Ali's story through film, which would defeat the entire purpose of the fair
use concept of copyright law. 22 3
B. Ali's Post-fight Jeers Prompt Lawsuit
Back in the ring, Ali fought Chuck "The Bayonne Bleeder" Wepner on
March 24, 1975, in his next title defense. 224  Although he lost, Wepner
became just the fourth fighter ever to knock Ali down. 225 The bout (and
Wepner) purportedly served as the inspiration for the Rocky Balboa character
in Sylvester Stallone's Rocky.226 Consequently, Wepner would later earn the
nickname "The Real Rocky. '22 7 Further, the Ali-Wepner bout served as the
backdrop for a lawsuit between Ali and a television producer in connection
with a suit brought by the fight's referee against Ali. In American
Broadcasting Co. v. Ali, the television producer American Broadcasting
Company (ABC) brought action against Ali seeking to set aside a labor
arbitration award in favor of Ali that required ABC to reimburse him for fees
and costs incurred by Ali in his successful defense of a libel action.228 Not
surprisingly, Ali's mouth was the source of this action. Four days after the
Ali-Wepner bout, broadcast journalist Howard Cosell of ABC conducted a
219. Id. at494.
220. Id. at 495.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 494. Other published cases stemming from the "Rumble" include Hutchinson v.
Brotman-Sherman Theatres, 419 N.E.2d 530 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981), in which the assignee of exclusive
telecast rights for the "Rumble" brought suit against defendant exhibitors for breach of their
agreement. Also, in South Shore Amusements, Inc. v. Supersport Auto Racing Ass'n, 483 N.E.2d 337
(I11. App. Ct. 1985), the plaintiff brought a breach of contract suit relating to a lease of building to
show the closed circuit telecast of the "Rumble."
224. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
225. See Chuck Wepner Biography, http://www.autographedtoyou.com/Chuck%20-Wepner-
biography.htm (last visited on Sept. 29, 2007).
226. Id
227. Id.
228. Am. Broad. Co. v. Ali, 489 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
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videotape interview of Ali. 229 Ali was a paid commentator on an ABC
show. 230 The Ali-Wepner bout was controversial, and Ali was critical of the
performance by the fight's referee, Anthony Perez.231 Ali and Perez "had
exchanged derogatory remarks after the contest concerning each other's
performance and alleged professional lapses of the other."232  Cosell
"vigorously and provocatively" pursed this subject matter in the taped Ali
interview.233 Specifically, Cosell invited Ali to "express yourself as volubly
as usual if you will" and "continued to prod Aft until the voluble Ali came
forth with the comment that precipitated the defamation lawsuit. ' 234 Cosell
further pursued "Ali with questions whether Ali was 'finished with you [sic]
tirade' and whether Ali was 'embarrassed' by his showing against Wepner." 235
ABC's broadcast of the interview precipitated a libel action by referee
Perez against ABC in state court. 236 "Ten days later Perez commenced a libel
action in [federal court] against Ali focused on the broadcast" and demanded
damages. 237 "Ali thereupon asserted a third party complaint against ABC in
the federal action, claiming indemnity as well as contribution from ABC. 238
Ali prevailed on the federal libel suit and claimed "he was entitled to
reimbursement from ABC for the fees and costs incurred by him in his
successful defense of the libel action."239 Ali further demanded an arbitration
of his claim against ABC under a collective bargaining contract between ABC
and the labor organization, the American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists (AFTRA).2 40 After a "lengthy and sharply contested" arbitration, an
arbitration panel awarded Ali $193,352.241 ABC then sought to set aside Ali's
arbitration award. 242 In rejecting ABC's claim and confirming Ali's award,
the court in American Broadcasting Co. found essentially that ABC had failed
to edit the controversial videotape interview despite the authority and
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opportunity to do so.2 4 3
Following the Wepner fight in 1975 and through the beginning of 1978,
Ali successfully defended his heavyweight title nine times, defeating Ron Lyle
(May 16, 1975), Joe Bugner (June 30, 1975), Joe Frazier (October 1, 1975),
Jean Pierre Coopman (February 20, 1976), Jimmy Young (April 30, 1976),
Richard Dunn (May 24, 1976), Ken Norton (September 28, 1976), Alfredo
Evangelista (May 16, 1977), and Earnie Shavers (September 29, 1977).244
Most notable of these fights was Ali's stirring fourteenth round knock-out of
Frazier in the epic "Thrilla in Manila."245
C. Ali Champions the Right of Publicity Protection
In January of 1978, Ali again went to court in one of the first cases to
recognize a right of publicity protection, and additionally, to apply this right to
an athlete. 246 That year, Ali sued Playgirl Magazine over the magazine's
unauthorized commercial use of a drawing that evoked his identity.247
Specifically, Playgirl Magazine had allegedly published an impressionistic
caricature of a nude African-American man seated on a stool in the comer of a
boxing ring with both hands taped and outstretched resting on the ropes on
either side. 248 Ali sought a preliminary injunction and damages for a common
law right of publicity infringement as well as for a violation of New York's
privacy law. 249 Ali claimed injury to his public reputation and the economic
consequences thereof.250 He further argued that he had expended great time
and effort throughout his career to establish a "commercially valuable
proprietary interest in his likeness and reputation."251
The court examined the facts to determine if a preliminary injunction was
243. Id. at 128.
244. Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
245. The seminal satellite broadcast of the "Thrilla in Manila" boxing match between Ali and
Frazier in 1975 by Home Box Office (HBO) launched the idea of satellite television service to the
American public. Jeffrey P. Cowan Jr., The Taxation of Space, Ocean, and Communications Income
Under the Proposed Treasury Regulations, 55 TAX LAW. 133, 134-35 (2001).
246. See Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). "The right of publicity is the
right of every person, celebrity, and non-celebrity alike, to control and benefit from the commercial
use of his or her identity." Domna L. Candido, The Right of Publicity: An Overview, in 476
PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, ANNUAL ADVANCED SEMINAR ON TRADEMARK LAW 181, 185 (1997).
247. Playgirl, 447 F. Supp. 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
248. Id. at 726.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 729.
251. Id.
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appropriate.252 When examining the success of Ali's claim on its merits, the
court found that although the caricature was captioned "Mystery Man," 253 the
striking resemblance to Ali was evident and accompanied with a "verse which
refers to the figure as 'the Greatest.' 254 Relying on the pecuniary value of
Ali's "public reputation or 'persona"' 255 and that the interest underlying "the
right of publicity is the 'straightforward one of preventing unjust enrichment
by the theft of good will,"' the court held Ali had met the criteria for making
out a common law right of publicity claim in New York.256 The district court
specifically held that the drawing was not newsworthy, but rather a
"dramatization, an illustration falling somewhere between representational art
and cartoon, and is accompanied by a plainly fictional and allegedly libelous
[sic] bit of doggerel. 257
The defendants in Playgirl argued that the statutory right of privacy does
not extend to protect Ali, as he is an "athlete ... who chooses to bring himself
to public notice, who chooses, indeed . . . to rather stridently seek out
publicity. ' 258 The court rejected this argument and stated that
such a contention 'confuses the fact that projection into the
public arena may make for newsworthiness of one's activities,
and all the hazards of publicity thus entailed, with the quite
different and independent right to have one's personality, even if
newsworthy, free from commercial exploitation at the hands of
another .... '259
The district court ultimately found the establishment of a "likelihood that
[Ali would] prevail on his claim that his right of publicity [had] been violated
by the publication of the offensive portrait. 260 The court even imposed the
harsh remedy of an injunction against any further distribution of the Playgirl
252. Id. at 726. According to the court, in order to determine whether a preliminary injunction
was necessary, Ali needed to clearly show "either (1) probable success on the merits and possible
irreparable injury; or (2) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward" Ali's favor. Id.
253. Id. at 727.
254. Id. "The Greatest" was a moniker that both the plaintiff and the press often used when
referring to Ali, the former heavyweight boxing champion of the world. Id.
255. Id. at 728.
256. Id. at 728-29 (quoting Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977)).
257. Id. at 727.
258. Id.
259. Id. (quoting Booth v. Curtis Publ'g Co., 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 745 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962).
260. Id. at 728.
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issue.261 In condemning an arguably creative part of the body of a magazine,
as opposed to an advertisement, the court broadened the scope of infringing
"commercial" uses to apply to works which are merely commercially
sponsored or contain paid advertising.262 This case further expanded the
notion of identity that included physical characteristics to identify a person.
D. Ali's Fight with Leon Spinks Incites Antitrust Lawsuit
Although Muhammad Ali was in the twilight of his boxing career, he was
still the heavyweight champion. In early 1978, Ali was preparing to defend
his heavyweight title against 1974 Olympic gold medalist Leon Spinks. 263 On
February 15, 1978, appearing in just his eighth professional bout, Spinks upset
Ali in fifteen rounds to win the heavyweight title.264 An Ali-Spinks rematch
was scheduled for September 15, 19.78, in New Orleans, Louisiana, which Ali
won by unanimous fifteen-round decision.265 Within weeks before the second
bout, the State of Alabama filed an antitrust case concerning the fight on
behalf of Alabama residents to obtain injunctive relief to prevent and restrain
violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.266 The complaint alleged that the
defendants, American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (ABC), Top Rank, Inc.
(Top Rank), and Louisiana Sports, Inc. (LSI), had "by written contracts agreed
to restrict the live telecast coverage by a 'blackout' (non-telecast) of a 200-
mile radius (400-mile diameter) area around New Orleans, Louisiana," the site
of the Ali-Spinks fight. 267 Alabama alleged that the blackout restriction was
an unlawful agreement in restraint of trade. 268 Subsequently, other states and
entities moved to intervene in the case.269
The facts of the case are simple and straightforward. Top Rank, the
promoter of the Ali-Spinks match, had sold to LSI its right to receive the live
gate proceeds of the Ali-Spinks bout for $3 million.270 Subsequently, Top
Rank assigned to ABC its right to the live telecast of the match for $5.15
261. Id. at 732.
262. Id. at 728-29.
263. See Cyber Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
264. Id.
265. Muhammad Ali, http://www.hickoksports.com/biograph/alimuham.shtml (last visited Sept.
29, 2007).
266. State ex rel. Baxley v. Am. Broad. Co., 1978 WL 1423 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 13, 1978).
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million.27 1 The agreement between ABC and Top Rank provided that ABC
would not telecast the fight in the state of Louisiana or within a 200-mile
radius of the city of New Orleans unless the live gate was sold out.272 LSI was
granted closed circuit TV rights.273 "This 'blackout' provision [was] the seed
of [this] controversy." 274  The court first addressed whether the State of
Alabama had made out a case for preliminary injunctive relief to enjoin the
fight for proceeding as planned.275 The State argued that the blackout of a
200-mile radius of New Orleans was arbitrary and unreasonable and suggested
a 75-mile radius.276 However, the court found that the State of Alabama failed
to prove a substantial likelihood of success on the merits since the State
provided insufficient evidence regarding differences in comparable population
density or other factors that could affect the reasonableness of a 75-mile
blackout radius area.277 Furthermore, the court found that the possible harm to
defendants outweighed the possible threat to the plaintiff since LSI had
incurred out-of-pocket costs totaling $4.1 million or more and its revenues
from ticket sales were about $3.5 million.278 Thus, a court order lifting the
blackout would probably cause LSI substantial economic loss.
279
E. The End of a Legendary Career
Far past his prime and lacking the once fatal mix of butterfly and bee, Ali
fought twice more and lost. In 1980, he was defeated by Larry Holmes, a
former sparring partner and the then-World Heavyweight Champion.
280
Despite the apparent finality of his loss to Holmes and his increasingly suspect





275. Id. at * 1-2.
276. Id. at *2-3.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *4.
279. Id.
280. Mark Giles, They Really Shouldn't Have Done It, TIMES (London), Oct. 14, 2005, at 103.
The case of Sunshine Promotions, Inc. v. Ridlen, 483 N.E.2d 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985), involved the
Ali-Holmes fight in part. There, Sunshine, a promoter of closed circuit telecasts of boxing matches
(including the Ali-Holmes fight), brought an action for the refund of a gross receipts tax imposed on
ticket sales for telecasts since such a tax was not imposed on subscription cable providers. Id. at 764.
The court rejected Sunshine's claim, finding that an Indiana state statute imposing such a tax on the
gross receipts of a closed circuit promoter did not deny the promoter's equal protection. Id. at 765-
67.
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Ali lost a ten-round unanimous decision to future heavyweight champion
Trevor Berbick in -what was billed as "The Drama in the Bahamas." 281
Following this loss, Ali retired in 1981.282 Ali was later diagnosed with
Parkinson's Syndrome, following which his motor functions began a slow
decline. 283 "I feel fine," Ali insisted. "I'm older and fatter, but we all
change." 284
In 1996, Ali carried the torch and ignited the Olympic flame during the
opening ceremonies in Atlanta, Georgia.285 His appearance at the Games
moved an international audience.
IV. CONCLUSION
Muhammad Ali continues to be one of the most recognized and admired
figures in the world because of his tremendous determination,
accomplishment, and perseverance against daunting odds.286 Ali was not just
a sports symbol; he personified the racial and political climate of his
generation. Whether calculated or not, Ali also directly and indirectly
accomplished many feats in court that remain legal precedent in assorted areas
of the American law. In the federal law context, Ali's struggle for
conscientious objector status resulted in a landmark U.S. Supreme Court
ruling, which set forth the standards that a draft registrant must satisfy in order
to qualify for conscientious objector classification. Further, Ali's involvement
in a leading case on warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance forced the
federal appellate courts to consider the President's Constitutional powers in
conducting warrantless surveillances on the grounds of national security. His
legendary bouts not only spawned a copyright infringement lawsuit, which
addressed the fair uses of images captured from historically significant events,
but another suit that delved into television "blackout" rules and antitrust law.
Ali's contribution to state common law was equally significant. Specifically,
Ali went to court in one of the first cases to successfully recognize a right of
publicity protection, and additionally, to apply this right to an athlete. Ali
would also compel courts to consider liability issues concerning libel under a
labor collective bargaining contract. Indeed, Ali was, and continues to be, The
281. Dick Heller, Ali Was "Greatest" No More, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at C13; Cyber
Boxing Zone, supra note 7.
282. Muhammad Ah, supra note 265.
283. Muhammad Ali Biography, http://novaonline.nvcc.edu/eli/evans/hisl35/events/ali98.htm
(last visited on Sept. 29, 2007).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. BINGHAM & WALLACE, supra note 58, at 256-59.
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Greatest in court.
TECHNICAL FOUL: DAVID STERN'S




In the past two seasons,' National Basketball Association (NBA)
Commissioner David Stem has used some of his expansive authority in
implementing a variety of rules designed to clean up the games, the players,
and the image of the NBA. These rules include instituting a dress code for
players2 and various uniform requirements, using a new synthetic basketball,
prohibiting players from attending certain nightclubs, and introducing a "point
of emphasis" that players will be called for technical fouls for excessive
complaining. Stem has implemented such rules under the auspices of the
amount of authority he has been given in the Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) between the league and the National Basketball Players Association
(NBPA) and in the NBA Constitution. However, the NBPA has begun to
express its disagreement with Stem's free flow of new rules and, in the future,
may take action against these or other newly formulated rules.
This article will examine the scope of authority that David Stem and
commissioners of other professional sports leagues have to formulate and
implement player conduct rules similar to those Stem has recently instituted.
In examining Stem's authority, this article will discuss: (1) the history of the
Associate attorney with Ice Miller LLP in Indianapolis, Indiana, practicing in the firm's private
equity and venture services group; J.D., magna cum laude, Marquette University Law School, 2007;
M.B.A., Marquette University Graduate School of Management, 2007; Wartburg College, 2004;
recipient of the National Sports Law Institute's Sports Law Certificate. The author would like to
thank his wife, April, for her support and also Professor Paul Anderson for his assistance and
guidance with this article.
1. The NBA seasons of 2005-2006 and 2006-2007.
2. The dress code was discussed by the NBA and the National Basketball Players' Association
(NBPA), and supposedly agreed upon, during collective bargaining negotiations in the summer of
2005. See Mike Wise, Opinions on the NBA's Dress Code are Far from Uniform, WASH. POST, Oct.
23, 2005, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/22/
AR2005102201386pf.html. However, since the dress code was not included in the final version of
that collective bargaining agreement, it will be analyzed as if the NBPA did not consent to its
institution.
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professional sports league commissioner, including cases challenging a
commissioner's authority, and the history of the NBA commissioner, (2)
recent rules established by David Stem, (3) CBA provisions of the National
Football League (NFL), Major League Baseball (MLB), National Hockey
League (NHL), and NBA governing the creation of new rules, (4) whether
player conduct rules must be collectively bargained between the league and
the players' union under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and (5)
Stem's authority to institute new player conduct rules in light of the NBA
CBA and the NLRA.
II. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUE COMMISSIONER
Since the inception of the professional sports league commissioner
position, the office has enjoyed a considerable amount of power over the
league and its players. A commissioner is unique in the amount of authority
he has been given, but the truly distinctive aspect of the position is that he
makes many decisions based on his sole discretion and "represents an almost
autonomous authority within the internal structure of the league, uncontrolled
by its principal owners." 3 A commissioner receives his authority to make
decisions through the league's CBA, constitution, and bylaws,4 but these
documents can also limit his authority.
A. History
The expansive authority possessed by professional sports league
commissioners began when Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis was elected as
the first commissioner of a professional sports league in 1921.5 Judge Landis
was elected as commissioner of MLB after the infamous Chicago Black Sox
scandal, 6 when the club owners decided that a one-person commissionership
was necessary to "assure that public interests would first be served" and
disgorge "existing evils" from baseball. 7 To ensure that Landis was able to
accomplish these goals, under the Major League Baseball Agreement he was
given the power to "'investigate, either upon complaint or upon his own
3. Gregor Lentze, The Legal Concept of Professional Sports Leagues: The Commissioner and an
Alternative Approach From a Corporate Perspective, 6 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 65, 72 (1995).
4. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 437 (2005).
5. The Commissionership: A Historical Perspective, MLB.cOM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/
mlb history.people.jsp?story=com (last visited Oct. 24, 2007).
6. In the Black Sox scandal, eight Chicago White Sox players allegedly took payments from




initiative, an act, transaction or practice, charged, alleged or suspected to be
detrimental to the best interest of the national game of baseball, (and to
determine and take) any remedial, preventive or punitive action (he deemed
appropriate).' 8 While this gave him considerable power, his power was
magnified because the agreement also provided that his "decisions w[ere] final
and could not be challenged by the clubs in court." 9
This expansive power first given to Landis has continued to this day in
MLB, and commissioners of the other professional sports leagues enjoy
similar authority. In MLB, the commissioner still has the authority to
investigate and punish actions, by a fine or suspension, that are not in the best
interests of baseball.' 0 In the NFL, the commissioner can fine, suspend, or
terminate the contract of a player whose conduct is deemed "to be detrimental
to the League or professional football."' I The commissioner of the NHL can
expel, suspend, fine, or a combination thereof "any official or a Member Club
or player or employee" for any act or conduct "whether during or outside the
playing season [that] has been dishonorable, prejudicial to or against the
welfare of the League or the game of hockey."' 2 The NBA commissioner's
authority includes the ability to discipline a player whose conduct at or during
a game is "prejudicial to or against the best interests of the Association or the
game of basketball" with a fine or suspension 13 and to fine or suspend "any
Player who, in his opinion, shall have been guilty of conduct prejudicial . .. or
detrimental to the [NBA].' 4
B. Cases Challenging Commissioners' Authority
The scope of a commissioner's authority, mainly his authority to act in the
best interests of the league or discipline a player for his conduct, has been
judicially challenged, although courts generally provide deference to a
commissioner's decisions except where the commissioner acted beyond the
scope of his authority or in bad faith. 15
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, MAJOR LEAGUE CONSTITUTION art. II, § 3 (2006), available at
http://www.businessofbaseball.com/docs/MLConstitutionJune2005Update.pdf.
11. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NFL
MANAGEMENT COUNCIL AND THE NFL PLAYERS ASSOCIATION Appendix C 15 (2006) [hereinafter
NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE CBA]; see also NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, CONSTITUTION AND BYLAWS
OF THE NFL art. 8.13(A) (rev. 1999).
12. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, NHL BYLAWS § 17.3(a) (1990).
13. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, NBA CONSTITUTION art. XXXV(d) (1989).
14. Id. art. XXXV(e).
15. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 437.
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A commissioner's decisions made under the "best interests" of the game
clause have been upheld for disapproving player trades 16 and for suspending a
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a club for one year due to his tampering
with the exclusive negotiating rights of a free agent and his former club 17
because the clause provides the commissioner with broad authority and
discretion. 18
However, even when acting under the "best interests" clause, a
commissioner's authority is not unfettered. In the tampering case mentioned
above, the commissioner also took away a draft choice from the club as a
penalty. 19 The court found that the commissioner did not have the authority to
take away the draft choice because it was a penalty that the commissioner did
not have the authority to impose for this type of conduct.20 This was similar to
Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp.,21 where the court found
that the NBA commissioner did not have the authority to deny a team a draft
choice; only the NBA's board of directors had this power pursuant to the
NBA's constitution. 22 Similarly, a commissioner's assignment of a club to a
different division under his "best interests" authority was invalid.23 Although
the best interests clause gave the commissioner broad authority, since the
dispute was already governed by the constitution, the commissioner could not
use his authority in contradiction of the constitution. 24
III. COMMISSIONERSHIP OF THE NBA
The NBA has had only four commissioners 25 since 1946, with each
individual making his own distinct mark on the league. 26 These four
commissioners, Maurice Podoloff, Walter Kennedy, Larry O'Brien, and David
Stem, 27 all had a different impact on the NBA, possibly due to their use or
16. Charles 0. Finley & Co., v. Kuhn, 569 F.2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1978).
17. Atlanta Nat'l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 1213, 1223 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
18. Id. at 1219-22; Kuhn, 569 F.2d at 534.
19. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. at 1216-17.
20. Id. at 1223.
21. Riko Enters. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
22. Id. at 525.
23. Chi. Nat'l League Ball Club, Inc. v. Vincent, 1992 WL 179208 (N.D. Ill. 1992), vacated,
reprinted in MITrEN ET AL., supra note 4, at 448.
24. Id.
25. Until 1967 the position was referred to as NBA President instead of NBA Commissioner.
Mike Monroe, The Commissioners, NBA.coM, http://www.nba.com/history/commissioners.html (last





nonuse of authority. Recently, current NBA Commissioner David Stem has
drawn attention to his use of authority by instituting a variety of player
conduct rules.
A. NBA Commissioners
Maurice Podoloff became the first league commissioner 28 in 1946 when
the NBA was known as the Basketball Association of America (BAA). 29
Unlike MLB Commissioner Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who had enjoyed
expansive authority for over two decades, Podoloff had limited authority, yet
he left his mark by successfully merging the BAA and the National Basketball
League to create the NBA. 30 Podoloff led the NBA until 1963 when Walter
Kennedy took over the position. 31 Kennedy served as commissioner 32 in 1964
when the NBPA was formed, and in 1971, the commissionership received
expansive authority, similar to that of the MLB commissioner, when "the
owners gave [Kennedy] far-reaching authority to run the league, making him
perhaps the most powerful administrative figure in American pro sports at that
time." 33
Kennedy was succeeded as commissioner in 1975 by Larry O'Brien,
whose accomplishments included a merger with the American Basketball
Association and a landmark CBA in 1983. 34 In 1984, current commissioner
David Stern took over the position. "Under Stem's guidance the NBA has
enjoyed its period of greatest growth and taken basketball to the forefront of
the global sports scene." 35 To accomplish this, Stern created the free agency
system, presided over the CBA that brought the salary cap and revenue sharing
to the NBA, developed NBA Properties and NBA Entertainment to market the
NBA, and moved the NBA into new technological outlets.36 He also
expanded the league to thirty teams, 37 and under his watch, the average player




32. Kennedy's title was changed from President to Commissioner in 1967. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. The 1983 CBA was landmark because it established the first salary cap in professional
sports, a revenue guarantee for players, and a substance abuse program. Dan T. Rosenbaum & Andy
Stein, Re-Negotiating the NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, Sept. 24, 2003,
http://www.uncg.edu/bae/people/rosenbaum/NBA/cbal.pdf.
35. Monroe, supra note 25.
36. Id. Stem served as NBA Executive Vice President during the 1983 CBA negotiations that
resulted in the salary cap and revenue guarantee. Id.
37. See Team Index, http://www.nba.com/teams (last visited Nov. 16, 2007).
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salary rose from $275,000 in 198338 to $5.215 million in 2006. 39
B. David Stern's Player Conduct Rules
While Stem has grown the NBA into a successful, worldwide
enterprise, his tenure has not been without controversy. During the past two
seasons, Stern has instituted a variety of player conduct rules with the purpose
of changing the NBA's image. These new rules include a player dress code, a
new basketball, various uniform rules, technical fouls for excessive
complaining, and a possible ban on certain nightclubs.
Stem instituted the player dress code40 at the beginning of the 2005-2006
season 41 to soften the NBA's hip-hop image and increase the league's appeal
to its fans.42 The dress code requires players who are "engaged in team or
league business" to dress in business casual attire.43 Business casual attire is
defined as a dress shirt or sweater with dress or khaki pants or dress jeans and
appropriate shoes." Players are not allowed to wear sneakers or sandals, 45
sleeveless shirts, shorts, jerseys, t-shirts, chains or pendants over clothing,
sunglasses, or headphones. 46
The second major rule change was the institution of a new basketball for
the 2006-2007 season. 47 The basketball was synthetic leather with a slightly
different two-piece panel layout that was used in all NBA games.48 The new
basketball was a significant change due to the panel layout and the synthetic
leather, and it was the first change in the NBA basketball in thirty-five years
and only the second change in sixty years. 49 While the NBA claimed that the
38. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n Players Ass'n, NBPA History, http://nbpa.com/history.php (last
visited Feb. 23, 2007).
39. Plunkett Research, Ltd., Sports Industry Overview, http://www.plunkettresearch.com/
lndustries/Sports/SportsStatistics/tabid/273/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2007).
40. NBA Player Dress Code, NBA.COM, http://www.nba.com/news/player-dresscode_
051017.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2006).
41. Proposed Dress Code Doesn't Suit Some NBA Players, ESPN.COM, Oct. 5, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/story?id=2181671.
42. Wise, supra note 2.
43. NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 40, § 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. § 3. A player can wear headphones in the locker room and on the team bus and plane. Id.
47. NBA Introduces New Game Ball, NBA.COM, June 28, 2006, http://www.nba.com/
news/blackbox_060628.html. The old basketball was leather and was comprised of the traditional





ball improved shooting, scoring, and turnovers, 50 players complained that the
ball stuck to their hands, did not bounce like the old ball,51 and cut their
fingers. 52 Due to these adverse effects, and because neither the NBPA nor the
players were consulted before introduction of the ball, the NBPA filed an
unfair labor practice charge53 claiming that the ball adversely affected working
conditions 54 and, therefore, could not be unilaterally implemented by Stem.
Before the unfair labor practice charge could be litigated, and after less than a
half season of use, the NBA pulled the new basketball and reverted back to the
old leather basketball. 55
Also instituted for the 2006-2007 season were uniform rules and a point of
emphasis. 56 The new uniform rules for the season are that players "can wear
one 4-inch wristband on each wrist[, which] cannot be worn on the bicep,...
headbands can be no wider than 2 inches, [and players] can no longer [wear]
tights or long compression socks." 57 Other uniform rules that are more strictly
enforced and subject players to discipline for the season are that "players must
keep their uniform shirts tucked into their pants" while they are on the court 58
and are prohibited from wearing rubber bands.59 Additionally, the rule that
"[p]layers, coaches and trainers are to stand and line up in a dignified posture
along the sidelines or on the foul line during the playing of the National
Anthem" 60 has been increasingly enforced as "players chewing gum and
shifting as they stood in line [during the National Anthem] .. .ha[s] been
outlawed. '61 In addition to these uniform rules, Stern also introduced a major
50. NBA to Switch to Leather Ball on Jan. 1, NBA.CoM, Dec. 11, 2006, http://www.nba.com/
news/ball_06121 L.html.
51. Michael S. Schmidt, N.B.A. to Take up Complaints with Ball Manufacturer, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/sports/basketball/O6ball.html?
ex
= l 172379600&en=026de53ab131 da43&ei=5070.
52. Brian Hanley, Iverson Not the Answer for Bulls, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Dec. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.suntimes.comlsports/basketball/bulls/ I 68800,CST-SPT-bullntl 2.article.
53. Schmidt, supra note 51.
54. Mitch Lawrence, Players Crying Foul, N.Y. DAILY NEwS, Nov. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/2006/11/16/2006-11-1(56-players-crying-foul-nbas-new-ball_
not th.html.
55. NBA to Switch to Leather Ball on Jan. 1, supra note 50.
56. Oscar Dixon, Stern Wants On-Court Decorum to be Uniform, USA TODAY, Oct. 26, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/sports/basketbalnba/2006- 10-26-uniformityx.htm?POE
=SPOISVA.
57. Id.
58. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, OFFICIAL RULES OF THE NBA, available at
http://www.nba.com/analysis/mles_ h.html?nav=ArticleList (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
59. Lawrence, supra note 54.
60. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 58.
6 1. Lawrence, supra note 54.
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point of emphasis for the season in a new rule that "[p]layers will be called for
technical[] [fouls] for excessive complaining." 62
Finally, in January 2007, the NBA required its security forces to
promulgate a list of nightclubs in all NBA cities that players should not visit.63
Once such locations are identified, "the league will send a directive to teams
mandating that players avoid those spots or be subject to a substantial fine." 64
Like the directive of the nightclub ban, these player conduct rules have been seen
as Stem's directives and have raised controversy among the players, NBPA, media,
and fans. The controversial nature of the rules has raised questions regarding Stem's
authority under the NBA CBA to institute such rules.
IV. PROFESSIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES' PROVISIONS GOVERNING RULE
CHANGES
David Stem and other professional sports league commissioners have
broad authority under the "best interests" clause of a league's CBA; however,
a commissioner's authority to institute new player conduct rules is limited
under a league's CBA, and he cannot unilaterally expand his power beyond
that given to him.65
A. Professional Sports Leagues' CBA Provisions
Provisions in professional sports leagues' CBAs governing the institution
of new rules during the current term of the CBA vary significantly. One of the
CBAs addresses only playing rules, while two cover most of the league's rules
and regulations, and another allows carte blanch institution of certain rules.
The specificity and scope of these CBA provisions has an impact on the
league's commissioner's authority to institute new player conduct rules.
i. NBA
The NBA commissioner has the broadest authority of the professional
sports leagues, as the NBA CBA does not require the commissioner to get
consent from the NBPA prior to enacting rules.66 The NBA "is entitled to
62. Dixon, supra note 56.
63. Mitch Lawrence, Indy's Change of Pace, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 21, 2007, at 63. This
mandate was in the wake of the murder of NFL player Darrent Williams at a Denver, Colorado,
nightclub. Id.
64. Id.
65. See infra Part II.B.




promulgate and enforce reasonable rules governing the conduct of players on
the playing court" and must only give notice and consult with the NBPA prior
to putting the rule into effect.67 "'Conduct on the playing court' [means]
conduct in any area within an arena (including, but not limited to, locker
rooms, vomitories, loading docks, and other back-of-house and underground
areas, including those used by television production and other vehicles) at,
during or in connection with an NBA ...game." 6 8 This includes "conduct
engaged in by a player within an arena from the time the player arrives at the
arena for an NBA game until the time the player has left the premises of the
arena following the conclusion of such game." 69 In regards to playing rules,
the NBPA has a vote on the NBA Competition Committee, which
recommends playing rules to the NBA's board of directors for final
approval. 70
ii. NFL
While the NBA's CBA allows unregulated institution of certain rules, the
NFL's CBA only governs playing rule changes, and it limits the
commissioner's authority by requiring the NFL to give the National Football
League Players Association (NFLPA) notice of all proposed changes. 71 "If
the NFLPA believes that the adoption of a playing rule change would
adversely affect player safety," it can call a meeting to discuss the rule change,
and if it is unsatisfied with the outcome of the meeting, then it can "request an
advisory decision by one of the arbitrators." 72 However, "[t]he arbitrator's
decision [is] advisory only, not final and binding." 73 Therefore, once the
arbitrator has made his decision, the NFL can implement the proposed playing
rule change, even to the disagreement of the NFLPA. 74
iii. MLB
Unlike the NFL provision, MLB's CBA provision governs playing rules,
major league rules, and any other rules or regulations, limiting the
67. Id.
68. Id. art. XXXI § 8(c).
69. Id.
70. Id. art. XXIX § 4(a).
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commissioner's authority to institute any type of rule. 5 If any playing or
scoring rule change is proposed by MLB, it must give notice to the MLB
Players Association (MLBPA). 76 The MLB and MLBPA must negotiate over
the proposed rule change if the change would "significantly affect terms and
conditions of employment., 77 If no agreement can be made on the rule
change, the rule will "not be put into effect until the completion of the next
complete succeeding season . . . following the date the change was
proposed.",
78
If the rule change involves "any Major League Rule, or other rule or
regulation," MLB must give notice to the MLBPA and must negotiate the
proposed change. 79  However, MLB's obligation to negotiate with the
MLBPA applies only to changes of existing rules or regulations that would
change a player benefit or rules that would "impose an obligation upon the
Players which had not previously existed.
80
iv. NHL
Unlike the NBA commissioner's broad rule-making authority, the NHL
commissioner's authority is the most restricted of the professional sports
leagues' commissioners. The NHL's CBA provisions govern the amendment
or modification of any league rule or playing rule, 81 and any rule change by
the NHL must be provided to the NHL Players' Association (NHLPA).82 If a
proposed league rule or playing rule would "affect terms or conditions of
employment of any Player" then the NHLPA must consent to the rule, which it
cannot unreasonably withhold.83  Additionally, the NHL must send the
NHLPA the current league rules, and "[n]o Player shall be bound by any
provision of a League Rule that has not been furnished to the NHLPA. ''84






81. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAGUE, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NHL AND NHL
PLAYERS' ASSOCIATION art. 30.3 (2005).
82. Id. (governing league rules); Id. art. 30.2 (governing playing rules).
83. Id. art. 30.3.
84. Id. art. 30.1.
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B. Commissioner's Authority to Institute Player Conduct Rules Under the
CBA
To institute new player conduct rules, a commissioner must have the
authority under the CBA provisions. If he is not given the explicit authority in
the CBA, he may still be able to unilaterally implement such rules without the
consent of the players' union under certain conditions. 85 Each of the four
professional sports leagues' CBAs have significantly different provisions
governing the institution of new rules, and therefore, the authority of each
commissioner to institute player conduct rules, such as those created by the
NBA, also varies significantly. The authority of each league's commissioner
to institute new player conduct rules will be analyzed based on the rules
instituted by David Stem.
i. NBA
The NBA's CBA provides Commissioner Stem with the most rule-making
authority of the professional sports league commissioners. The CBA gives
Stern broad authority to institute rules "governing the conduct of players on
the playing court."' 86 Conduct on the playing court "mean[s] conduct in any
area within an arena ... from the time the player arrives ... until the time the
player [leaves]." 87  While this gives Stem considerable authority, he still
should not be able to ban players from attending certain nightclubs or institute
the new basketball. The prohibition on players attending nightclubs does not
govern the conduct of players while they are within an arena; likewise, the
new basketball should not be considered "conduct of players." Similarly, the
dress code cannot be implemented by Stem, as its scope is too broad. The
dress code would be within the scope of the clause if it regulated players'
attire only when they were in an arena. However, the dress code requires
"[b]usiness Casual attire whenever [players] are engaged in team or league
business." 88 This requires certain attire even when players are outside an
arena, which falls outside the scope of the CBA. Finally, the uniform rules
and technical fouls for excessive complaining would be within the scope of the
provision as they regulate the conduct of players on the playing court.
85. Rules could be implemented by the commissioner if they do not relate to "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment .. " Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1994). See infra Part V for a complete discussion.
86. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 66, art. VI § 12.
87. Id. art. XXXI § 8(c).
88. NBA Player Dress Code, supra note 40.
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ii. NFL
Unlike Stem's broad authority, the NFL's CBA governs only changes to
playing rules, which limits the commissioner's authority to implement new
rules.89 The NFL commissioner must give notice of playing rule changes to
the NFLPA and may have to discuss the changes with them, but he can
ultimately institute these playing rules without the NFLPA's consent. He
cannot, however, institute other types of rules.
Playing rules are rules that govern the administration of the game itself,90
such as the descriptions of the playing field, duties of the officials, penalties
that may be assessed, timing, and other rules governing how the game is to be
played. 91 The majority of the rules instituted by the NBA-the dress code, the
nightclub ban, the new ball, and the uniform rules-would likely not be
considered playing rules, and thus, would not be permissible under the NFL
CBA.
The dress code and nightclub ban are not playing rules as they govern
conduct outside of the game. A new ball and uniform rules would also not be
considered playing rules. While both could be considered rules governing the
administration of the game, because the NFL's current playing rules do not
address the design of the ball nor uniform requirements, 92 the NFL, and likely
an arbitrator or judge, would not consider them playing rules. Only one rule,
the penalty for excessive complaining, would be considered a playing rule
because it involves administration of the game and is a penalty similar to those
found in the NFL rulebook.93
iii. MLB
MLB's CBA is much broader than the NFL's CBA. Not only does it
govern playing rules, but it also governs most other rules and regulations of
the league. 94 Under the MLB CBA, the commissioner would only have the
authority to unilaterally implement playing rules, as other rules and regulations
89. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE CBA, supra note 11, art. XIII § l(c).
90. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL RULES (2006), available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/official info/officialrules/foreword.jsp. "This code of rules is written to
govern the playing of baseball games." Id.
91. See id; NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, DIGEST OF RULES, available at
http://www.nfl.com/rulebook/digestofrules (last visited Mar. 19, 2007).
92. Id. These rules include a section on the ball; however, it sets forth the number of balls
needed for a game and the administration of ball use. Id. It does not include rules governing the ball
itself.
93. See id.
94. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 75, art. XVIII.
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must be negotiated with the MLBPA. 95 Similar to the NFL, the penalty for
excessive complaining would be considered a playing rule, while the dress
code and nightclub ban would not be playing rules. However, contrary to the
NFL, a new ball and uniform rules should be considered playing rules because
they concern the playing of the game and are currently included in the MLB
rulebook. 96
Under the MLB CBA, any other rule changes, if they altered a player
benefit or introduced a new obligation on a player, could not be instituted by
the commissioner, as they must be negotiated with the MLBPA. 97 Under
these criteria, the commissioner could not institute the dress code or the ban on
certain nightclubs, as they would impose new obligations on a player that had
not previously existed under the CBA.
iv. NHL
Contrary to Stem's broad authority, the NHL's CBA significantly limits
the commissioner's rule-making authority. The CBA provisions govern
playing and league rules and do not allow the commissioner to institute any
rule that "affect[s] terms or conditions of employment of any Player," without
the consent of the NHLPA.98  This limitation effectively provides the
commissioner with no significant rule-making authority because, under the
NLRA, the league must collectively bargain with the NHLPA over "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 99
V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
Even where a commissioner does not have authority under the CBA to
institute a certain player conduct rule, he may still unilaterally implement the
rule if it does not affect the players' "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."' 00
The NLRA governs employer-employee relations, 1° 1 and it gives
employees the right to form labor organizations to collectively bargain with
95. Id. Playing rules must be negotiated with the MLBPA but if the two parties cannot reach an
agreement, the rule can be instituted by MLB the following year. Id.
96. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, OFFICIAL RULES §§ 1.09, 1.11 (2006), available at
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/y2007/01-objectives-of the.game.pdf.
97. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, supra note 75, art. XVIII.
98. NAT'L HOCKEY LEAUGE, supra note 81, art. 30.3.
99. Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
100. Id.
101. Id. §§ 151- 169.
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their employers. 10 2  Because players in professional sports leagues have
formed unions to collectively bargain with their respective leagues, the NLRA
governs the bargaining relationship between the two parties. In the collective
bargaining relationship, "to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to.
. .confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment."' 10 3
"[W]ages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"'1 4 are
considered mandatory subjects of collective bargaining that must, at the
insistence of either party, be bargained for between the employer and the
union. 105 Those subjects not comprising one of these areas are permissive
subjects that need not be bargained over. 10 6 Failure or refusal by a party to
negotiate with regards to a mandatory subject, such as an employer
unilaterally implementing a mandatory subject, constitutes a violation of the
duty to collectively bargain and is an unfair labor practice. 10 7
However, what constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining is sometimes
not clear. "[G]eneral[ly], 'only issues that settle an aspect of the relationship
between the employer and employees' are mandatory subjects of bargaining.
An issue arising from outside the bargaining unit may be a mandatory subject.
. .if it 'vitally affects' the terms and conditions of employment within the
bargaining unit." 108 Even if a decision by an employer has an adverse effect
on employees, if the decision is one about "the scope or direction of an
enterprise," it will not be considered a mandatory subject. 109 If the subject is
not a mandatory one, then it is considered permissive and may be implemented
by the employer without being presented to the union, regardless of whether
the subject was included in the CBA.110
102. Id. § 157; Brent Showalter, Comment, Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports:
Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility of the Leagues?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651, 654
(2007).
103. Nat'l Labor Relations Act § 158(d).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. John Vukelj, Post No Bills: Can the NBA Prohibit Its Players from Wearing Tattoo
Advertisements?, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 507, 542 (2005).
107. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).
108. Pall Corp. v. NLRB, 275 F.3d 116, 119-20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (quoting Allied Chem. & Alkali
Workers, Local Union No. I v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 178-79 (1971)).
109. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 673 (1981).
110. Mark M. Rabuano, Comment, An Examination of Drug-Testing as a Mandatory Subject of
Collective Bargaining in Major League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439, 446-47 (2002).
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A. Employer Rules as a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
Whether a rule instituted by an employer is a mandatory subject of
collective bargaining, especially on the grounds that the rule affects "other
terms and conditions of employment,""'I I is often unclear because the NLRA
does not specifically define these terms. Generally, instituting new rules that
could result in employee discipline, such as rules on absenteeism and
tardiness,11 2 or procedural and safety rules 113 affect the terms and conditions
of employment, and thus, must be bargained over.
In Murphy Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 114 the employer unilaterally modified and
implemented rules on absenteeism and tardiness. 115 The employer refused to
bargain over the rules 116 because the CBA between the employer and the
union contained a clause stating that "'all management functions are reserved
to the Company,"' and the CBA did not address the rules in question. 117 The
employer also claimed that the rules were not new because they were merely a
clarification of its previous rules. 118 The court found that these rules were
conditions of employment, and thus, mandatory subjects of bargaining. 119
They were more than a clarification of existing rules, and the clause in the
CBA did not give the employer authority to institute the rules. 120 The CBA
"ma[de] no reference to rules on absence or tardiness. Any waiver of the
Union's right to bargain about conditions of employment must be 'clear and
unmistakable."121
Similarly, new plant rules issued by Miller Brewing in NLRB v. Miller
Brewing Co. 12 2 were considered conditions of employment and thus subject to
bargaining. 123 Although the booklet of plant rules issued by Miller Brewing
mainly contained rules that were already known and in force, which did not
need to be bargained over, it did contain at least two new rules that required
111. Nat'l Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1994).
112. Murphy Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 303, 304 (7th Cir. 1971).
113. See NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12, 15 (9th Cir. 1969).
114. 454 F.2d 303 (7th Cir. 1971).
115. Id. at304.
116. Id. at 306.
117. Id. at 304 (quoting CBA).
118. Id. at 306.
119. Id. at 307.
120. Id. Clarification of existing rules usually need not be bargained over. See id. at 306-07.
121. Id. (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. .v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 918, 923 (4th Cir. 1969)).
122. NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12 (9th Cir. 1969)
123. Id. at 15.
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bargaining. 124  Furthermore, even though the union had not previously
objected to the unilateral implementation of plant rules, such a waiver did not
bar the union from challenging future rules. 125 "Each time the bargainable
incident occurs-each time new rules are issued-Union has the election of
requesting negotiations or not. An opportunity once rejected does not result in
a permanent 'close-out'....126
B. Equipment as a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining
In addition to new rules, equipment or machinery may also be considered
to affect the conditions of employment. In National Football League
Management Council,127 the NFLPA demanded that the NFL Management
Council collectively bargain over future installations of artificial turf at NFL
stadiums. 128 When the management council declined, claiming that it was not
required to bargain on that subject, the NFLPA filed suit alleging that
installation of artificial turf was a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining.' 29 The National Labor Relations Board found that artificial turf
was a mandatory subject, and therefore, the management council "was
obligated to meet and confer with the Union on this matter."'
130
C. Commissioner's Authority to Institute Player Conduct Rules under the
NLRA
A commissioner would have the authority to institute rules such as a dress
code, a new ball, a nightclub ban, uniform rules, and a penalty for excessive
complaining only if he was given the authority in the league's CBA or if the
rule was a permissive subject of collective bargaining. Of these rules, only the
uniform rules and the penalty for excessive complaining would likely be
considered permissive. The remaining rules would be considered conditions
of employment, and therefore, would be mandatory subjects that must be
collectively bargained.
The institution of a new ball, similar to the artificial turf in National
Football League Management Council, is a mandatory subject of collective
bargaining. Although the court did not explain the reasoning behind its
124. Id. at 15-16.
125. Id. at 15.
126. Id.
127. NFL Mgmt. Council, 203 N.L.R.B. 958 (1973).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 958-59.
130. Id. at 959.
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decision that artificial turf was a mandatory subject, installing turf would
likely affect the conditions of employment because it is fundamental to the
players performing their jobs and could affect their health and safety.
Similarly, a new ball is such an integral part of players' jobs that changing the
ball would affect their working conditions, such as the new basketball
instituted by the NBA did, cutting the players' fingers and affecting their
shooting and dribbling.
The nightclub ban and dress code are also mandatory subjects that must be
bargained for because they affect a player's terms and conditions of
employment. The nightclub ban affects the terms and conditions of a player's
employment because a player is not allowed to visit those banned nightclubs
without the risk of getting penalized with a substantial fine. 131 This new rule
infringes into the players' personal lives outside of their employment as
professional athletes and subjects them to discipline if they violate the rule,
materially altering their conditions of employment. Similarly, the dress code
also affects conditions of employment. Before the dress code, players could
wear any attire of their choosing. 132 The dress code changed this by requiring
the players to wear business casual attire to, from, and inside the arena,
thereby substantially altering a condition under which the players were
employed.
The uniform rules and the penalty for excessive complaining could follow
similar logic as that of the dress code in that they alter a condition of
employment; however, both rules are likely permissive subjects of bargaining.
First, both rules could be considered clarifications of existing rules, as opposed
to new rules, and therefore are not mandatory subjects. The rule on excessive
complaining is a clarification of the rule that officials are permitted to assess
technical fouls "at any time." 133 The uniform rules could be a clarification of
the existing uniform rules, including the rule that players must be uniformly
dressed. 134  Some of these uniform rules, such as players keeping their
uniforms tucked in and standing in line during the National Anthem, are not
new rules at all, but are existing rules that are being more strictly enforced.
Additionally, the uniform rules that are new, such as those regulating
headbands, wristbands, and compression shorts, even if they are not
considered clarifications, do not affect the conditions of a player's
employment, as they are very small and have no affect on a player performing
his job functions.
131. Lawrence, supra note 63.
132. Players' attire was subject to individual team rules.
133. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 58, Rule No. 12A § V(a).
134. Id.
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VI. DAVID STERN'S RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
Under the NBA CBA, David Stern has the authority to establish rules
governing the conduct of players while they are on the playing court. 135
Under this authority, Stern can likely institute the uniform rules and assess
technical fouls for excessive complaining. 136 He cannot, however, institute
the new basketball, the nightclub ban, or the dress code because these rules
either govern players' conduct outside the playing court or do not involve the
conduct of players.
For Stern to be able to institute these three rules that fall outside the scope
of his authority under the CBA, they must be considered permissive subjects
of collective bargaining. If the rule changes are deemed mandatory subjects,
then Stern can institute them only if the NBPA consents to their institution.
Similar to his authority under the CBA, Stern would have the authority to
unilaterally implement the uniform rules and assess technical fouls for
excessive complaining, as they are likely permissive subjects of bargaining. 137
The new basketball, nightclub ban, and dress code, however, would likely be
considered mandatory subjects of collective bargaining, and therefore, Stern
does not have the authority to institute them without the consent of the NBPA.
The NBPA could bring, and would likely be successful on, unfair labor
practice charges against Stern because he has not bargained over the rules,
choosing instead to unilaterally implement them. Even though the NBPA may
have not have formally objected to these rules, under Murphy, it has not
waived its rights to bargain over them unless it gave clear and unmistakable
consent. 138 Furthermore, even though the NBPA has not objected to the
unilateral implementation of these rules or previous rules, it can still require
collective bargaining over these or future rules because "[e]ach time the
bargainable incident occurs-each time new rules are issued-Union has the
election of requesting negotiations or not." 139
VII. CONCLUSION
NBA Commissioner David Stem does have expansive authority, which
has been given to him under the CBA and the NBA's Constitution. Recently,
he has seemingly tested the limits of his authority through implementing a
variety of player conduct rules in an effort to improve the league's image.
135. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 66, art. VI § 12.
136. See infra Part IV.B.4.
137. See infra Part V.C.
138. Murphy Diesel Co. v. NLRB, 454 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1971).
139. NLRB v. Miller Brewing Co., 408 F.2d 12, 15 (9th Cir. 1969).
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Stem's intentions in instituting such rules may or may not be laudable, but he
has continued the barrage of rules, much to the disagreement of the NBPA.
On the other hand, the NBPA has been hesitant to take any action against these
rules due to the possible bad publicity of multi-million dollar athletes
complaining about having to dress in business casual attire or use a different
basketball, the expense in pursuing claims, and the questionable outcomes.
While Stem may not have the authority to institute some of the rules under
the CBA's provision giving him the power to institute rules governing players'
on-court conduct, and some of the rules may be considered mandatory subjects
of collective bargaining, his actions could have a more serious effect than the
issue of whether he does or does not have the authority to undertake such
actions. That effect could be felt in 2011 when the current CBA expires 140
and the NBPA insists on taking away some of the commissioner's rule-making
authority. It is possible that from now until 2011 Stem will not institute any
new, attention-getting rules and the NBPA will forget about his recent actions.
However, it is equally as possible that he will continue to implement player
conduct rules to the disagreement of the NBPA and it will not forget about his
use of authority. "[A] league commissioner does not have unfettered
independence or authority .... [A]t times, he or she must walk a tightrope to
avoid undermining or losing his or her authority."' 41 David Stem is walking a
tightrope with his player conduct rules and is in danger of losing his authority.
140. NAT'L BASKETBALL ASS'N, supra note 66, art. XXXIX § 1. The current CBA runs through
June 30, 2011, and the NBA has a one-year option to extend it through June 30, 2012. Id. art.
XXXIX §§ 1-2.




DISBARRING JERRY MAGUIRE: HOW
BROADLY DEFINING "UNAUTHORIZED
PRACTICE OF LAW" COULD TAKE THE
"LAWYER" OUT OF "LAWYER-AGENT"
DESPITE THE CURRENT STATE OF
ATHLETE AGENT LEGISLATION
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, moviegoers watched as fictional agent Jerry Maguire waltzed out
of his plush window office at Sports Management International to represent
athletes independently. 1  However, from the time Jerry Maguire was
representing "The Great Rod Tidwell ' 2 until now, the agent industry has
become one of enormous change. Industry giants such as IMG, Octagon, and
SFX, among others, once unfamiliar to the sports world, have used their
purchasing power to buy the businesses of boutique agencies,3 building an
arsenal of athletes and leverage that has made it difficult for smaller firms to
compete.4  At the same time, agents have begun to specialize, usually
representing players in only one sport and often players at only one position.5
Perhaps most significantly, instances of unscrupulous and incompetent
1. See Cameron Crowe, Jerry Maguire Movie Script (2006), available at
http://www.godamongdirectors.com/scripts/errymaguire.txt.
2. Rod Tidwell became Jerry Maguire's only client following Jerry's termination from Sports
Management International by rival agent Bob Sugar, played by comedian and sports persona Jay
Mohr. See id.
3. KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE & TIMOTHY DAVIS, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS AGENTS 38 (2003).
An example of one such acquisition was the purchase of David Falk's Falk Associates Management
Enterprises (FAME). Id. at 39. Falk, Michael Jordan's long-time agent, sold his practice to SFX for
$82.9 million, including $38.75 million up front and $15 million in bonuses per year for five years if
FAME met certain cash flow requirements. Richard Sandomir, Sale ofAgency Opens New Doors for
Falk and Clients, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1998, at C6.
4. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 45-46.
5. See Peter Keating, Crash Landing, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, Apr. 1, 2002, available at
http://espn.go.com/magazine/vol5no07steinberg.html.
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conduct by agents, including one involving hip-hop mogul Percy "Master P"
Miller, 6 have finally led Congress to draft, and George W. Bush to sign, the
first piece of federal legislation regulating agent conduct. 7 This legislation,
the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act (SPARTA), was signed in
2004.8
Today, while Jerry Maguire would no doubt find it difficult to compete
independently, his biggest competitor may not be specialty-agents or even
large umbrella corporations with 300-plus clients; his biggest competitor may
be himself. Some may recall that Jerry Maguire was a lawyer, not just an
agent. 9 While SPARTA imposes penalties on agents who do not follow the
rules, 10 it is the lawyer-agents who still remain at a large competitive
disadvantage with their non-lawyer counterparts." Specifically, attorney-
agents are still held to a higher standard of care for negligence claims and
governed by an unforgiving code of professional conduct, the violation of
which could lead to disbarment.12 Also, and often overlooked, attorney-agents
may be precluded from recovering for services rendered in a state where they
are not licensed if they are determined to have engaged in the "unauthorized
practice of law,"' 3 a phrase that courts have defined broadly. 14
This comment will address how, despite being a highly regulated industry,
the business of sports agents exists in competitive imbalance. Because courts
have held that attorneys are always attorneys even when acting as agents, 15
and because they have broadly defined the "unauthorized practice of law" to
6. Mark's Sportslaw News, Williams Quits No Limit Sports: Fallout Over Controversial
Contract Leads Saints' RB to Steinberg, Mar. 27, 2000, http://www.sportslawnews.com/
archive/Articles%202000/WilliamsSteinberg.htm. Leland Hardy, an agent with No Limit Sports,
created by Master P, negotiated an incentive-loaded contract for then New Orleans Saints' running
back Ricky Williams, which included mostly bonus money and little guaranteed salary. Id.
7. See Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act: Hearing on H.R. 361 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial and Admin. Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary H.R., 108th Cong. 29 (2003) (statement
of Scott Boras), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju87094.000/
hju87094_0.HTM.
8. Melissa Steedle Bogad, Note, Maybe Jerry Maguire Should Have Stuck with Law School:
How the Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act Implements Lawyer-Like Rules for Sports Agents,
27 CARDOZO L. REv. 1889, 1904 (2006).
9. See Crowe, supra note 1.
10. Sports Agent Responsibility and Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7804 (2006).
11. Tamara L. Barner, Note, Show Me the... Ethics?: The Implications of the Model Rules of
Ethics on Attorneys in the Sports Industry, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 519, 523-24 (2003).
12. Idat521-22.
13. See David A. Gerregano, Annotation, What Constitutes "Unauthorized Practice of Law " by
Out-of-State Counsel, 83 A.L.R.5th 497 (2000).
14. In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 672 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1994).
15. In re Pappas, 768 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Ariz. 1988) (citing In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481 (1997)).
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include many of the services athletes expect from agents, 16 attorney-agents
risk losing everything, from their hard-earned money to their licenses. Prior to
addressing the substantive issue, however, this comment will briefly explore
the existing structure of the athlete agent industry and then evaluate the current
state of agent regulation from all sources, both public and private. Finally,
suggestions for bridging the competitive gap between lawyer and non-lawyer-
agents will be presented.
II. THE ATHLETE-AGENT BUSINESS: EVOLUTION AND THE CURRENT STATE
OF THE LAW GOVERNING AGENTS
As professional sports transitioned from chump-change in the mid-1900s
to big business in the late 1970s and early 1980s, agents became
commonplace, 17 forcing changes to the landscape of sports, not all of which
were good. 18 Despite legislation from multiple entities-state, federal, and
private-attempting to control rogue agents and their unscrupulous behavior,
not all problems have been solved. 19 The current state of the law governing
lawyer conduct creates a competitive disparity between lawyer-agents and
their non-attorney counterparts. Therefore, despite a melting pot of
regulations governing agent conduct, qualified and ethical attorneys may still
find it difficult, if not impossible, to enter the profession without putting their
licenses, reputations, and money up for grabs.
A. Defining "Agent, "a Tumultuous Task
The term "sports agent" has varying definitions and meanings depending
on the context and depending on the source defining the term.20 The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) defines an athlete agent as "[a]ny
person who represents any individual in the marketing of his or her athletics
ability." 21 Meanwhile, federal and state legislatures have adopted their own
definitions.22 SPARTA's drafters defined "agent" as an individual who
16. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon, & Frank, P.C. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County, 949
P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1998).
17. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 10-11.
18. See id. at 99-100.
19. See Mark's Sportslaw News, supra note 6.
20. ROBERT H. RUXIN, AN ATHLETE'S GUIDE TO AGENTS 10 (4th ed. 2004).
21. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 2005-06 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL art. 12.3.1.2(a),
available at http://www.ncaa.org/ibrary/membership/division-i-manuaU/2005-06/2005-06 d I
manual.pdf.
22. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 7801 (Supp. 2004) with WIS. STAT. § 440.99 (2005-2006).
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"recruits or solicits a student athlete to enter into an agency contract." 23
Wisconsin has adopted the same definition but adds that an agent can be
anyone "who represents to the public that the individual is an athlete agent."
24
It is clear that the definition of "sports agent" is varied.
Regardless of the definition used, today's sports agent performs a variety
of tasks for his or her athletes that extend beyond simply negotiating the
athlete's playing contract with a team.25  The modem-day agent not only
manages and negotiates playing contracts, but also determines his athletes'
market value, uses that value to his players' advantage by securing and
sustaining endorsement revenue for the players off the field, secures personal
appearances for the players, acts as a speaking agent for the players when
dealing with the media, and counsels his rookie clients on pre-draft planning
and preparation, including scheduling workouts, creating media kits and
marketing collateral, and generally easing the players' concerns as draft day
approaches. 26 More and more, agents are performing these and other services
for their athletes well into retirement.
27
In addition, savvy businessmen and lawyers have begun to dominate the
profession by offering specialty services beyond those offered by traditional
agents. 28 Today's agents often have graduate degrees in business, usually
finance and economics, or law degrees, and sometimes both. 29  Financial
planners and Certified Public Accountants (CPAs) who moonlight as sports
agents can offer their athletes traditional services in addition to financial and
investment planning, tax planning, and money management advice.30 Also,
many lawyer-agents offer legal expertise to their athlete clients in addition to
traditional agent functions. 31 It used to be that anyone could represent an
athlete, but now, with complex collective bargaining agreements and contract
dynamics, lawyers and businessmen are commonplace.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 7801(2).
24. WIs. STAT. § 440.99(2) (2005-2006).
25. RUXIN, supra note 20, at 10.
26. Id.
27. Walter T. Champion, Jr., Attorneys Qua Sports Agents: An Ethical Conundrum, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 349, 351-52 (1996).
28. Timothy Davis, Regulating the Athlete-Agent Industry: Intended and Unintended
Consequences, 42 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 781, 791-92 (2006).
29. See id. The National Football League Players Association (NFLPA) currently requires agents
wishing to become certified to possess both an undergraduate degree and either a master's or law
degree from an accredited university. Salary Cap and Agent Administration Department: Agent
Certification, NFLPA.ORG, http://www.nflpa.org/RulesAndRegs/AgentCertification.aspx (last visited
Sept. 25, 2007).
30. See Champion, supra note 27, at 351-52.
31. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 22.
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B. The Athlete Agent Business, an Industry of Change
Agents are not new to the sports scene and have been representing
athletes since the early 1900s. 32 In 1920, sports agent Charles "Cash and
Carry" Pyle 33 negotiated a $100,000, eight-game contract for "Red" Grange of
the Chicago Bears. 34 The contract was representative of what agents could
accomplish for their athletes and is considered one of the first contracts
negotiated by an agent. 35 However, not until the late 1970s did agents really
begin to dominate professional sports, and the contract negotiated by Pyle for
Grange was only a foreshadowing of things to come. 36
The boom of agents truly began in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
can be directly attributed to a number of factors responsible for reshaping the
economic landscape of professional sports.37  Interleague competition
increased as rival professional leagues formed and forced their competitors to
spend more to keep players. 38  In addition, revenue-grossing television
contracts and the cultivation of additional revenue streams put more money in
the hands of owners, while the bargaining power of player unions was
simultaneously getting stronger.39 At the same time, successful challenges by
players against the reserve and option clauses in their contracts led to the
advent of free agency where players could bid their services on the open
market.40 Finally, the birth of salary arbitration in professional baseball
created an additional catalyst for increased compensation to players in that
sport. 41 Almost instantly, it seemed, sports had become big business.
As a result, player salaries skyrocketed throughout professional sports,
32. MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION 671 (2005).
33. Besides athlete contracts, Pyle also represented Grange in endorsement opportunities and
even movie appearances. Id.
34. RuxIN, supra note 20, at 5.
35. Id
36. MITrEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 671.
37. Id.
38. The World Football League (WFL) was formed in 1973 and folded two years later. NFL
History, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/history/chronology/1971-1980 (last visited Sept. 25, 2007).
During its tenure, however, the WFL lured and signed several NFL star veterans to astronomical
salaries. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 11. The United States Football League and the
American Basketball Association were additional rival leagues that effectively competed with the
NFL and National Basketball Association (NBA) respectively. Id.
39. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 12.
40. Id. at 10-11. For example, in Mackey v. NFL players challenged the "Rozelle Rule," which
required a team wishing to sign a player formerly under contract to provide compensation to the
player's former team. 543 F.2d 606, 609 (8th Cir. 1976). The rule was successfully overturned on
antitrust grounds. Id. at 623.
41. RUXIN, supra note 20, at 6.
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and the playing field was ripe for the entry of agents.42 For example, the
average salary in the National Basketball Association (NBA) rose from
$20,000 in 1967 to $90,000 in 1972. 4 3 Salaries in the National Football
League (NFL) closely followed suit with averages escalating from $90,000 to
$190,000 between 1982 and 1985, 44 while average salaries in the National
Hockey League (NHL) and Major League Baseball (MLB) each jumped 150%
from 1987-1992.45  Today's player salaries have reached seemingly
insurmountable heights with 2003-2004 average salaries reaching $4.9
million, $1.83 million, and $1.33 million in the NBA, NHL, and NFL,
respectively. 46 A recent example of the acute escalation of player salaries is
the $252 million, ten-year deal negotiated for baseball player Alex Rodriguez
by super agent Scott Boras. 47  Escalating player salaries like the one
exemplified by the Rodriguez contract, and the high commissions these
contracts promise to the agents negotiating them, have attracted numerous
agents to the profession while heightening competition.48
Adding fuel to the already competitive fire is the fact that large
corporations, once unfamiliar to the sports industry, began using their buying
power to purchase smaller, boutique agencies. 49 Octagon, IMG, and SFX
Sports are well-known examples of companies who began using their capital
to buy up the businesses of respected agents beginning in 1995,50 including
those representing athletes in the four major professional sports, as well as
those representing Olympians, tennis players, golfers, extreme and action
sports competitors, and others. 51  The result has been some of the most
powerful agents in their respective sports joining forces under one roof.52
42. See Stacey M. Nahrwold, Are Professional Athletes Better Served by a Lawyer-
Representative Than an Agent? Ask Grant Hill, 9 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 431, 431-32 (1999).
43. Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Sports Leagues, in LAW OF PROFESSIONAL AND AMATEUR
SPORTS 19-1, 19-26 (Gary Uberstine ed., 2002).
44. Id. at 19-27.
45. RUXIN, supra note 20, at 7.
46 Major League Salaries, BASEBALL-ALMANAC.COM, http://www.baseball-almanac.com/
charts/salary/major-leaguesalaries.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
47. The $252 Million Man: Rodriguez Rose from Humble Beginnings to be the Highest-Paid
Baseball Player in History, CNN.COM, http://www.cnn.com/CNN/Programs/people/shows/rodriguez/
profile.html#top (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
48. Nahrwold, supra note 42, at 431-32.
49. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 33.
50. Posting of Rick Karcher, Director, Center for Law and Sports, Florida Coastal School of
Law, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/08/hollywood-talent-firm-consolidates.html (Aug. 23,
2006).
5 1. See IMG - Sports, http://www.imgworld.com/sports/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
52. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 35-36.
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These powerhouse agencies have become attractive to athletes as one-stop
shops offering everything from contract negotiations, marketing management,
legal and financial planning services, and post-career opportunities. 53
In 2006, a momentous power shift occurred when Creative Artists Agency
(CAA), a talent-marketing firm in California, entered the fray, purchasing the
businesses of some of the agents originally owned by these three companies.5 4
The move caused some of the most prominent agents in the business to shift
allegiance to CAA and leave their former employers. 55 The purchasing that
has occurred by CAA and others has put a large percentage of available
athletes in the hands of a few dominant entities, forcing smaller agents to fight
for the leftovers.5 6 These umbrella corporations and the variety of services
they offer clients have made it difficult, if not impossible, for many smaller
agents to compete.5
7
As the number of agents continues to grow and the number of athletes
remains relatively stagnant,58 competition between agents has grown fierce,
spawning unscrupulous conduct by agents motivated by greed. 59 Probably the
most notorious problem agent is "Tank" Black, a former coach turned agent
who coaxed many college athletes into premature representation agreements,
forcing many of them to forfeit their remaining eligibility and turn pro.60
Adding insult to injury was the fact that Black lost some $12 million of his
clients' money to poor investment schemes.6' Bad boy agents Norby Walters
and Lloyd Bloom went one step further, allegedly offering drugs and
prostitutes to potential recruits. 62 The duo even threatened to break the legs of
53. See id. at 29.
54. Karcher, supra note 50.
55. Id. CAA purchased the rights to former SFX football agent Ben Dogra as well as the practice
of former IMG agent Tom Condon, who has represented some of the biggest names in the NFL. Id.
The firm also purchased the rights to prominent MLB and NHL agents, amassing a combined client
roster of 140 athletes across the four major professional sports, currently the most of any agency. Id.
56. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 29.
57. Id. at 29. IMG has even developed its own training facility, "IMG Academies," offering its
athlete clients and amateur prospects the chance to train and rehabilitate at a state-of-the-art training
facility located in Florida. IMG Academies, IMGA Headquarters, http://www.imgacademies.com/hq/
default. sps?itype=7959 (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
58. MITTEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 692.
59. Nahrwold, supra note 42, at 434-35.
60. Mike Fish, A Black Eye: Headed to Prison, Black Should be a Lesson to Agents, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, May 7, 2002, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/inside-game/mikefish/news/2002/05/
07/tankblack/.
61. Id.
62. See David Lawrence Dunn, Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It Hasn 't
Succeeded Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1032 (1988).
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one of their athlete prospects if the athlete refused to pay back loan money. 63
Perhaps not as popular, but equally devious, was agent Richard Sorkin, who
lost much of his clients' money to bad stock market decisions and compulsive
gambling.64
This hyper-competitive and often unscrupulous agent behavior, although
deplorable, is not surprising given the increase in athlete salaries and the
relative stability in the number of athletes coming out of college. The result
has been a gorge of legislation from federal and state legislatures, as well as
the NCAA and league players associations attempting to rid the industry of
problem agents.
C. Tightening the Reins: Legislation Abounds as Everyone Takes a Crack at
Agents
Misconduct by agents has led to a cornucopia of regulatory doctrines from
multiple sources all aimed at controlling agent conduct.65 While intensive
regulation has to some extent solved the challenges presented by problem
agents like Tank Black, it has also resulted in some problems of its own, not
the least of which is inconsistency. 66 Also, despite progressive legislation
such as SPARTA, the agent industry still exists in competitive disparity where
attorney-agents struggle to compete with their non-attorney counterparts.67
Regulation of agents by private associations such as the NCAA and the
individual players unions is well intentioned, but cannot alone control problem
agents. Specifically, NCAA bylaws prohibit athletes from reaching a
representation agreement with an agent or from receiving gifts from an agent
prior to the expiration of the athlete's college eligibility.68 However, because
the NCAA lacks the jurisdiction to regulate agents, any punishment for
violating these rules falls on the athletes or their university. 69 In addition,
while professional players unions have instituted regulations governing agent
63. John Gorman, Bears' Douglass: Agent Said He'd Break My Legs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 1989,
at Sec. 4(1).
64. Paul L. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pros'Agent,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 1977, at S1.
65. See Eric Willenbacher, Note, Regulating Sports Agents: Why Current Federal and State
Efforts Do Not Deter the Unscrupulous Athlete-Agent and How a National Licensing System May
Cure the Problem, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1225, 1226 (2004).
66. See id. at 1243-45.
67. See id. at 1244-46.
68. NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, supra note 21, art. 12.3.
69. Diane Sudia & Rob Remis, Athlete Agent Legislation in the New Millennium: State Statutes
and the Uniform Athlete Agents Act, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 263, 268-69 (2001).
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conduct, 70 the enforceability and effect of these rules is questionable because
sanctions against agents are rarely levied.71
As a result of the ineffectiveness of private organizations in regulating
agent conduct, individual states began regulating agents internally. 72 While
agents are subject to the same state laws and criminal codes as other state
citizens, most states have drafted agent-specific statutes as well. 73 Some state
registration statutes require agents to pay a fee to the state, post a surety bond,
or even pass a competency exam before they are allowed to recruit athletes. 74
Other state regulations prohibit agents from engaging in certain types of
conduct when soliciting athletes, the violation of which can subject them to
criminal and civil penalties. 75 The result of states creating agent legislation
unique to their own jurisdiction was an inconsistency in the law applied to
agents. 76
70. See NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING
CONTRACT ADVISORS (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.nflpa.org/RulesAndRegs/
AgentRegulations.aspx. The NFLPA forbids contract advisors from offering anything of value to
potential players or their families when recruiting those players. Id. § 3(B)(2)-(3). Agents are also
prohibited from providing false or misleading information to athletes while recruiting. Id. § 3(B)(4).
71. See Barner, supra note 11, at 532. For example, while the NFLPA receives hundreds of
complaints against player agents every year, the union filed only fifty-five individual disciplinary
proceedings against agents between 1996 and 2003, twenty-two of which pertained to the agent
failing his or her mandatory certification exam. Mark Doman, Attorneys as Athlete-Agents:
Reconciling the ABA Rules of Professional Conduct with the Practice of Athlete Representation, 5
TEX. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 37,47 (2003) (citing Interview with Mark Levin, Director of Salary Cap
& Agent Administration Division, NFLPA, in Wash., D.C. (Apr. 8, 2003)). Therefore, only thirty-
three of those proceedings dealt with serious agent misconduct. Id. at 48. The NFLPA's inability to
punish misbehaving agents does not stem from a lack of resources, but rather from its inability to
obtain evidentiary proof that the agent engaged in the alleged misconduct in the first place. Id.
However, despite its lack of enforceability, the NFLPA still maintains the strictest agent regulations
of the four major professional sports unions. Posting of Rick Karcher, Director of the Center for Law
and Sports, Florida Coastal School of Law, http://sports-law.blogspot.com/2006/ 11/another-agent-
suing-nflpa-over-due.html (Nov. 22, 2006).
72. See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 32, at 719.
73. See id.
74. Sudia & Remis, supra note 69, at 275.
75. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 18897.8-.97 (2006) (making it a misdemeanor to violate any
provision of the state code governing agents and allowing any person harmed by the agent's conduct
to recover punitive damages from the agent).
76. UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT (2000), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bl/ulc/
uaaa/aaal 130.htm. Prior to the adoption of the UAAA, twenty-eight states had adopted some form of
legislation regulating athlete agents; however, inconsistencies across the board made the statutes hard
to follow. Id. Specifically, only two-thirds of existing state regulations required agents to register
with the state before representing athletes, and even those states had varied registration terms, ranging
from one year in thirteen states, two years in four states, and for indefinite terms in two states. Id.
Also, substantial differences in registration procedures as well as record maintenance, reporting,
renewal, notice, warning, and security requirements created confusion among agents trying to follow
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
In 2000, in an attempt to reduce confusion and create parity among state
agent regulations, Congress enacted a piece of model legislation called the
Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA). 77 The UAAA is not binding on the
states and can be adopted by the states at their discretion to either take the
place of or supplement existing state agent laws.78 The UAAA standardizes
agent reporting, registration, and record keeping requirements for agents in
states that choose to adopt it, and it also includes a list of punishable
misconduct for agents recruiting college athletes. 79 The UAAA also allows
for criminal penalties against violating agents 80 and for the recovery of civil
damages by the educational institution against the agent and student athlete. 81
As of July 2007, thirty-six states had adopted the UAAA. 82
Congress passed SPARTA in 2004,83 creating the first piece of federal
legislation aimed at regulating agents.84 Essentially, SPARTA compensates
for the NCAA's lack of jurisdiction over agents by making it unlawful for
agents to recruit student athletes by offering them anything of value or by
feeding them misleading information. 85 However, SPARTA does not make
the recruiting of college athletes illegal, it only requires that the athlete consent
in writing to being represented by the agent and that the agent notify the
athlete that consenting may render him or her ineligible. 86  Therefore,
SPARTA does not completely safeguard college athletes from unknowingly
losing their eligibility.87
However, SPARTA is a valuable piece of legislation despite the UAAA
and other state agent regulations. Specifically, SPARTA affords private
parties recourse against agents in federal district courts, even in states that
currently do not have agent legislation on the books.88 Also, unlike the
the rules. Id. The Act's drafters expounded on the headaches such inconsistency must have caused
rule-abiding agents, stating, "Conscientious agents operating in more than a single State must have
nightmares caused by the lack of uniformity in the existing [state] statutes." Id.
77. Id.
78. See Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) History and Status, NCAA.ORG,
http://wwwI .ncaa.org/membership/enforcement/agents/uaaa/history.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
79. UNIFORM ATHLETE AGENTS ACT § 14 (2000).
80. Id. § 15.
81. Id. § 16(a).
82. See Uniform Athlete Agents Act (UAAA) History and Status, supra note 78.
83. Bogad, supra note 8.
84. See id. at 1914-15.
85. SPARTA, 15 U.S.C. § 7802(a) (2006).
86. Id. § 7802(b)(3).
87. See id.
88. See Willenbacher, supra note 65, at 1242.
[Vol. 18: 1
DISBARRING JERRY MA G UIRE
UAAA, SPARTA allows both states and educational institutions to bring
actions for damages, thereby compounding the potential blow to the
misbehaving agent's pocketbook. 89 Finally, SPARTA treats a violation of its
provisions as an unfair or deceptive trade practice punishable by the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) under the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(B). 90 In
this way, SPARTA also imposes federal criminal penalties on misbehaving
agents.9 1 Therefore, SPARTA was a valuable addition to existing agent
legislation.
In addition to private regulatory provisions and state and federal laws
governing traditional agents, attorney-agents are also governed by a set of
model ethical rules that dictate acceptable behavior.92 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (MRPC) was drafted by the American Bar Association
(ABA) as a uniform code of conduct governing attorney behavior. 93 The
MRPC has been adopted with minor revisions and modifications by most
states. 94 Violations of the model rules in states that have adopted them have
resulted in attorneys being fined, suspended from practicing law, and even
disbarred.95
It has long been thought that because the model rules impose restrictions
on attorney behavior, some of which is considered business as usual for sports
agents, the rules limit the ability of attorneys to effectively compete with non-
attorney-agents. 96 For example, Model Rule 1.5 prevents attorneys from
charging excessive fees. 97 Because agents are paid a percentage rate of the
athlete's total compensation, as athlete salaries climb, the agent's fee
increases. 98 Given the escalating salaries of professional athletes, a three to
five percent commission, the industry norm for professional sports, of even a
marginal salary could be considered excessive compared to what lawyers
would normally make if they performed the same services at an hourly rate.99
Similarly, under Rule 7.3, attorneys are not allowed to solicit business from
89. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7804-7805 (Supp. 2004).
90. Id. § 7803(a).
91. Id.
92. See Bogad, supra note 8, at 1907.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Bamer, supra note 11, at 523-24.
96. See Nahrwold, supra note 42, at 440-41.
97. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2007).
98. See Barner, supra note 11, at 524.
99. See id. at 524-25.
2007]
MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW
prospective clients when doing so for their own pecuniary gain.' 00 This
prevents attorneys from aggressively recruiting athletes about to turn pro,' 0'
an activity most consider to be a staple function of successful agents, vital to
their success. 102 Also, Model Rules 1.4 and 8.4, which rightfully subject
attorneys to punishment for fraudulently misrepresenting themselves to clients,
do not hold weight for non-attorney-agents. 10 3 Therefore, non-attorney-agents
have fewer restrictions on what they may say when selling themselves to
college athletes. 1
04
Lastly, attorney-agents are subject to heightened expectations of
competency under Model Rule 1.1 not demanded of non-attorney-agents. 10 5
While the competency requirement is a valuable protection for athletes,
attorney-agents are required to exercise extreme caution learning the tools of
the trade, 10 6 investing many more labor-intensive hours strictly scrutinizing
league collective bargaining agreements, player contracts, and learning the
economics of the relevant sport than their non-attorney counterparts are
required to invest. Attorneys who fail to complete this due diligence are
engaging in malpractice, which may be evidence of the attorney's negligence
in a court of law. 10 7 Therefore, the Model Rules are often viewed as
significantly handicapping attorney-agents. 0 8
Despite this disparity, some claim that SPARTA bridges the gap between
attorney and non-attorney-agents by imposing federal restrictions on agents
that mimic the MRPC. 109 One argument goes that because SPARTA requires
100. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2007).
101. See id. (declaring it unethical for lawyers to solicit business from prospective clients either
in person, by telephone or through real-time electronic communication).
102. Russell Hubbard, Out of Bounds - In the Battle for Pro Prospects, Some Sports Agents
Break the Rules, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Dec. 21, 2003, available at http://www.profilessports.com/
news/outofbounds.html.
103. Bogad, supra note 8, at 1909.
104. While the NFLPA does prohibit its agents from fraudulently misrepresenting themselves to
athletes in their recruiting efforts, only statements that contain "materially false or misleading
information" are punishable. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS'N, supra note 70, § 3(B)(4).
On the other hand, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct uses broader language, making
punishable the use of any communication "involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation."
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c) (2007). Therefore, attorney-agents are culpable for a
larger scope of conduct than non-attorney-agents, and, given the inability of the NFLPA to gather
evidence against most misbehaving agents, will likely be held accountable more readily than non-
attorneys who are not subject to scrutiny by the bar.
105. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2007).
106. See id.
107. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope [20] (2007).
108. See Barner, supra note 11, at 524-25.
109. Bogad, supra note 8, at 1908-09.
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disclosure to student athletes while preventing agents from wooing athletes
with false or misleading information, SPARTA effectively mimics Model
Rules 1.4 and 8.4 for non-attorney-agents."10 Also, proponents allege that
because SPARTA encourages states to adopt the UAAA,' Iit will eventually
result in all states mandating background checks and competency evaluations
prior to licensing agents.112
However, even if SPARTA imposes standards for all agents similar to the
provisions of the MRPC, competitive disparity still exists between attorney
and non-attorney-agents. Specifically, because courts have held that lawyers
are lawyers twenty-four seven, even when they are performing non-attorney
activities, 113 attorneys are subject to a body of common law precedent
governing their conduct even when acting in other professional capacities, not
all of which is favorable. 114 For example, lawyers are held to a higher
standard of care than lay persons in the event they are sued for negligence.' 's
Also, while a violation of the MRPC does not itself give rise to a cause of
action for negligence against an attorney, conduct that violates a provision of
the MRPC can be used as evidence that an attorney was negligent. 1 6 These
and other issues affecting attorneys have made life difficult for attorneys
wishing to branch out into other industries. 117
A competitive disparity between lawyer and non-lawyer-agents that has
been almost universally undervalued is how broadly courts have defined what
constitutes the unauthorized practice of law. Namely, because attorneys are
always attorneys, even when they are acting as agents, attorney-agents are not
safe from court precedent broadly defining the unauthorized practice of law to
include activities performed by lawyers that are typical of everyday agents."l 8
The next section will discuss how attorney-agents may be in danger of losing
not only their money and their reputations, but also their licenses if they
perform typical agent functions in a state where they are not licensed.
110. Id.
111. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7804-7805 (Supp. 2004).
112. See Bogad, supra note 8, at 1910.
113. In re Pappas, 768 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Ariz. 1988).
114. See id.
115. See generally 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 177 (2006). See also Meyer v. Wagner, 709
N.E.2d 784, 791 (Mass. 1999) (holding that the standard of care in determining whether an attorney
was negligent should be based on whether he exercised the degree or skill expected of a qualified
attorney).
116. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, Preamble and Scope [20] (2007).
117. See Barner, supra note 11, at 523.
118. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon, & Frank, P.C. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County,
949 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1998).
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III. DESPITE THE CURRENT STATE OF AGENT REGULATION, LAWYER-AGENTS
ARE STILL AT A COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE COMPARED TO THEIR NON-
LAWYER COUNTERPARTS
Despite SPARTA and other progressive reshaping of the athlete agent
industry by state and federal legislatures, the agent business still presents a
competitive disadvantage to lawyer-agents. Because courts have determined
that lawyers are always lawyers even when acting in the capacity of some
other profession, attorney-agents could find themselves at the receiving end of
litigation, facing suspensions, fines, potential disbarment, and even the non-
fulfillment of contractual obligations by athletes who allege that their attorney-
agent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
A. The "Two-Hat" Theory: Attorneys Are Always Attorneys
Kenneth Shropshire and Timothy Davis, professors of business and law
respectively and experts on the agent industry, have stated that "[a]ttorney
status carries with it assumptions made by the public as to the training,
competence, ethics, and accountability of attomeys.""l 9 Indeed, one of the
selling points that attomey-agents can offer their clients is the fact that they are
attorneys. 120 Therefore, with the best interests of the public at heart, courts
have held that attorneys cannot shed their role as attorneys regardless of what
activity or type of professional employment they are undertaking, even when
that activity or type of employment is outside the practice of law. 121
In fact, the strong weight of authority has held that an attorney can never
wear multiple hats and is an attorney twenty-four hours a day, seven days a
week. 122 For example, the court in In re Pappas123 found that an attorney,
who was also a certified public accountant (CPA), was guilty of violating a
number of provisions in the state code of ethics governing attorney conduct
after he botched a business deal involving some of his clients.124 Although the
119. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 93.
120. Id.
121. See Doman, supra note 71, at 42-43.
122. See In re Dwight, 573 P.2d 481, 484 (Ariz. 1977) (holding that an attorney acting in his
capacity as an investment advisor was subject to ethical rules governing attorneys). The court held
that "[a]s long as a lawyer is engaged in the practice of law, he is bound by the ethical requirements
of that profession, and he may not defend his actions by contending that he was engaged in some
other kind of professional activity." Id.; see also Kelly v. State Bar of Cal., 808 P.2d 808, 812 (Cal.
1991) (holding that an attorney who helped a client purchase an airplane was an attorney even in that
capacity).
123. In re Pappas, 768 P.2d 1161 (Ariz. 1988).
124. Id. at 1168-69.
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attorney was acting as a financial advisor to the clients at the time and had
never represented them legally, the court refused to distinguish between the
defendant's role as an attorney and his role as a CPA. 125 The court reasoned:
The duties of a lawyer who also holds other professional licenses
cannot be circumscribed by the fine distinctions that we might
draw between the nature of the services performed under a
particular license. How is one to tell whether, in advising [his
clients] about the tax consequences of the condemnation
settlement, respondent acted as an accountant or a lawyer?...
More importantly, how is any client to know when a lawyer cum
accountant cum investment adviser removes one hat and puts on
another? 126
Several courts have specifically ruled that attomey-agents were acting as
attorneys in their role in representing professional athletes. 127 In Cuyahoga
County Bar Ass'n v. Glenn,128 the Supreme Court of Ohio held that an
attorney-agent had violated a state ethics code governing attorney conduct by
coaxing some $20,000 from his client's team, the Chicago Bears, without his
client's consent. 129 The court subsequently suspended the lawyer from the
practice of law for one year and ordered that he repay the money in full, plus
interest.130 In In re Horak,131 the court held that an attorney who was
representing the government of St. Vincent in its bid for the 1988 Olympic
Games was operating in the capacity of a lawyer and not a sports agent, and
was therefore subject to disciplinary proceedings for violating regulations
governing the misappropriation of client funds. 132 The court subsequently
disbarred the attorney. 133
Some have argued wrongly that the decision in Wright v. Bonds134 can be
used as precedent to show that some courts have held attorneys to be sports
agents and not attorneys. 135 In Wright, Barry Bonds' ex-agent sued Bonds for
125. Id. at 1166.
126. Id.
127. See SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 92-93; see also Bogad, supra note 8, at 1900.
128. Cuyahoga County Bar Ass'n v. Glenn, 649 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio 1995).
129. Id. at 1214-15.
130. Id.
131. In re Horak, 224 A.D.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
132. Id. at 52.
133. Id. at 53.
134. Wright v. Bonds, No. 96-55586, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 16811, at *2 (9th Cir. July 3,
1997).
135. Barner, supra note 11, at 523.
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breach of contract when Bonds defected to another sports management
finn. 136 Bonds countered that the agreement between him and Wright should
be null and void because Wright had never registered with the Major League
Baseball Players Union. 137 The court held that Wright should be held to the
standards of an agent even though he was an attorney. 138 The court reasoned
that Wright was not acting as a lawyer and was instead acting as an agent, as
evidenced by his sending of correspondence using his agency stationary rather
than that of his law firm and the fact that the contract between him and his
client specifically excluded legal work. 139
However, the holding in Wright likely will not disrupt the commonly held
belief that attorneys are always attorneys even when acting as agents. While
the court in Wright distinguished between attorneys acting as agents and those
acting as attorneys, the court was simply interpreting a California statute that
allowed attorneys to perform legal work for athletes without having to register
with the state's Labor Commissioner, a requirement for athlete agents.' 40 In
that regard, it was not directly on point with cases specifically deciding the
issue of whether attorneys are always attorneys. 14 1 Also, the multi-hat theory
expressed in In re Pappas suggests just how far the courts will stretch the
notion that attorneys are always attorneys.14 2 There is nothing to suggest that
an attorney who decides to be a sports agent will be treated any differently.
Therefore, courts will most likely hold that attorneys are attorneys even
when acting as sports agents and cannot shed their attorney hat and the often
burdensome body of law that governs them simply by acting in the capacity of
another profession. Since lawyers are not free from the law governing lawyer
conduct even as sports agents, one concern is that attorney-agents may be
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by performing typical sports
agent duties in states where they are not licensed and exposing themselves to
potential liability because of it.
B. Unauthorized Practice of Law
MRPC 5.5 states that "[a] lawyer may practice law only in a jurisdiction in





141. Compare id. with In re Horak, 224 A.D.2d 47 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) and Cuyahoga County
Bar Ass'n v. Glenn, 649 N.E.2d 1213 (Ohio 1995).
142. In re Pappas, 768 P.2d 1161, 1166 (Ariz. 1988).
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which the lawyer is authorized to practice."' 143 Most courts have agreed,
holding that an attorney who practices law in a state where he is not licensed
engages in the unauthorized practice of law in that state, 144 with the phrase
"unauthorized practice of law" being one that is defined broadly by courts to
include even the transactional and negotiation activities 145 viewed as
traditional practices of modern-day sports agents.146
Although many have called for reform in this area to loosen the restraints
on a lawyer's ability to practice extraterritorially, 147 the modern trend in the
law strictly limits a lawyer's ability to do so. 148 Most courts agree that an
attorney who is not licensed to practice law in a state cannot recover for legal
services performed in that state and may also be subject to additional penalties
at the court's discretion. 149 Therefore, given the fact that lawyers are always
lawyers, even when they are acting as sports agents, attorneys wishing to
become agents should be concerned about the unsettled nature of court
precedent defining what is and is not the unauthorized practice of law.
Further broadening the competitive gap between attorney and non-
attorney-agents is the fact that non-attorney-agents will likely not be held to
the same standard as their attorney counterparts by courts determining if the
agent has committed the unauthorized practice of law. 150 Specifically, courts
have been hesitant to uphold allegations that lay persons have engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and therefore, non-attorney-agents are not likely
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law by performing their duties as
agents. 151
In addition, the majority of courts have broadly construed the
unauthorized practice of law as extending beyond representation by a lawyer
143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.5, Comment [1] (2007).
144. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 3 (2000) (stating that the
unauthorized practice of law concerns any extraterritorial practice by a lawyer outside of the state in
which he is licensed, unless that representation is ancillary to a representation of a client within the
state he is licensed and unless the lawyer also obtains permission from the foreign state).
145. See Birbrower, Montalbano, Condon, & Frank, P.C. v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara County,
949 P.2d 1, 12-13 (Cal. 1998).
146. Job Profiles, http://www.jobprofiles.org/artsportsagent.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2007).
147. Carol A. Needham, Negotiating Multi-State Transactions: Reflections on Prohibiting the
Unauthorized Practice of Law, 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 113, 133 (1993).
148. See In re Application of Jackman , 761 A.2d 1103, 1109 (N.J. 2000) (emphasizing the
decision reached by the court in Birbrower, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998)).
149. C.D. Sumner, Annotation, Right of Attorney Admitted in One State to Recover
Compensation for Services Rendered in Another State Where He Was Not Admitted to the Bar, 11
A.L.R.3D 907, §2 (2006).
150. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 4, Cmt. c (2006).
151. See id.
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in court to also include transactional practice. 152 In Birbrower, Montalbano,
Condon, & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court,153 the court held that a group of
New York attorneys were engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when
they counseled a California client on strategy leading up to an arbitration
proceeding over the terms of a contract. 154  The court held that both
representing the client in arbitration and the attorneys' advice to the client not
to settle constituted the unauthorized practice of law. 155 The New Jersey
Supreme Court affirmed the holding in Birbrower.156 The court held that
"[o]ne is engaged in the practice of law whenever legal knowledge, training,
skill, and ability are required."' 157 Both courts refused to allow the attorneys to
recover for their services.' 58
Courts have interpreted the phrase "unauthorized practice of law" as
including activities by a lawyer in a state where he is not licensed even when
the lawyer does not physically enter the state. 159 The Birbrower court held
that even though the New York attorneys conducted a portion of their work
from their New York offices, they were precluded from recovering to the
extent that their services affected a California client. 160 The court opined that
while "[p]hysical presence [in the state] is one factor [it] may consider in
deciding whether the unlicensed lawyer has [engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law] . . . it is by no means exclusive."' 16 1 The court overturned a
California appeals court, which only a year prior held that a Colorado lawyer
could recover fees for the portion of services rendered from his licensed
state. 162
While there are no cases specifically interpreting whether an attorney-
agent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, the precedent discussed
suggests that the everyday practices of attorney-agents may not be protected
152. See Jackman, 761 A.2d at 1109.
153. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 1.
154. See id. at 12-13.
155. See id.
156. Jackman, 761 A.2d at 1106 (holding that an unlicensed associate handling merger and
acquisition transactions had engaged in the unauthorized practice of law).
157. Id.; see also In re Peterson, 163 B.R. 665, 674-76 (Conn. 1994) (holding that a bankruptcy
attorney who was not licensed in the state of Connecticut could not recover for services, some of
which included basic negotiation).
158. Compare Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 13 with Jacknan, 761 A.2d at 1109-10.
159. Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 6.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 5.
162. Estate of Condon, 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 922, 928 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that physical
presence of the attorney in the non-licensed state was necessary to bar recovery).
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from scrutiny. Specifically, the broad construction of unauthorized practice of
law by Birbrower and others to include out-of-court activities like negotiation
and dispute resolution techniques should be troubling to lawyer-agents
because these services are typical, everyday agent activities. 163 Also, while
negotiation is a staple function of athlete agents in all sports, arbitration
advocacy is an additional function performed by Major League Baseball
agents, 164 and therefore, should create additional concern for lawyer-agents
representing players in that sport. Therefore, the inseparable fusion of dispute
resolution techniques and professional sports, combined with the suggestion in
Birbrower that dispute resolution constitutes the practice of law, should
concern lawyer-agents who are not licensed to practice law in jurisdictions
where they are negotiating and arbitrating on behalf of their athletes.
Even attorney-agents conducting business from their home offices in the
state where they are licensed may not be protected. 165  The holding in
Birbrower suggests that attorney-agents may be engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law even when conducting business by phone, fax, or otherwise
within the state in which they are licensed because physical presence in the
non-licensed state is not required.166 Therefore, it is at best unclear whether
this problem can be avoided by setting up a home office in the state where the
attorney is licensed and conducting business from that state by electronic
means.
Some may argue, however, that all of this is irrelevant and that athletes do
not go looking to poach attorney-agents for free services, entering into
agreements with them only to later opt out of their promises and stop payment
through an unauthorized-practice-of-law claim. However, disagreements
between athletes and their agents over money do occur, 167 and when they do,
it is not unrealistic to assume that the athlete would use any and all available
resources to prevent payment to that agent, including a claim that the agent
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Therefore, there should be at
least some concern among attorney-agents that their status as attorneys could
163. See RUXIN, supra note 20, at 9-10.
164. See ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY AND SALARY
ARBITRATION 151 (2000).
165. See Birbrower, 949 P.2d at 5-6.
166 See id.
167. See Zinn v. Parrish, 644 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1981). Leo Zinn was a prominent sports agent in
the 1970s who negotiated a series of contracts with the Cincinnati Bengals for his client Lemar
Parrish. Id. at 361. Before Zinn could collect for his services, Parrish terminated the relationship and
refused payment. Id. at 362; see also Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542, 547-49 (E.D.
Mich. 1984) (holding that an athlete-plaintiff was correct in asserting that his agent had a conflict of
interest, thereby entitling the athlete to damages).
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lead to problems down the road.
However, the state of the industry suggests that many lawyer-agents are
not concerned, 168 and many in the industry even boast of the special niche
services that their multifunctional law firm can offer clients, from contract
negotiation to tax and estate planning. 169 A court only needs to look at the
web sites of these law firms as evidence that what is truly being offered is a
bundle of legal services, not simply the work of a typical sports agent.170 But
even if these law firms could show that the services they perform are typical of
sports agents and not limited to attorneys, the holding in Birbrower and other
cases suggests that even attorneys performing agent services may very well be
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
In the age of multi-state negotiations for athletes who are sponsored by
multiple companies and who may play for various teams throughout their
careers, many of which may not be located in the state where the attorney-
agent is licensed, becoming an agent is risky business for attorneys wishing to
keep their licenses and their money. Also, given the dog-eat-dog nature of the
agent industry, where conflicts over athletes are just part of a day's work, it is
a very real possibility that a rival agent will encourage an athlete to allege his
attorney-agent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, thus voiding any
contractual obligations owed to that attorney by the athlete. The unauthorized
practice of law defense is therefore a very real concern.
IV. BRIDGING THE COMPETITIVE GAP BETWEEN LAWYER AND NON-
LAWYER-AGENTS: A BIRD'S-EYE VIEW
The hyper-competitive and often unethical state of the agent industry
has already caused some lawyers to leave the profession, despite their
qualifications. 17 1 Len Elmore, ESPN basketball analyst and lawyer with
LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene, & MacRae in New York,' 72 summarized his
experience as an agent as follows:
In all candor what chased me from the [agent] industry was the
shrinking revenue caused by wage scaling and my unwillingness
to pay a young kid to become my client. I simply did not desire,
168. See Lynch, Gilardi, & Grummer, Sports Law and Athlete Representation,
http://www.Igglaw.com/pa-sports.html (last visited Sept. 24, 2007); see also Williams & Connolly,
LLP, Sports, http://www.wc.com/practice.cfin?practice id=130 (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
169. See Williams & Connolly, supra note 168.
170. Id.
171. See SHROPSHIRE& DAVIS, supra note 3, at 60.
172. LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene, & MacRae Lawyer Directory, http://www.llgm.com/
leonardelmore/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2007).
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nor could I afford, to 'stoop to conquer.' Betrayal by client
family members . . . also had negative impact. Thus, I was left
with a harsh business reality. It was time to fold them and move
on. 173
Elmore's distaste for the industry highlights a greater concern than the
industry's cost-to-value proposition. If attorneys are already discouraged by
their inability to compete for athletes, the restrictive nature of the law
governing lawyers could only add a further disincentive to qualified attorneys
wishing to enter the profession. And there is little doubt that the agent
industry, despite the progressive efforts by the NCAA, Congress, and the
states would benefit greatly from well-trained, competent lawyers qualified to
represent athletes. 174 The Ricky Williams fiasco and other incidents of
incompetence by agents make this apparent. 175 Ironically, however, ethical
attorneys may currently be the only attorneys discouraged by their
professional ethos from entering the agent industry.
While the current state of the law governing lawyers may seem ominous to
ethical attorneys concerned about their licenses and reputations, that law is not
without the ability to change. The most practical solution that would
seemingly bridge the competitive gap between lawyer and non-lawyer-agents
would be a top-down approach, beginning internally with the ABA and
trickling down to individual state bars, to rethink and modify the policy
surrounding MRPC 5.5 and other rules as they relate to an attorney's
participation in other professions. Doing so likely provides the best chance of
bridging the competitive gap between attorney and non-attorney-agents.
Modifying the policy surrounding the law governing lawyers likely does
not require much, if any, restructuring of the MRPC or the restatements. The
solution may be as simple as amending ABA policy through an addendum
letter or through some other written amendment sent individually to each state
bar association, combined with an ongoing dialogue with those associations
and with local and federal judges. The goal would be to have all states, as
well as state and federal courts, begin to modify their existing policies to the
extent that lawyers engaged in other professions, while still governed by the
173. SHROPSHIRE & DAVIS, supra note 3, at 60 (quoting Len Elmore, Turn Out the Lights,
Agents' Party Is Over, SPORTS Bus. J., July 9, 2001, at 54).
174. See Bob George, Poston Brothers Becoming NFL Laughingstock, Mar. 28, 2004,
http://www.patsfans.com/bob/display-story.php?storyid=2418.
175. NFLPA Suspends Agent Poston for Two Years, NFL.COM, July 28, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2530936. In 2006, NFL Agent Carl Poston was
suspended for two years by the NFLPA for leaving $6.5 million in bonus money on the table when
negotiating LaVar Arrington's contract with the Washington Redskins. Id. Arrngton was forced to
buy his way out of the deal, an expenditure of $4.4 million. Id.
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MRPC, should be able to engage in conduct that is reasonably expected of
practitioners in those professions without the fear of reprimand.
Absent some modification to the existing structure of the law governing
lawyers, ethical attorneys wishing to become sports agents, and those already
in the business, may find it increasingly difficult to compete with their non-
attorney counterparts on a level playing field. The unfortunate consequence
will be the disenfranchisement of lawyers wishing to enter the profession-
lawyers who would otherwise bring polished contract negotiating skills and
zealous advocacy to the bargaining table.
V. CONCLUSION
Jerry Maguire would no doubt find being a present-day attorney-agent
difficult if not impossible, and unfortunately, may be forced to leave the
profession, contract expertise and spotless personal ethics in tow. While
SPARTA takes a recognized step towards regulating agent conduct in
recruiting college athletes, it only marginally closes the gap between attorney
and non-attorney-agents. The looming threat of being disbarred or otherwise
sanctioned for violating any one of numerous Model Rules applied to
attorneys as agents may itself prove effective in keeping ethical, hard-working
attorneys out of the business. Combined with the broad interpretation courts
have applied to the unauthorized practice of law, these forces may be enough
to discourage some of the best and brightest contract negotiators, namely
lawyers, from ever becoming agents in the first place.
However, the purpose of this article was not to paint an ominous picture of
the athlete agent business or to prevent otherwise qualified attorneys from
trying their hand in the industry. The reality is that lawyers become agents all
the time, and some of the best agents in the field are lawyers. Rather, the idea
was to raise what is a very real concern affecting attorney-agents so that
attorneys wishing to become agents can take precautions to protect their
money, to protect their good names, and most importantly, to protect their
licenses.
It is very possible that the day may soon arrive when the law governing
lawyers begins to modernize, allowing attorneys to wear two hats instead of
one. Given the increasingly demanding agent certification requirements being
implemented by professional sports leagues and their unions, and given the
need for good lawyers in the industry, it may only be a matter of time before
the courts take a more modern, less restrictive look at what it means to be an
attorney, allowing lawyers to branch out into other professions without the
fear that just being a lawyer will place them at a competitive disadvantage.
Until then, the Jerry Maguires of the world should not be altogether
[Vol. 18:1
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discouraged from entering the business, but should at least take a more
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